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Introduction
To assess policy effectiveness and to determine
the accuracy of ex-ante predictions, public agencies
increasingly have begun to perform ex-poste
evaluations. In the current environment that is
characterized by funding limitations, stringent
accountability requirements, and higher user
expectations, such evaluations are considered critical
because the results are useful to refine decisionmaking processes. The motivation for ex-poste
evaluation is rooted in the fact that public agencies
seek to maximize service to facility users and the
community, and to provide facility level-of-service in
a cost-effective manner. In the context of highway
transportation, the extent to which these overall goals
are achieved are assessed on scales of performance
measures such as: project cost, reduction of travel
time, increase in travel time reliability, improvement
of air quality, reduced number of crashes, increased
economic development, etc. Agency officials require
knowledge of the true cost and benefits of agency
actions in terms of these performance measures. That
way, appropriate lessons could be learned and the
decision-making processes could be enhanced.

A specific case in point is that involving
project costs. INDOT is increasingly concerned
about the reliability of cost estimates of its
projects. Cost overruns associated with large
scale and high visibility transportation projects
can generate public relations problems for the
agency. With increased media coverage of cost
overrun, questions have arisen about the ability of
highway agencies to forecast costs accurately.
What is needed, therefore, is a methodology
to help the planners and decision-makers at
INDOT to predict cost overruns, monitor and
evaluate the cost estimates prepared during the
project development process (PDP), so as to
quantify the efficiency of the cost estimation
processes. Also, there is a need to develop a
methodological framework that can be used by
highway agencies to identify projects that are
susceptible to high cost overrun and underrun, so
that appropriate proactive decisions (such as
adjusting the contingency amounts) can be made
to ameliorate the cost overrun problem.

Findings
The study product is a methodology for
identifying contracts that are likely to experience
cost overrun at different stages of the project
development process. The methodology analyzes
escalation patterns of cost estimates across the
stages of project development. To facilitate
implementation of the methodology, models
were developed to identify contracts that are
likely to experience cost overrun in Indiana.
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The factors that were found to affect the
probability and magnitude of cost overrun in
Indiana included: contract work category, size,
geographic location, highway functional class,
route type, NHS status, contract classification,
time duration between final design completion
and project proposal, time duration between
letting and project proposal, percentage
difference between design estimate and proposed
cost, percentage difference between letting and
proposed cost, the probability of a contract type
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to exhibit a particular escalation pattern, and the
variability in the probability to exhibit a
particular escalation pattern.
For expansion (capacity addition) and
bridge contracts, the probability of cost overrun
increased with increase in contract size. For
pavement projects, large contracts (exceeding $5
million) were found to be more likely to
experience a cost underrun compared to small
contracts. Pavement contracts in urban areas
were found to be more likely to experience cost
overrun compared to their rural counterparts. For
expansion and bridge contract cost overrun, no
significant difference in cost overrun likelihood
was found between urban and rural areas.
Specifically, expansion and pavement contracts

on Non-NHS highways were found to be more
likely to experience cost overrun, compared to
such contracts on NHS highways. Bridge
contracts on Interstates were more likely to
experience cost overrun compared to NonInterstates.
It was found that as the time duration
between project proposal and design completion
increased, the tendency of a contract to
experience cost overrun increased. Longer time
spans between project proposal and letting were
also found to increase the probability of cost
overrun. In addition, the risk of occurrence of a
particular escalation pattern was found to
influence the probability of cost overrun.

Implementation
A software tool was developed on the
basis of the analytical relationships. This tool
can be used to compare contracts in Indiana and
to determine which are likely to follow a given
escalation patterns or incur high cost overruns at
the planning, design, and letting stages.
Specifically, this tool can be used by INDOT to
estimate the probability and magnitude of a cost
overrun for a contract on the basis of its
characteristics. The estimated probability and
magnitude of cost overrun can be compared
across a set of contracts, and the ones that are
more likely to experience cost overrun can be
identified. Implementing the study product is
expected to enhance monitoring of project costs
at INDOT. This is important at the current time

as the agency strives to make its operations more
transparent. By providing planners and decisionmakers with an estimate of the expected cost
overrun, such personnel will be in a better
position to give advice on adjustments to project
contingency amounts.
A core group of persons at INDOT
under advisement of FHWA is recommended for
the project implementation. This group, to be
represented by INDOT’s Central Office and
District planning divisions and research and
development office, will have as its principal
mission,
the
advancement
and
institutionalization of the most practicable
methods outlined in the research report.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Overall Background
Highway agencies around the world are increasingly concerned about the reliability of cost estimates of
projects within their jurisdiction. Cost overruns associated with large scale and high visibility transportation
projects have received global attention and criticism. With increased media coverage of cost overrun,
questions have arisen about the ability of highway agencies to forecast costs accurately. The cost overrun
associated with the Bay Bridge replacement in San Francisco, California (ENR, 2001), the cost and time
overrun associated with the Central Artery/Tunnel project in Boston (ENR, 2002(a); Murphy, 2002), and
the 180% cost overrun associated with the Springfield Interchange project in Northern Virginia (ENR,
2002(b)) constitute just a few of the numerous articles that have received widespread attention from the
public and from governments. According to an article in the Engineering News Record (ENR, 2002(c)), the
final cost of most mega-projects can be significantly higher than the cost projections during the planning
and development phases of the projects.
The issue of cost overrun has attracted attention of several federal agencies such as the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) and the United States General Accounting Office (GAO, 2003).
FHWA’s National Highway Institute developed a new course to promote the importance of accuracy in
construction cost estimation by measuring the risk and uncertainty in cost estimation using the principles of
deterministic and probabilistic cost estimation (FHWA, 2008).
A hearing of the Transportation Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee of the
United States Congress focused on the issue of infrastructure project costs. It identified the need to improve
the quality of the initial cost estimates and to monitor the overall cost estimation process of major highway
and bridge projects. The hearing also pointed out that information on the amount and reasons for cost
overrun is generally unavailable, as this information is neither tracked by the FHWA or by state highway
agencies (Schexnayder et al., 2003).

1.2. Consequences of Inaccurate Cost Estimation
As billions of dollars continue to be invested in the development of highway infrastructure, the issue of the
accuracy of construction cost estimates remains a serious concern among highway agencies. Construction
cost estimates prepared during the project development process play an important role in the delivery of
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efficient highway programs (Sinha and Labi, 2007). The selection of a transportation alternative over others
is often influenced by decision-making criteria such as the cost-effectiveness factor, net present value, and
benefit-to-cost ratio, which in turn are heavily hinged on the reliability of project cost estimates. An
inaccurate cost estimate may result in the selection of a less cost-effective alternative, thereby having an
adverse impact on the value of the investment. Given the volume of investment made on transportation
infrastructure, a less than optimal return from projects can have a large cumulative adverse impact on the
efficiency of the overall transportation system.
Furthermore, inaccurate estimation of construction cost of a project can jeopardize the entire
transportation improvement program of a highway agency. For example, if the final construction cost of a
project exceeds the forecast construction cost (even with contingencies), funds are diverted from other
programmed projects in the transportation improvement program, resulting in a delay in the
implementation of these projects. When programmed projects fail to get implemented at the scheduled
optimal time for this reason, the programming schedule of the agency is disrupted and the consequences of
a less-than-desired transportation system is borne both by the highway agencies and the users.

1.3. Terminology
In this study, cost overrun is calculated as the percentage difference between the final construction cost and
the estimate of the construction cost that is prepared at any given stage of project development. A positive
percentage difference indicates that final construction cost is more than the cost estimate, representing cost
overrun; a negative percentage difference indicates that final construction cost is less than the cost estimate,
which is termed a cost underrun. Different estimates of construction cost are prepared at the different stages
of project development. Thus, cost overrun can be estimated with respect to the estimate at any given stage
(defined later in Chapter 3).

1.4. Goals and Objectives
On the basis of the study background, the goals of this study are as follows:
a)

To help the planners and decision-makers at highway agencies to evaluate the cost estimates
prepared during the project development process (PDP), so as to quantify the efficiency of the
process within their respective jurisdictions;

b) To develop a methodological framework that can be used by highway agencies to identify projects
that are susceptible to high cost overrun and underrun, so that relevant decisions (such as setting
an appropriate contingency amount) can be made when planning such projects.
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The specific objectives associated with these goals are as follows:
a)

To assess the adequacy of methodologies and techniques that are used for the estimation of
construction costs at various stages of project development by analyzing data on differences
between the final cost and the cost estimated at each stage, using data on past projects;

b) To analyze the trends in cost overrun or underrun so that factors that are likely to influence the
probability and magnitude of cost difference can be identified;
c)

To develop risk-based econometric models that describe the relationship between probability of
cost overrun / underrun and contract-specific factors such as: work type, area type (urban vs.
rural), geographic location, NHS Status, highway functional class, and project size;

d) Using the developed models to propose a framework on the basis of that can be used to identify
contracts likely to experience high cost overrun and underrun;
e)

To develop a software tool that implements the framework, for forecasting cost overrun likelihood
of projects in the Indiana Statewide Transportation Improvement Program (INSTIP).

1.5. Organization of The Report
The report is organized into seven chapters. In Chapter 1, the background, terminology, motivation, goals
and objectives of the study are outlined. Chapter 2 presents a review of literature on the general subject of
ex post facto evaluation, while Chapter 3 provides an overview of the state of practice and preliminary
issues in ex post facto evaluation with specific focus on highway construction cost estimates. Cost
estimates prepared at each stage of the project development process are discussed. Studies that have been
conducted to determine the accuracy of these estimates and the factors affecting their inaccuracy are also
discussed.
Chapter 4 presents the proposed methodology to (a) determine cost overrun / underrun associated
with historical contracts and (b) to study the associated trends by contract specific factors. A methodology
is also proposed to develop risk-based econometric models to identify the factors that significantly
influence the accuracy of cost estimates.
Chapter 5 analyzes the cost differences associated with historical highway contracts in Indiana. In
this chapter, the methodology presented in Chapter 4 is used to analyze the trends during project
development. Risk-based econometric models are presented in Chapter 6, while Chapter 7 provides the
software tool and demonstrates its application to INDOT projects. Chapter 8 summarizes the findings and
conclusions of the study and presents recommendations for future work.
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CHAPTER 2.

LITERATURE REVIEW OF EX-POSTE EVALUATION STUDIES
2.1. Introduction

To assess policy effectiveness and to determine the accuracy of ex ante predictions, public agencies
increasingly have begun to perform ex post facto (or post-audit) evaluations. In the current environment
that is characterized by funding limitations, stringent accountability requirements, and higher user
expectations, such evaluations at public agencies, foreign governments, donor agencies, and global
development banks are considered critical because the results are useful to refine decision-making
processes. The motivation for ex post facto evaluation is rooted in the fact that public agencies seek to
maximize service to facility users and the community, and to provide facility level-of-service in a costeffective manner. In the context of highway transportation, the extent to which these overall goals are
achieved are assessed on scales of performance measures such as: reduction of travel time, increase in
travel time reliability, improvement of air quality, reduced number of crashes, increased economic
development, etc. Agency officials require knowledge of the true cost and benefits (effectiveness) of
agency actions in terms of these performance measures. That way, appropriate lessons could be learned and
the decision-making processes could be enhanced. This chapter discusses past experiences of ex post facto
evaluations in different sectors, modes of transportation, and countries. Also the chapter identifies
performance measures, approaches, and techniques for ex post facto evaluation.

2.2. Sectors, Performance Measures, and Techniques
Ex post facto evaluations are vital in both public and private sectors, and are used in all sectors of the
economy (industrial, commercial, transportation agricultural, health, etc.). In the transportation sector,
recent ex post facto analyses have primarily focused on rail and highway investments. In the case of rail
investments, the relatively long service lives and high capital costs of rail asset construction and
preservation, coupled with the predominantly private sector participation and profit motivation in the rail
mode, necessitates the formulation of prudent policy decisions. Ex post facto studies of investments in the
rail mode have stressed the need for appropriate design and maintenance decisions that yield cost-effective
management of such assets over their entire service lives (Zoeterman, 2004).
The literature review conducted as part of the present study suggested that project economic
analyses at the planning phase of project development generally tend to be overly optimistic. This could be
due a variety of reasons such as inherent inaccuracies in the input variables for economic analysis, incorrect
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long-term forecasts of travel demand, or probably a desire to inflate benefit expectations so as to receive
funding for a project. In any case, it is critical that cost estimates are constantly verified. In the rail
industry, for example, forecasts of freight growth rates and overall size have been found to be frequently
overestimated leading to lower-than-expected revenues even though rail’s freight market share, compared
to other modes, is generally stable (Anguera, 2005). Similarly, ex post facto evaluations show that the rate
of return are not always the same as that expected during forecasting (Israel, 1972).
In the water resources sector, ex post facto analyses are commonplace and a number of such
studies in that field have focused on social impacts (Andrews et al., 1974), environmental impacts
(Bokhari, 1975; Ciliberti, 1980; Jingxun et al., 1991), and economic impacts (Haveman, 1972; Duckstein,
1975; Edwards and Salt, 1993; Feeney, 1995), or a combination of these and other performance measures
(Grillenzoni et al., 1994). The cost and effectiveness of flood control projects and other
natural/technological disaster responses are also commonly assessed through ex post facto studies
(Galloway, 1980; Fischl, 1993; Cohen, 1995; Gruntfest, 1997). Wescoat and Halvorson (2000) compiled
several ex post facto evaluations relating specifically to dams and other water-related projects (Wescoat,
2000).
In the context of highway transportation in particular, the phenomenon where an investment yields
lower revenue and incurs higher construction costs than originally estimated, appears to be longstanding
and prevalent. In recent years, however, there is encouraging statistical evidence that the growth of cost
overruns has slowed (Pickrell, 1990; Flyvberg et al., 2002; Flyvberg et al., 2003; Dantata et al., 2006).
This may be partially attributable to the adoption of policies of transparency/accountability, or the
application of project cost prediction models.
As discussed in greater detail in Section 3.4.1, state transportation agencies have recently begun to
develop cost prediction models relying on historical construction costs (i.e., similar project costs or specific
line item unit costs). This arose out of explicit or implicit ex post facto evaluations at transportation
agencies that identified the need for enhanced assessment of project costs at the planning stage. Virginia
DOT developed an Excel spreadsheet entitled Project Cost Estimation System (PCES) to predict roadway
and bridge construction costs. Specializing in Interstate/highway right-of-way and utility cost estimation,
PCES requires basic inputs such as roadway dimensions, features, traffic patterns, and perceived project
complexity, and has been found to be accurate within 22% (Kyte et al., 2004). The Maryland State
Highway Administration similarly uses a spreadsheet to predict early- and late-stage construction costs
based on historical unit costs; the Florida DOT also predicts costs using historical data, but on a more
aggregate scale; the Delaware DOT developed a detailed form to list all project costs while allowing for
expert opinion of engineers regarding reasons for cost escalation; and Wisconsin DOT advertises project
benefits, risk factors, and a range of cost probabilities (Kyte et al., 2004). To address highway agencies’
need for a versatile cost estimation software, Earth Tech, Inc. developed TRACER, which predicts costs
with minimal information and also allows for “what-if” scenarios to be simulated.
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Besides construction delivery costs, ex post facto evaluation has been carried out for other
performance measures to assess highway operational policies, planning, and economic impacts/benefits.
Such studies include those that recently explored the economic effectiveness of safety improvements
(Andreassen, 1992; Commonwealth of Australia, 2007; Yannis et al., 2008), impacts of congestion
management (Van der Loop, 2000; Evan, 2007), air quality enhancements (Farrell et al., 1998), and transit
investments (Nakamura et al., 1989). Also for the highway mode, a number of studies have examined the
differences in predicted investment outcomes using before and after analyses, in terms of benefit-cost and
net-present value that utilized data on estimated and actual: travel time savings, construction costs, traffic
growth, traffic composition, accident rates, average accident costs, length of evaluation period, discount
rate, and amount of diverted traffic (Commonwealth of Australia, 2007). In 2001, the United Kingdom
Highways Agency introduced Post Opening Project Evaluation (POPE) to evaluate post-implementation
impacts of major road projects; the POPE program has focused on before and after estimates of costs and
benefits in terms of traffic volumes, travel times, and number of accidents (Oxera Consulting Ltd., 2005).
In the future, the Highways Agency’s goal is to expand ex post facto studies to address environmental
impacts (Oxera Consulting Ltd., 2005). Also, with explicit recognition of the fact that volatile assumptions
made at the planning stage can significantly impact the effectiveness of planning decisions, Khisty (1981),
Niemeier and Beard (1993), Guers and van Wee (2006), and McNeil and Mizusawa (2008) conducted ex
post facto analyses to ascertain whether their planning methods yielded accurate assessments of actual
outcomes of projects, and used a variety of tools including GIS, planning software, land use allocation
methods, urban development philosophy, and asset management concepts.
Furthermore, another common performance measure used in ex post facto evaluation of highway
investments is economic development (Weisbrod et al., 2001; Leong et al., 2003; Rychnowski et al., 2003;
Weiss and Figura, 2004).

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) encourages ex post facto

analysis, primarily for this purpose (FHWA, 2009). In 2000, the U.S. Congress directed the FHWA to
conduct the Economic Development Highways Initiative; this initiative combined the knowledge and
experience of over 200 local, state, and regional officials in order to determine realistic expectations for
economic development based on local economic conditions (Weiss and Figura, 2004).
European and Asian governments have expanded the use of ex post facto analysis beyond public
works. Several studies have evaluated a variety of topics including policies relating to carbon dioxide and
air pollution emissions (APREC, undated; Millock and Nauges, 2006), financial market effects from trade
and mergers (Heckman et al., 1999; Fletcher, 2005; Isik-Dikmelik, 2006; Boumemellassa and Valin, 2008),
urban development (Burgess and Arup, 2003; Gleave, 2008), social investments (European Social Fund,
2009) and even research policies in general (Aho et al., 2008). A list of other similar European studies is
provided by the Center for Strategy and Evaluation Services (CSES, 2009). Most notably, researchers in
France and Japan have developed refined procedures for conducting ex post facto evaluations. In Japan,
these evaluations are recommended to be updated annually; in France, such evaluations are recommended
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to be conducted between three and five years after completion of a project (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan, 2000; Jeannesson et al., 2007).
Other than public agencies, the main contributors to the literature on ex post facto studies are the
development banks. The goal of global development organizations, such as the World Bank, Asian
Development Bank, KfW Entwicklungsbank, and the Overseas Development Administration, is to
essentially provide the most “good” for their limited resources. Such organizations have performed ex post
facto evaluations to assess the effectiveness of investments with regards to economic development, antipoverty programs, fighting HIV/Aids, improving water resources/sanitation, and disaster relief (Asian
Development Bank, 1990; Cairncross, 2002; Eriksen and Bhatti, 1993; Dayton, 1998; Chen and Ravllion,
2003). Lists of ex post facto reports for Kfw Entwicklungsbank and Overseas Development projects are
provided by at Entwicklungsbank (2009) and Overseas Development Administration (1984). World Bank
ex post facto studies are typically conducted every five to eight years (Gunnerson, 1989).
To conduct an ex post facto evaluation, data collection, data analysis, social studies, model
calculations, simulation, and literature searches are typically required (Institut National de Recherche sur le
Transports et Leur Securite, 1997).
While ex post facto studies are usually conducted at the end of a project, recently McNeil and
Mizusawa (2008) suggested an adaptive approach combining ex post facto and ex ante analyses (Figure
2.1).

Ex Post
Facto

Ex Ante

Before and After

With and Without

With and Without

Implementation

Implementation

Implementation

Figure 2.1. Ex post facto and Ex ante Approaches (McNeil and Mizusawa, 2008)
The ‘with and without’ ex post facto approach relies on a combination of collecting time-series data and on
simulation analysis, allowing the agency to immediately switch investment strategies once a shift in
effectiveness becomes apparent. The responsive nature of this analysis helps reduce heterogeneity; ex post
facto analyses are susceptible to external influences that make the underlying cause behind a project’s
success or failure difficult to determine (McNeil and Mizusawa, 2008). Also, statistical or econometric
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models require a significant amount of data that may not be available. However, if sufficiently validated,
these models can improve decision-making.
2.3. Chapter Summary
Overall, ex post facto analysis has proven worthwhile because it allows for the full assessment of the cost
and effectiveness of a variety of policies and decisions in a wide range of sectors including transportation.
Ex post facto studies have helped agencies set more realistic expectations in terms of their performance
measures regarding investment costs and benefits. In the current era of limited funding and increased
scrutiny of taxpayer-funded investments, ex post facto analyses are particularly important in helping to
reduce the frequency and size of cost overruns. Thus, the conduction of regular ex post facto studies has
been highly recommended at public agencies. The immediate recognition of trend reversal using an
intermediate ex post facto analysis approach (i.e., continuously updated regression models) allows for the
reduction of the influence of external effects. In the field of transportation, ex post facto analysis is in a
nascent stage of development and is not yet fully applied to all projects in this sector. A reason for the
limited use of ex post facto studies is the high cost of conducting such studies and the limitation of data
availability. At the Indiana Department of Transportation, severe data limitations have precluded the
conduction of ex post facto evaluations. However, as recent research has shown, lessons to be learned from
such studies can lead to enhanced levels of service for all performance measures and reduction in agency
costs in the long-term. On the basis of lessons learned from the literature review and discussed in this
chapter, the subsequent chapters present and demonstrate a framework for ex post facto evaluation of
Indiana highway project costs.
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CHAPTER 3.

HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION COST ESTIMATION

3.1. Introduction
A highway project can be described as a construction, maintenance or repair activity undertaken at a
specific geographic location to address a highway transportation infrastructure need or requirement. In the
United States, state departments of transportation are responsible for initiating and supervising the planning
and development of their highway infrastructure projects. The planning, design and development of a
project can span between two to ten years or more depending upon the project size and complexity. During
this period, several estimates of the initial capital cost of the project are prepared. This chapter presents a
detailed account of the various activities that are undertaken during the planning and development phase
with particular focus on the estimation of construction costs and the methods and techniques used for their
preparation.

3.2. Project Development Process (PDP) Overview
At most highway agencies, the development of a project starts with the conceptualization of the project
need and scope and ends with the letting of the project for construction. As shown in Figure 3.1, this period
can be divided into six stages: (a) Planning, (b) Programming and Preliminary Design, (c) Final Design, (d)
Advertisement and Contract Preparation, (e) Letting, and (f) Construction. At the conceptual planning
stage, a feasibility study is undertaken to justify the project and to define the project scope, scale,
complexity, alternatives, and environmental and community impacts. The opinions of the public and other
stakeholders are taken into consideration at this stage. A preliminary estimate of the cost is prepared. Then
based upon all the above factors, the project is forwarded in the form of a formal proposal to the next stage,
rejected, or postponed for submission at a later date. Conceptual planning of a project is followed by its
inclusion in the network programming, and then preliminary design of the project (design stage). In
programming, all proposed projects in the network (i.e., the entire state) are reviewed, evaluated and
selected for inclusion in the state’s transportation improvement program. The proposed projects are ranked
in the order of their importance, relevance, need, cost-effectiveness, and their ability to meet the highway
agency’s goals and objectives within the specified budget constraints.
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Transportation Needs or Market Demand Needs or Perceived Needs or
Infrastructure Deficiencies

Stage 1: Planning
Conceptual Planning and Feasibility Study, Definition of Project Objectives Scope,
Complexity, Alternatives, Consider Environmental Factors, Interagency
conditions, Public Opinion

Stage 2: Programming and Preliminary Design (Post Programming)
Conduct Environmental Analysis, Public Hearings
Obtain funding authorization, Environmental Clearance
Determine Right of Way Impact, Economic and Financial Feasibility, design
criteria and parameters, utility locations and drainage, preliminary design plans
such as alternative selection, geometric specifications and layouts

Stage 3: Final Design and Detailed Engineering
Construction Plans and Specifications, Right of Way Acquisition, Development of
Detailed Construction Plans, Specifications and Estimated (PS & E), Finalize
Pavement and Bridge Design, Traffic Control Plans, Utility Drawings, hydraulic
studies/drainage design

Stage 5: Advertisement Preparation Stage
Projects combined to form Contracts, Preparation for Contract Bidding
Documents, and Advertise for Bids, Holding Pre‐Bid Conference, Receive and
Analyze Bids

Proposed Cost

Engineer’s
Assessment

Final Design

Engineer’s
Estimate

Stage 6: Letting Stage
Contracts Awarded to Consultants / Contractors for Construction if Bid Amounts
are not more than a specific set percentage of Engineer’s Estimate.

Letting Cost
(Contract Award
Amount)

Stage 7: Construction Stage
Construction and Implementation of Developed Plans, Conduct Inspection and
Materials Testing, Traffic Detours, Change Orders, Time delays in Construction,
Unforeseen Site Conditions, Adverse Weather Conditions

Final Cost
(Incurred After
Construction)

Figure 3.1: Stages of the Project Development Process
A preliminary engineering design is prepared for the project once it has been included into the
state’s transportation improvement program. By the end of the preliminary design phase, in most cases, the
scope of the project becomes clear and the project is ready for the development of a detailed engineering
design. This marks the beginning of the design stage where a blueprint for construction is prepared and the
individual items and construction plans are finalized. The final design stage is followed by the project
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advertisement for letting. Projects at the same location or involving the same type of work are often lumped
together to form a “contract” for advertisement.
The project development process described above reflects the general practice only, specific
details vary across state highway agencies where the process may comprise more or fewer stages,
depending upon the type of project and the time available to plan and prepare the project (Hendrickson and
Au, 1998). In addition to differences in the structure of the project development process, type of activities,
and the methodologies used, the process of allocation of the work during the project development process
can also vary across agencies. Most agencies retain direct control of the work that is carried out at the
planning and programming stages. Some agencies hire the services of planners, consultants, and financial
experts outside the agency at various stages of project development particularly for complex projects.
Again, the exact nature of the state of practice differs between agencies and is influenced by the type,
scope, and complexity of project.

3.3. Construction Cost Estimation
The estimation of highway project cost involves the use of engineering judgment, experience, and scientific
principles and techniques to determine the value of the goods and services that are purchased for
implementation of the project. The life-cycle agency cost of a project includes the initial capital cost and
the subsequent operation/maintenance costs. The capital cost of the project can broadly be divided into two
categories: a) cost of non-construction related activities and b) cost of construction.
Non-construction activities associated with a project include items such as preliminary
engineering, right-of-way acquisition, preparation of legal documents, project engineering and architecture
work, third party collaboration (utility/railroad), transportation demand and supply management, and
construction engineering and management. These activities generally involve several agencies and
stakeholders. The preliminary engineering cost comprises of costs for activities such as field investigation,
management of the preliminary design work, preparation of environmental documentation, and cost of any
external consultant(s) (INDOT, 2005). Administrative and right-of-way costs include cost of activities such
as storm water management, wetland mitigation, and costs of any contractual obligations with property
owners (FHWA, 2007). Also, costs corresponding to construction contingencies, construction
administration, and public outreach are determined.
The present study focuses on the estimation of construction cost only. Construction costs often can
represent approximately 60 to 80 percent of total agency costs in most projects (Anderson et al., 2007). The
estimation of construction cost of a project is a continuous process that is carried out at all the stages of the
project development process shown in Figure 3.1. The estimates are prepared at each stage after taking into
account all available information at that phase of project development. The first estimate is prepared at the
planning stage and is referred to as the proposed cost. Then an engineer’s assessment of the proposed
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project and its cost is carried out after the project has been programmed in the statewide transportation
improvement program. Several cost estimates are prepared during the design stage; the final estimate
(prepared at the end of the design stage with completed plans) is referred to as the design cost. An
engineer’s estimate is prepared at the advertisement stage before a project is let. This cost estimate is used
for administrative and legal purposes and also as a benchmark for bid evaluation at the letting stage.
Overall, the estimates at each stage are developed to keep track of the construction cost of the project, make
decisions, formulate the long-term spending plans, and most importantly for accounting and control
purposes (Anderson et al., 2007). The prepared estimates serve as a basis for the management and
performance of a project.
Construction cost estimates tend to become more accurate as a project evolves from planning stage
to letting stage (Meyer and Miller, 2001). Figure 3.2 presents schematically the level of uncertainty
associated with the estimate of the construction cost at each stage of project development. The quantifiable
component of the construction cost increases with project development as more detailed information about
the construction activities and processes becomes available. A contingency amount is set aside to account
for the unknown construction costs at each stage. The contingency (as a percentage of the estimate) reduces
as the project progresses through the various development stages.

Planning
20-45%

Total
Cost
($)

Preliminary Design
20-25%

Final Design
10-15%

Advertisement
3-5%
Contingency

Unknown Construction
Related Costs

Quantifiable Construction
Costs

Estimated
Construction
Cost

Figure 3.2: Typical Progression of Cost Uncertainty Across the Stages of Project Development

3.4. Planning Stage
The State department of transportation (DOT) is the central agency that administers all State highway
projects within a state. The program development division of the department issues a call to the districts,
MPOs, and local highway agencies to submit new project proposals for their respective jurisdictions. The
call for proposals initiates the concept development and planning process. The recipients of the call identify
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highway transportation needs and requirements within their respective jurisdictions. A list of projects to be
undertaken is prepared on the basis of the needs, goals and objectives of all partners involved, and the
transportation improvement program of the local highway agency or MPO.
A proposal is prepared for all the identified projects. These proposals are required to include
sufficient descriptive information such as need / justification for project, type of work, scope of project,
location, and the basic design concept. Early consultation meetings are held with the respective
stakeholders and public opinion is sought. Alternatives are defined, studied, and evaluated. Environmental
factors are considered. Public involvement and participation is facilitated to take public opinion further into
consideration. Regulating agencies are notified about the proposed action. Certain DOTs have specific
requirements that need to be addressed at the planning stage. In California for example, all projects initiated
by Caltrans are required to satisfy the California Environmental Quality Act. All DOTs require an
environmental clearance as mandated by the FHWA. A project scoping report is prepared on the basis of
the findings of such assessments.
The specific procedures within the planning process can vary from one highway agency to another
and even from one project to another depending upon the type of construction activities involved, size and
scope of the project, geographic location of the project, methods of procuring professional services, nature
of construction contract award process, and financing mechanisms.

3.4.1.

Estimation of Proposed Costs – State of Practice

The proposed cost (the first estimate of the construction cost) is prepared for each feasible project and is
prepared at the planning stage using limited information such as: project length, project work type, number
of lanes, pavement type, type of bridge, etc. The prepared estimate is used for programming a project into
the state transportation improvement program (Caltrans, 2008). The proposed cost is considered as an
“order of magnitude” estimate and is generally prepared using average unit costs that are typically
determined using historical costs (costs of similar facilities constructed in the past) (Meyer and Miller,
2001). The Maryland State Highway Administration uses an Excel-based tool for preparing an estimate of
the proposed roadway cost using historical costs per mile (Rummel et al, 2002). The Alabama DOT uses a
regression-based tool for estimating proposed costs. The regression model, based on the bid data from
historical projects, gives the unit average costs (Sanders et al., 1992). The Florida Department of
Transportation updates a Transportation Costs Report periodically with cost data from historical highway
projects and calculates the unit costs per centerline mile to estimate the proposed cost for roadway projects
(FDOT, 2002).
Planners and engineers often use their own personal engineering judgment and experience to
prepare the proposed cost estimate (AACE, 1997). Several agencies depend heavily on experienced
estimation professionals to estimate the construction cost at the planning stage. Schexnayder et al. (2003)
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found that twenty-six state highway agencies in the United States had a dedicated section of experienced
professionals for cost estimation. The other twenty-four highway agencies use the services of persons in the
engineering design and contract preparation units to prepare estimates.
The California Department of Transportation uses a systematic approach of grouping basic work
functions together for preparing proposed cost estimates (Caltrans, 2008). Cost information on basic work
items such as earthwork, drainage, traffic, pavement structural section materials, and other structural items
that are easy to identify is acquired. A systematic field review is conducted to identify the typically
overlooked work, so as to minimize the difference between proposed cost and final design estimates. Highcost items such as utility relocation costs, hazardous waste mitigation costs, requirements for noise barriers,
retaining walls, drainage facilities, traffic handling, etc., are identified in the field. Information on
geotechnical conditions on the site, environmental issues, pavement structural information, right of way,
and the possibility of utilizing any existing resources is also sought.
As the uncertainty associated with the prepared proposed costs is often high, a large contingency
amount is set aside at the planning stage. The contingency can vary between 20 - 45% depending upon the
type of the project and the level of detail that was used to estimate the proposed cost (Meyer and Miller,
2001; PennDOT, 2007). A graduated contingency scale that allows for the provision of setting the
contingency percentage on the basis of criteria such as project size or project type is popularly used for
setting the contingency amount at the planning stage. Several state highway agencies have established a
separate contingency account to fund projects with construction contingencies. For example, in Kentucky, a
highway construction contingency account has been created within the road fund (KLRC, 2009). The
money is appropriated to the account by the State’s General Assembly.

3.4.2.

Research Studies on Estimating Proposed Cost

Kim et al. (2008) proposed a case-based reasoning model for estimating proposed cost. This approach
utilizes project specific factors that are available at the planning stage, such as project location, project type
(new / existing), contract type (lowest price, pre-qualified completion, or design-build), construction
period, and length and width of highway. The model, developed using data from 90 historical highway
projects, provided decision-makers with a tool to conduct feasibility studies and to make budgetary
allocation decisions more effectively.
Sodikov (2005) proposed a methodology for estimating proposed costs using artificial neural
networks. Hegazy and Ayed (1998) also used the neural network approach to develop parametric cost
estimation models for highway projects on the basis of project location and highway length. Cost
estimation models based on artificial neural network concepts have been found to be more effective in
dealing with the uncertainty associated with cost estimation at the planning stage compared to regression
models, because they provide a superior framework to structure the relationships between cost and its
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significant influential factors (Smith et al., 1997). On the other hand, regression models may provide
reasonable approximations and are easy to use and interpret.

3.4.3.

Accuracy of Proposed Cost Estimates

The Virginia Department of Transportation (JLARC, 2001) found that the initial estimates of project cost
tend to be significantly lower than those made at subsequent phases of project development. Factors found
responsible for underestimation included: a) augmentation of project scope, b) exclusion of inflation at the
planning stage, and c) failure to account for several cost items relating to site conditions. The transferability
of the average unit costs used to prepare the proposed cost estimates has also been indicated as a possible
source of error (AASHTO, 2006). Urban area projects are likely to have higher unit costs as the
construction process is carried out in confined workspaces with a large volume of traffic and limited hours
of operation (nighttime work). However, the factors that lead to higher costs at urban areas may be
outweighed by factors such as the extensive availability of local contractors, equipment, material, and
personnel in urban areas.
Wachs (1982) conducted interviews of several transportation planners, public officials, and
consultants to determine the source of inaccuracy in cost forecasts for highway and transit projects. Based
on the interviews, it was concluded that forecasts were often manipulated to get the projects approved. In
one case, a transportation planner was asked to revise her transit patronage estimates so that the project
could be justified to receive the federal grant. Such deliberate manipulations in the estimation of benefits
and costs add uncertainty to the planning stage.
In cost overrun studies conducted abroad (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003) it has been
found that cost escalation is a pervasive phenomenon across transportation project types, geographical
locations, and historical periods. Based on an analysis of 258 transportation infrastructure projects (worth
U.S. $90 billion) from around the world, Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) concluded that the cost estimates that were
used to decide whether these projects should be built are highly misleading and inaccurate. Approximately
80% of the projects were found to have a cost overrun, about 50% of these projects were found to have an
overrun in excess of 10%. Flyvbjerg et al. (2004) found that cost escalation is strongly influenced by the
implementation phase length and project type, and it was suggested that decision-makers and planners
should be duly concerned about delays and long implementation phases. The sample of 258 projects
comprised of 167 road projects that experienced an average cost overrun of 20.4% (with a standard
deviation of 30%). Also, 33 bridge and tunnel projects were analyzed and found to have an average cost
escalation of 34% (with a standard deviation of 62%). A total of 58 rail projects were analyzed and the
average cost escalation across those projects was found to be 45% (with a standard deviation of 38%).
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of cost escalation percentage across the 258 contracts.
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Figure 3.3: Inaccuracy in Cost Estimates at the Time of Decision to Build (Flyvbjerg, 2002)

3.5. Programming and Preliminary Design Stages
The objective of the programming phase is to determine the optimal set of projects from the larger universe
of proposed projects to be included in the DOT’s transportation improvement program. In Indiana for
example, after the project proposals have been prepared and submitted, the Indiana Department of
Transportation (INDOT) engages its sections or divisions responsible for budget and finance, planning and
programming, etc. to evaluate and verify the project proposals. Early meetings are conducted to prepare a
prioritized list of proposed projects. The MPOs are required to ensure that their respective regional
transportation plans (RTP) are in conformance with the statewide transportation plan (STP). The Division
of Program Development summons the bridge, pavement, and other program management groups to
analyze the proposals within their respective jurisdictions. This marks the beginning of the programming
phase. Table 3.1 shows the steps during the programming phase followed at INDOT.
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Table 3.1: Steps Involved in the Programming Phase of Project Development (INDOT, 2004)
Programming Phase, Step I: Statewide Review and Program Update
A. Program Management Groups (PMGs) Begin Review of Proposed Projects
B. Statewide Priority Analysis
C. Draft Program Update Report for State Projects
D. Executive Review and Approval of Report
E. External Consultation
F. Final Program Update Report
G. Schedule Update and Budget Confirmation
Programming Phase, Step II: Directory of State Highway Projects
A. Develop Listing of State Highway Projects
B. Publish Directory of State Highway Projects
Programming Phase, Step III: Draft INSTIP Development
A. Draft Constrained List of State Highway Projects
B. Internal INDOT Review & Draft Constrained List
Programming Phase, Step IV: INSTIP Development with MPO TIPs
A. MPO Consultation on Draft Constrained List
B. Agreed‐To Project List Prepared
C. List Sent to MPOs for TIP Development
D. MPO Submittal of TIPs to INDOT, FHWA and FTA
E. MPO TIP Review and INSTIP/TIP Project Compatibility Check
F. INDOT Notification of TIP Review Results
Programming Phase, Step V: INSTIP Publication
A. INSTIP Preparation
B. Public Review and Comment Period of INSTIP at District Meetings
C. FHWA and FTA Review of INSTIP
D. Publication and Distribution of Final INSTIP

The basic framework of the programming process is similar for most state highway agencies in the
United States. The programming phase starts with the review of the project proposal that explains the
project needs, justification, and the costs. The review is conducted to ensure that the recommended projects
are in accordance with the criteria, requirements, and objectives set forth by the highway agency. The
proposed cost of the project is validated during the review, and after the review is completed, all the
projects are prioritized on the basis of the recommendations from the review. A draft program report is
prepared to update the state’s existing transportation improvement program with new project proposals and
to present an account of the impact of including the new projects on the budget. The updated program
report is submitted for executive review. The districts and MPOs are consulted for their comments and a
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final program report is prepared after addressing the issues and concerns of all parties. The state’s directory
of all the highway projects is updated. The directory is used for preparing a draft of the state’s
transportation improvement program (STIP) that contains a list of projects that are: (i) planned for
implementation during the next three to five years and (ii) that seek federal funding. The draft STIP is
developed in consultation with the districts and the MPOs. Public review and comments are also sought on
the STIP before submission to the FHWA and the FTA for review, comments, and approval. If approved,
the projects scheduled in the first three years of the STIP are considered as committed projects and
applicable federal funds are allocated to these projects. Thereafter, more detailed planning and design work
is undertaken for the committed projects.

3.5.1.

Programming and Preliminary Design Stage Cost Estimation

At the programming stage, the estimates of proposed cost of submitted projects are reviewed, evaluated,
and revised if, required. After programming, the preliminary design stage commences and detailed
information on the project is sought for the preparation of preliminary construction plans. An estimate of
the cost is prepared based on the preliminary design specifications and the additional details acquired about
the project scope and complexity. This estimate is often referred to as the engineer’s assessment cost. The
techniques that are used to prepare this estimate vary significantly in complexity across the DOTs. Widelyused techniques are categorized as: (a) detailed estimation methods and (b) historical bid-based cost
estimation methods.
The detailed estimation method uses information such as the procedures used for construction,
labor cost, material cost, and market conditions specific to the project location. The time required to
prepare such estimates increases depending upon the level of detail being considered. The time required is
significantly greater compared to that derived using methods based on average unit costs used at the
planning stage. The detailed estimation method is a cost-based approach, as compared to the bid-based
pricing method where average unit costs are estimated based on historical bids. The historical bid price
estimation method is, however, simple, fast, and the most widely used method for cost estimation
(Damnjanovic et al., 2008). This method can be used to estimate the cost of projects that are similar to
those undertaken in the past with similar items, quantities, and locations (AASHTO, 2006).
The New Jersey Department of Transportation uses the Cost Estimation Software (CES) for
estimating construction costs (NJDOT, 2006). This software can be used to estimate cost at various stages
of project development depending upon the level of detailed information available. At the preliminary
engineering stage, the construction cost estimate is prepared based on factors such as project length, work
type, number of lanes, pavement type, and type of bridge. There are several categories of the type of work
that are used by NJDOT at the preliminary design stage: new construction, reconstruction/widening,
widening and resurfacing, resurfacing, bridge repair, intersection improvements, electrical safety and traffic
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control, intelligent transportation systems, demolition, and drainage. A separate form is used for estimating
the cost of each work type. For each project work type, cost groups are formed depending upon the profile
of the project. The corresponding cost of each cost group is determined using the bid-based pricing method.

3.5.2.

Accuracy of Programmed Amount

The California Department of Transportation conducted performance reviews to measure the agency’s
success in planning and delivering projects within the specified budget (Caltrans, 2002). The contract
award amount was measured as a percentage of the programmed amount and the agency strived to have this
percentage fall within the 85-100% range. Figure 3.4 shows a comparison of the awarded amount as a
percentage of the project budget for each year during the period 1998-2002. Caltrans was successful in
letting contracts at 85% of the programmed amount during the four years.
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of Contract Award Amount to Programmed Amount for Contracts in California
(Caltrans, 2002)
The Missouri Department of Transportation uses a tracking system to assess their performance and
to determine how well services and products are delivered to customers; the system tracks the percentage of
projects that are completed within the programmed amount (MoDOT, 2008). Figure 3.5 shows the
percentage of projects that were delivered within the programmed amount by project size. Large size
projects (over $1 million) were found to be delivered within the budgeted amount more frequently.
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Figure 3.5: Percent of Projects Delivered Within the Programmed Amount in Missouri (MoDOT, 2008)

3.6. Final Design Stage
During the final design stage, detailed construction plans, and specifications are developed and finalized,
and specific items to be used in construction and the corresponding quantities are determined. A design
estimate of the construction cost is prepared either in-house or by a consultant as the construction plans and
specifications are being developed. However, a consistent methodology is not in place for controlling the
estimate of construction cost that is prepared at this stage in most of the DOTs (Schexnayder et al., 2003).
Estimates prepared at the design stage vary significantly from those prepared at the planning and
preliminary design stages. The methods and the tools used for the estimation of the final design cost are
discussed in this section.

3.6.1.

Estimation of Design Cost at Highway Agencies

Estimates of construction cost established at the design stage are generally prepared using computer
software. Item level details are fed into the software and the unit costs for each item are adopted either from
the software, based on default settings, or specified by the estimator based on current trends. Information
on the quantities of each item is available from the detailed design plans. AASHTO’s TRNS*PORT is the
most widely used computer software for estimation (Schexnayder et al., 2003). In addition to TRNS*PORT
several other software are used for the estimation of construction cost. Bid Tabs Professional by Oman
Systems Inc. (Schexnayder et al., 2003) is one of the available systems in use by several agencies.
TRACER is another software package that is in use; it uses parametric cost estimation methods with
minimal user input (AASHTO, 2009). Models that define the relationship between the parameters and the
detailed quantities of construction requirements are the basis for the computation of estimates.
TRNS*PORT can be used to prepare parametric or item-level project cost estimates based on
project work types and other project characteristics. The software has four modules namely: a) CES, b)
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PES, c) LAS, and d) CAS. The Cost Estimation System (CES) module of the software is used for cost
estimation. Figure 3.6 shows the framework of the TRNS*PORT software. In the New Jersey Department
of Transportation (NJDOT, 2006), the CES module starts to be used at the preliminary design stage.
Because itemized details are not available at that stage, those cells are left blank and are filled at the final
design stage. The software uses unit bid prices for the preparation of the estimate. Historical bid prices are
used to update the database. The Proposal and Estimates System (PES) module is used after the final design
at the advertisement stage. The cost estimate prepared in CES is passed to PES. The Letting and Awards
System (LAS) module is used for the analysis of the bids and the Construction Administration System
(CAS) module is used at the construction stage. The database that stores information about the historical
bids, average unit prices, and other analysis models is stored at the back-end in the decision support system
(BAMS/DSS) data warehouse.
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Figure 3.6: Framework of the TRNS*PORT Software (AASHTO, 2009)

3.6.2.

Accuracy of Design Estimates

In a study involving approximately 300 projects by the Virginia Department of Transportation (JLARC,
2001), it was concluded that cost estimates are underestimated prior to final design completion. VDOT
develops cost estimates at four points prior to the final design completion: a) scoping, b) preliminary field
review, c) field inspection, and d) approval of right-of-way plans. It was found that the final design
estimate for construction cost was 74% higher than the project scoping estimate, 53% higher than the
estimate prepared after preliminary field review, 45% higher than the estimate prepared after field
inspection, and 19% higher than the estimate prepared after submission of right-of-way plans. Furthermore,
it was found that the contract award amount was fairly close to the final design estimate. The final
construction cost was found to exceed the budgeted amount by an average of 19% for Interstate projects,
16% for primary projects, 9% for secondary projects, and 8% for urban projects. On an average, the final
cost exceeded the budgeted cost by an average of 11%. The additional funds set aside for contingency were
also exceeded. Several factors were identified that explained the low cost estimates: requests by localities
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for additions to the project, non-adjustment for inflation, unforeseen site circumstances, increases in
property values as a result of project development, inconsistency in inclusion of contingencies, etc. The
inherent incentive in the system to inadvertently underestimate the project costs at the design phase was
identified as one of the factors.
The Washington Department of Transportation analyzed 360 highway construction projects
completed in 2003-05 and found that 93 were “over budget” (MacDonald et al., 2005). A project was
considered over budget if the final cost exceeded the total project cost (listed in the last legislative budget)
by over 5%. Of the projects that went over budget, 80% were low cost projects with cost less than $1
million. Approximately 15% of the over budget projects were in the range of $1-$5 million and only 5% of
the projects were greater than $5 million. The actual causal factors of cost overrun were analyzed, and it
was found that cost overrun in 70% (65 of 93) of the projects resulted from estimation of inaccurate
quantities of material at the design phase. For approximately 11% (10 of 93) of the projects, overrun was
due to changed or unforeseen site conditions, and for 19% (18 of 93) of the projects, overrun was due to
factors such as weather, environment, utilities and emergencies.
The revisions in designs were attributed as one of the main reasons for cost overrun in a FHWA
study of seventy-four projects each worth more than $10 million, the average cost overrun rate exceeded
25% (Jocoby, 2001). However, unexpected site conditions were also cited as one of the reasons, and could
be the cause for most of the design revisions. The Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT)
classifies the change orders related to highway construction projects in two categories: a) preventable and
b) non-preventable. Preventable change orders are those that occur due to errors and omissions during the
design phase, scope changes, or changes in constructability of a project. Non-preventable change orders
occur due to changed field conditions, failed materials, or changes in standards or specifications.
Bordat et al. (2004) analyzed 822 contracts implemented in 1996-2001 and found that of the total
amount associated with change orders ($65 Million), the design-related errors and omissions were
responsible for 15% ($9.5 Million) and the constructability of the design was found responsible for
approximately 5% ($3.4 Million). Inadequate time to produce quality designs and no accountability for
project’s construction performance are the two reasons that were cited as root causes for design errors and
omissions. Table 3.2 presents a summary of the main factors that were found responsible for change orders.
These included: ‘construction-related constructability’, ‘design-related constructability’, ‘design-related
errors and omissions’, and ‘quantity-related errors and omissions’. Design related errors and omissions
accounted for $9.5 million of the $12 million associated with change orders in this category.
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Table 3.2: Factors Responsible for Change Orders in Highway Construction (Bordat et al., 2004)
Factor Responsible for Change Order
No Recorded Reason
Errors and Omissions
Constructability
Scope Changes
Changed Field Conditions
Failed Materials
Standard / Specifications Updates

Number of
Contracts
224
476
410
278
324
251
94
2057

Number of
Change Orders
6024
3937
3227
2093
1813
392
390
17876

Increase in Cost Due to
Change Orders (Million $)
$29
$12
$10
$7
$2
$0.70
$60

3.7. Contract Preparation and Advertisement Stage
During the advertisement stage, preparations for the letting the projects are made and documents are
prepared for the bidding. Often, several projects in the same geographic location or involving the same kind
of work are lumped together to form a contract so that they can be let together. The contracts are advertised
for bids, pre-bid conferences are held, and the bids are received and analyzed at this stage. An engineer’s
estimate of the cost is prepared at this stage to serve as an estimate of the project cost for legal purposes and
to be used as a benchmark to evaluate the bid estimates of the construction cost at the contract letting stage.

3.7.1.

Preparation of Engineer’s Estimate

An engineer’s estimate of the construction cost is prepared before a contract is advertised for bidding. The
engineer's estimate is based on the completed plans and specifications as compared to the design estimate
that was prepared when the construction plans were being finalized. State departments of transportation
often use the services of design consultants for preparing the engineer’s estimate of the cost. Another
important distinction between the engineer’s estimate and the final design estimate is that the engineer’s
estimate is generally prepared by taking into account the contractors overheads and profits (Hendrickson
and Au, 1998). Schexnayder et al. (2003) found that sixteen DOTs reviewed and analyzed the estimate
prepared by the consultants and changes were made wherever necessary. Twenty-six DOTs used estimates
prepared by consultants to cross-check the engineer’s estimate that was prepared in-house before the final
engineer’s estimate was recorded. The estimates produced by the consultants were used without any
substantial changes by the remaining eight DOTs. Irrespective of whether the estimate was prepared inhouse or by an external consultant, the historical bid based approach was the most commonly used
approach for the computation of the engineer’s estimate. Often, a combination of the historical bid based
approach and the detailed estimation approach is used wherein the cost of the major items of work is
estimated using the detailed approach and may constitute 50-80% of the total construction cost depending
upon project type. The rest of the items are estimated using the historical bid based approach.
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The use of software for computing the engineer’s estimate is common practice at several DOTs.
For example, NJDOT uses the PES module (Figure 3.6) of the TRNS*PORT software to import the
estimates of cost prepared during the project development phases and develop a final cost estimate based
on the additional design information that is entered after the project plans have been finalized. Once the
engineer’s estimate has been computed the PES module prepares an electronic bid letting package. This
package is provided to the contractors electronically using software called Expedite. The contractors submit
their bids electronically using this software and the bids are made available to the DOTs for analyses.

3.7.2.

Accuracy of Engineer’s Estimate

The Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT, 2008) compared the final construction cost
with the engineer’s estimate to determine the reliability of the in-house procedures for cost estimation
(Table 3.3). The final cost exceeded the engineer’s estimate by approximately 6% in 2004 resulting in an
overrun of nearly $18 million. In each of the fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006, approximately 25% of the
contracts had a final cost that exceeded engineer’s estimate by more than 10%. The percentage of contracts
having an overrun of greater than 10% was found to increase to about 30% and 32% in the years 2006 and
2007, respectively. Figure 3.7 presents the cost overrun trend from 2004 to 2008.
Table 3.3: Annual Report of Accuracy of Engineer’s Estimate at Washington DOT (WSDOT, 2008)
Fiscal
Year
2004

Number of
Contracts
159

Total Engineer's
Estimated Cost
$302,276,645

Total Final
Cost
$320,356,211

Annual
Overrun ($)
$18,079,566

Annual
Overrun (%)
5.98%

2005

165

$303,266,277

$305,253,750

$1,987,473

0.66%

2006

125

$228,945,165

$231,324,283

$2,379,118

1.04%

2007

136

$286,993,516

$290,728,546

$3,735,030

1.30%

2008

131

$298,200,264

$310,216,164

$12,015,900

4.03%

Total

716

$1,419,681,867

$1,457,878,954

$38,197,087

2.69%

Percentage of Contracts
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Figure 3.7: Percentage of Contracts for which Final Cost Exceeded the Engineer’s Estimate by Over 10%
(WSDOT, 2008)
Figure 3.8 shows a plot of the percentage difference that was observed for 131 contracts in year
2005. The percentage difference is plotted against contract size. The number of contracts for which the
final cost exceeded the engineer’s estimate by more than 10% was found similar to those for which the
engineer’s estimate exceeded the final cost by 10% or higher.

Underrun > 10%

Cost
(Million
Dollars)

Overrun > 10%

⎛ Final Cost - Engineers Estimate ⎞
Y=100 ⎜
⎟%
Engineers Estimate
⎝
⎠

Y
Figure 3.8: Comparison of Final Cost with Engineer’s Estimate by Contract Size (WSDOT, 2008)
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3.7.3.

Determining Cost Overrun at Advertisement Stage

Several researchers indicated that the overrun of the final construction cost can be determined by studying
the difference between the contract award amount and the engineer’s estimate (Jacoby, 2001; Jahren and
Ashe, 1990). Also, Hendrickson and Au (1998) noted that cost overrun could result from mismanagement
and lack of coordination and communication between the planners, designers, decision–makers, and
contractors. The impact is particularly severe for larger and more complex contracts. Rowland (1981)
indicated that as the size of a contract increases, the rate of cost overrun also tends to increase. The factors
that are responsible include enhanced complexity of large contracts, increased number of communication
channels, and possible distortion of information as it is exchanged between the various participants in the
process. Contracts that experienced such factors during the planning and design phase can be identified
before advertising the contract for bidding. Also, projects that are lumped together to be let as a single
contract can be studied to determine if such an approach increases the number of communication channels
and creates management issues.

3.8. Letting Stage
After a contract has been advertised and the bids have been received by the DOT, a letting date is set for
the contract to be awarded. The time period between the programming stage and the letting stage may vary
from three to ten years depending upon the type of contract. The cost estimate is prepared by the
contractors in a short time-span and with the objective of winning the contract. The bid amounts are
compared to the engineer’s estimate and the contract is often awarded to the contractor with the lowest bid,
as long as it is not lower and / or higher than the engineer’s estimate by a certain specified percentage. The
Letting and Award System (LAS) module of TRNS*PORT software is used by several agencies to analyze
and manage bids.

3.8.1.

Estimation of Letting Cost

Estimating the letting cost involves an assessment of the construction duration, labor requirements,
construction methods, equipments, and material quantities. Inaccurate estimation of any one of these inputs
could result in incorrect estimation. For example, underestimation of the construction duration will
generally result in underestimation of the labor hours required for construction, which in turn would result
in a relatively lower than normal bid by the contractor. Labor availability, productivity, and quality are also
taken into consideration in preparing the bid estimate.
The bid estimate is generally prepared by either using historical price data or by estimating the
cost using the prevalent market prices and trends. Stern (1994) argued that the latter is a better approach as
prices of goods and commodities depend on a number of market factors and economic conditions. The
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overall condition of the economy, prices of individual items, construction equipments, methods, and
technology are likely to change with time and from one project location to another. The duration of a
project may play an important role in determining the expenditures during the construction process.
Contracts constructed over longer durations are likely to have high labor costs and become more
susceptible to changes in the prices of commodities. Finally, in a competitive and declining market,
contractors often decide to bid with a lower profit margin, which may cause the agency’s estimate to be
significantly higher than the bid amount.

3.8.2.

Accuracy of Letting Cost

Gkritza and Labi (2008) found that the likelihood of overrun of final cost compared to letting cost is
influenced by project size and contract duration. Larger and longer-duration projects were more likely to
result in cost overrun. Bordat et al. (2004) conducted a survey across several states to collect information
about the overrun of the final cost compared to the letting cost. The states were asked to share information
about the percentage of contracts with cost overrun, average cost overrun rates, annual amount spent on
cost overrun, and causes of overrun. A summary of responses is presented in Table 3.4. The percentage of
contracts exceeding letting cost was found to vary between 33% and 92% across the states. It was found
that the Ohio and Texas DOTs had spent the most amount of money on cost overrun annually compared to
other states. The average cost overrun rate was found to be less than 10% across all the states. However,
this average figure does not indicate that high cost overrun did not occur in these states. The amount of
money spent on cost overrun may have been compensated for by the cost underrun, which explains the low
overall cost overrun rate. However, both cost overrun and underrun exceeding 10% suggest inaccuracies in
cost estimation and therefore need to be addressed separately.
Table 3.4: Rate of Cost Overrun and Annual Cost Overrun Expenditure of Selected States
(Bordat et al., 2004)
State

Period

Arkansas
Idaho
Indiana
Missouri
New Mexico
Ohio
Oregon
Tennessee
Texas

1997 to 2002
1997 to 2001
1996 to 2002
1999 to 2002
2002
1994 to 2001
1998 to 2002
1998 to 2002
1998 to 2002

Percentage of Projects
with Overrun
55% - 62%
55% - 67%
55%
60-64%
62%
80%-92%
18%-33%
61%
66-75%

Cost Overrun
Rate
2% - 11%
5% - 11%
5%
4%

6%
4% - 7%

Annual Amount Spent on
Cost Overrun
$5 - $9 Million
$26 - $45 Million
$2 - $42 Million
$12 Million
$76 - $196 Million
$0.4 - $5.7 Million
$40 Million
$68 - $282 Million

In an economic and efficiency audit study, Wagner (1998) found that the Delaware Department of
Transportation (DOT) experienced cost overrun averaging 13.9% between 1994 and 1996 due to changes in
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the work scope and incorrect estimates of work quantities in the original bid specifications. Jahren and
Ashe (1990) found that the risk of high cost overrun rates was greater when the winning bid amount was
less than the engineer’s estimate, and further identified some cost overrun factors such as the contract
document quality, nature of interpersonal relations on the project, and contractor policies. Other reasons
found to be related with cost overrun included the rising costs of labor and materials, inadequate analysis
(e.g., poor costing methods), poor control and scheduling, and inadequate information (Akran and Igwe,
2001). Kaming et al. (1997) identified variables that have an impact upon construction time and cost
overrun using factor analysis techniques. It was found that the main causes for cost overrun were: (i) the
complexity of the project, (ii) inflationary increases in material costs, and (iii) inaccurate material
estimates.
Crossett and Hines (2007) compared final cost with letting cost for contracts from twenty-one
states. The final and letting costs were acquired for contracts that were greater than $1 million in size and
were scheduled to finish between 2001 and 2005. Information was obtained from the states of Arizona,
California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and
Washington. Percentage of contracts for which final cost exceeded letting cost was determined for each
state was found to be between 36% - 69%. Across all the states, on average, the final cost exceeded the
letting cost for approximately 55% of the projects. The percentage of contracts for which the final cost
exceeded 110 percent of the letting cost was found to vary between 11 and 48 percent (Figure 3.9).
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Figure 3.9: Percentage of Contracts (Exceeding $1 Million) for which Final Cost Exceeded Letting Cost
(Crossett and Hines, 2007)

31

The Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT, 2008) compared the final cost
with the letting cost for the contracts that were completed during the period 2002 – 2005. A total of 122
contracts in 2002, 175 contracts in 2003, 147 contracts in 2004, and 155 contracts in 2005 were analyzed.
The total final cost for the 599 contracts exceeded the letting cost (award amount) by approximately $76

Cost

Millions

Million. Figure 3.10 shows the annual comparison of the final and letting cost during this period.
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Figure 3.10: Comparison of Final Cost and Letting Cost in Washington State (WSDOT, 2008)
Figure 3.11 shows comparison of final and letting costs for 122 contracts completed in year 2005.
The final cost exceeded the letting cost for a large number of contracts.
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Figure 3.11: Distribution of Contracts with Cost Overrun (WSDOT, 2008)
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3.9. Chapter Summary
The chapter discussed the issues in cost estimation of the various phases of highway project development.
The first estimate of the construction cost at the planning stage is generally based on unit (e.g., lane-mile)
averages. After the project is included in the state’s transportation improvement program, the engineer
assessment estimate is prepared. Then, the preliminary design work starts and the project scope, work type,
and complexity are defined more clearly. A preliminary design estimate of the cost is prepared on the basis
of preliminary plans. The preliminary design stage is followed by the final design stage as greater detail on
construction practices, material, and equipment becomes available. At this stage, a design estimate of the
construction cost is prepared. When the project plans are finalized, an engineer’s estimate of the cost is
prepared based on the basis of the final plans and specifications. This estimate is used to advertise the
project for legal purposes and to analyze the bids from constructors. After bids are received and analyzed,
the contract is awarded – this is the letting stage. The winning bid cost is recorded as the letting cost. Most
departments of transportation use software such as TRNS*PORT for estimating the preliminary design
cost, final design cost, and engineer’s estimate. The historical bid-based pricing approach is the most
common method for estimation of cost at the preliminary design, final design, and the advertisement phase.
The item level details are not available at the preliminary design stage, but greater detail becomes available
at the final design stage and also when the engineer’s estimate is prepared. The extent of phase-to-phase
variation of these estimates varies across the DOTs largely due to differences in the level of detail used in
estimating these costs.
The pervasive problem of overrun of final cost, compared to letting cost, has been studied by
several highway agencies. Most of these studies found that early cost estimates are significantly lower than
the final cost. Inaccuracies have also been found at the design stage and with the engineer’s estimate.
Agencies have focused on average differences between final cost and cost estimates to determine the
reliability of the cost estimates. Low values of average cost overruns do not indicate that the cost estimation
process was efficient because the final cost may be significantly higher than the cost estimate for some
contracts, and significantly lower than the cost estimate for others. If the final cost exceeds the cost
estimate for a large number of projects, the funding of future transportation improvement programs is
affected. The Virginia Department of Transportation had to postpone or cancel 166 projects because the
cost estimates were underestimated (Kyte et al., 2004). On the other hand, if the cost estimate is higher than
the final cost, the opportunity to implement other projects is jeopardized. Agencies do not have a
methodological framework to identify projects where final cost is likely to exceed the cost estimate, or
where the cost estimate is likely to exceed the final cost. This deficiency is addressed in Chapter 4, where a
methodological framework is presented to study the reliability of the cost estimates in detail and identify
projects that are likely to experience reliability issues.

33

CHAPTER 4.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1. Introduction
Reliability of construction cost estimates at each project development stage is critical for decision-making.
Chapter 2 presented various studies that have been conducted in the United States and abroad on this topic.
At several highway agencies, the final construction cost has been found to be significantly different from
the estimated cost for a large number of contracts.
Analysis of cost overrun and underrun associated with historical contracts allows agencies to
determine the accuracy of cost estimates. Most agencies have so far focused on comparison of final
construction cost with letting cost and cost overruns have been given more importance than underruns.
Average percentage differences between final and letting cost across all the contracts in a state have been
used to report the overall inaccuracy of cost estimates. In such, average cost overrun is compensated by
cost underrun, and the low average suggests erroneously that the overall impact of cost inaccuracy is
insignificant. While some agencies have used the distribution of cost overrun and underrun, factors that can
lead to identification of contracts with high cost overrun and underrun at an early stage of project
development have not been studied extensively. Factors such as contract size, geographic location, and
work category have been identified as some of the factors that can be used to identify contracts susceptible
to cost overrun and underrun. However, variability across contracts from the same geographic location, or
of the same size has not been studied in the past. Also, the inter-relationship between such factors has not
been explored.
In the present study, a methodology has been proposed for use by highway agencies to overcome
these deficiencies. The methodology analyzes historical contracts, studies the variability of cost overrun
across districts, counties, urban and rural areas, contract sizes, types, work categories, highway functional
classes, NHS status, and any other factors that are available during the initial planning stages and are
believed to have an impact on cost overrun. The following section presents a framework for the
probabilistic analysis of cost overrun and underrun associated with the cost estimates.
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4.2. Methodological Framework
4.2.1.

Step 1: Study Design, Data Acquisition, and Pre-processing

The study design and the type of information that has to be collected in a cost overrun analysis study is
largely determined based on the goals and objectives of the study. For studies that require a basic analysis
of cost overrun, information on the various cost estimates and the final construction cost is sufficient. The
estimates (proposed, engineer’s assessment, design, engineer’s estimate, and letting), and the final cost
information that is sought includes the date when the estimate was prepared and if it was inflation-adjusted
or non-adjusted (Figure 4.1).

Proposed
Cost
PCost

Engineer’s
Assessment

First
Estimate
(Stage 1)

Second
Estimate
(Stage 2)

EACost

Design
Cost
DCost
Third
Estimate
(Stage 3)

Engineer’s
Estimate
EECost
Fourth
Estimate
(Stage 4)

Letting
Cost
LCost

Final Cost

Fifth
Estimate
(Stage 5)

Incurred
Cost
(Stage 6)

FCost

Time
Date 1

Date 2

Date 3

Date 4

Date 5

Date 6

Figure 4.1: Information about Cost Estimates and Final Cost Sought for a Cost Overrun Study
Additional information that may be sought includes: information on the methods and procedure
used for preparation of the estimates, level of detail to which each estimate was prepared, the contingency
included in each estimate, and whether any adjustments for inflation were made. Such information is
generally used to determine whether inflation played a role or whether appropriate contingencies were
included in the estimates.
Detailed information on contract-specific factors should be sought when seeking to identify
contracts that are more likely to experience cost overrun. Such factors can be broadly divided into two
categories, namely: a) actual causal factors and b) surrogate causal factors. The actual causal factors
include factors such as: scope changes, unforeseen site work, inflation, change orders, limited information
during planning and development stages, inadequate methods for estimation, etc. Surrogate causal factors,
on the other hand, are factors that point towards the actual underlying causal factors, and can be used as
indicators in the absence of actual causal factors to identify contract types that are likely to experience high
cost overrun or underruns. Such factors may include geographic location, contract size, contract work
category, route type, highway functional class, area type, NHS status, population, and other socio-economic
characteristics of the region in which the project is planned. In addition, surrogate factors that measure the
efficiency and characteristics of the planning process such as schedule delays, number, size and nature of
initial scope changes, and escalation pattern of the previous cost estimates may prove to be indicators of the
underlying problems causing a cost overrun.

35

For example, the district, county, and area type provide information about the geographic location
of a contract and may indicate towards the economic characteristics of the region that lead to overrun. The
‘route type’, ‘functional class’ and ‘NHS status’ indicate the importance of the highway route on which the
contract is implemented and can point towards site conditions, such as traffic management issues. The
contract size and type point towards the planning, development and construction procedures that are used to
prepare the estimates. The contract work category may indicate towards the unforeseen construction
activities likely to be experienced during construction. Schedule delays, initial scope changes, and
escalation pattern of prior cost estimates may indicate the complexity and uncertainty associated with cost
estimation.
The present study presents a methodology for analyzing cost overrun based on surrogate causal
factors, as information on these factors is available to planners at the initial planning and development
stages. It is expected that an analysis based on these factors can provide planners with a tool to identify
contract types that are likely to experience high cost overrun.
For each contract, information on all potential surrogate causal factors is collected. Each factor is
tested for its significance in identifying contracts with cost overrun. Factors that are discrete in nature are
broken down into their respective factor levels (Table 4.1). For example, all the districts within a state
represent the district factor levels. The factor levels for route type are State Roads, U.S. roads, and
Interstate roads. The functional class factor levels provide information about the functional class of the
highway on which a contract is implemented, such as urban Interstate, rural Interstate, urban arterial, rural
arterial, etc. The NHS status factor has factor levels such as: Non-NHS, Non-Interstate NHS, and Interstate.
The factor levels corresponding to contract size and those corresponding to work category may be defined
differently across different states. The work category factor levels are defined by combining contracts
involving similar construction work. For example, all bridge-related contracts, such as bridge rehabilitation,
replacement and removal, can fall under the factor level ‘bridge work’, whereas all pavement-related
contracts can fall under the factor level ‘pavement work’. On the other hand, some states may decide to
analyze bridge rehabilitation and bridge replacement as two different factor levels. The factor levels
corresponding to area type can be represented by urban or rural areas. Contracts that comprise of more than
one project are called kin contracts, whereas those that comprise of a single project are called stand-alone
contracts. The kin or stand-alone contract specifications represent the contract type factor levels.
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Table 4.1: Factor Levels Corresponding to Discrete Contract-Specific Factors
#

1

Contract Specific Factor

District

2

Route Type

3

Work Category

4

Area Type

3

Functional Class (FC)

5

NHS Status (NHS)

6

Project Size
(Size Based on Proposed
Cost of the Project)

7

Contract Type

Contract Specific Factor Levels
District Type ‘1’
.
.
.
District Type ‘i’
.
.
.
District Type ‘N’
Route Type ‘1’
.
.
.
Route Type ‘i’
.
.
.
Route Type ‘N’
Work Category ‘1’
.
.
.
Work Category ‘i’
.
.
.
Work Category ‘N’
Urban Area
Rural Area
FC Category ‘1’
.
.
.
FC Category ‘i’
.
.
.
FC Category ‘N’
NHS Category ‘1’
.
.
.
NHS Category ‘i’
.
.
.
NHS Category ‘N’
Category 1 – Low Cost Projects
.
.
.
Category ‘i’ – Intermediate Cost Projects
.
.
.
Category N – High Cost Projects
Kin Contract – Several Projects lumped together
Standalone Contract – Single Project Contract
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A uniform distribution of the contracts across all the factor levels is sought so that a sufficient
number of observations is available for statistical analysis and the development of risk-based econometric
models as demonstrated in the proposed methodology. An analysis of the one-way and two-way
distribution of the contracts by the factor levels was conducted to determine if a sufficient number of
contracts are available in the dataset. The one-way distribution of the contracts by factor level is expected
to yield at least 50 contracts corresponding to each factor level. If a particular factor level does not meet the
criteria, it is can be combined with another similar factor level by redefining the factor levels corresponding
to the factor under consideration.
Next, the two-way distribution of the contracts by all pairs of factors was analyzed to ensure that
all contract types are uniformly represented. The two-way distributions are helpful in interpreting the
conclusions about cost overrun. For example, an average cost overrun of 60% across Interstate pavement
contracts acquires a completely different interpretation, depending upon the number of contracts which this
average was calculated. If information is available only for two Interstate pavement contracts, the average
overrun of 60% may indicate an aberration from the normal. However, if the average overrun across 40
contracts is 60%, such contracts become an issue of concern. Table 4.2 presents the framework for the twoway distribution analysis of the contracts, given seven factors (as presented in Table 4.1). There are 7C2
(that is, 21) ways of selecting any two factors and analyzing the distribution of the contracts by their
respective factor levels. Table 4.3 presents a sample two-way distribution table when contract size and
work category are the two factors that are selected. Such two-way distribution analysis of the contracts in
the database helps in conducting a comprehensive analysis of the cost overrun associated with historical
highway infrastructure projects, using the statistical methods and concepts as described in subsequent
sections.
Table 4.2: Framework for the Two-Way Distribution Analysis of the Contracts

Work
Category
Contract Size
Contract Type
Route Type
Area Type
District
NHS Status

Work
Category

Contract
Size

-

*

Contract
Type

Route
Type

Area
Type

District

NHS Status

-

* Refer to Table 4.3 for a sample of two way distribution analysis by Contract Size and Work Category
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Table 4.3: Illustrating the Distribution of Contracts by Contract Size and Work Category

Small Size
Contracts

CONTRACT SIZE
(BASED ON PROPOSED COST)
Medium Size
Large Size
Very Large
Contracts
Contracts
Contracts

$1 Million
to
$2 Million

WORK
CATEGORY

$2 Million
to
$5 Million

$5 Million
to
$10 Million

Total

More
than
$10 Million

Expansion
Contracts
Bridge
Contracts
Pavement
Contracts
Total

4.2.2.

Step 2: Analyzing Accuracy of Cost Estimates

The methodology for determining the accuracy of the proposed, engineer’s assessment, design, engineer’s
estimate, and letting cost estimates is discussed in this section. The cost estimates that were not adjusted for
inflation at the time of preparations are analyzed in Steps 2 and 3. Where the non-inflated cost estimates are
not available, Steps 2 and 3 are skipped and the analysis proceeds to Step 4.

4.2.2.1. Step 2.1: Calculation and Preliminary Analysis of Cost Overrun
The cost overrun (Y1) of the final construction cost compared to the proposed cost estimate is referred to as
the planning stage cost overrun. The planning stage cost overrun can be calculated as follows:
Planning Stage Cost Overrun:

100

%

(4.1)

The engineer’s assessment estimate which is the second estimate of the construction cost is
prepared after the programming phase. The cost overrun (Y2) of the final cost compared to the engineer’s
assessment cost is referred to as the post programming stage cost overrun. The post programming stage cost
overrun can be calculated as follows:
Post Programming Stage Cost Overrun:

100

%

(4.2)

The cost overrun (Y3) of the final cost compared to the design cost is referred to as the design
stage cost overrun and is calculated as follows:
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Design Stage Cost Overrun:

100

%

(4.3)

The cost overrun (Y4) associated with the engineer’s estimate, that is prepared before project
letting, at the advertisement stage, is referred to as the advertisement stage cost overrun and can be
calculated as follows:
Advertisement Stage Cost Overrun:

100

%

(4.4)

Several estimates of the final construction cost are prepared at the letting stage. The present study
focuses on the comparison of the winning bid estimate or the letting cost with the final incurred
construction cost to determine the cost overrun associated with the letting cost (letting stage cost overrun)
The letting stage cost overrun is calculated as follows:
Letting Stage Cost Overrun:

100

%

(4.5)

A negative value of the cost overruns Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4, and Y5 indicates that the final incurred
construction cost is less than the corresponding cost estimate, and hence represents a cost underrun. On the
other hand, a positive value of the cost overrun indicates that the final cost exceeded the proposed cost. The
step-by-step procedure for preliminary analysis of cost overrun of ‘N’ historical contracts is as follows:
(a) Calculate the planning stage cost overrun (Y1) for each contract ‘j’, and denote it by Y1j.
(b) Plot a histogram of Y1j representing the planning stage cost overrun of all the ‘N’ contracts.
(c) Determine the 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% quartiles of the planning stage cost overrun, Y1.
Quartiles are points at regular intervals from the cumulative distribution of planning stage cost
overrun. The value Zx of the X% quartile indicates that X% of the contracts have the planning
stage cost overrun less than Zx. The quartiles indicate severity of the cost overrun problem.
(d) Determine the average planning stage cost overrun ( Y1 ) across the ‘N’ contracts as follows:

∑ (Y )
N

Y1 =

1j

j =1

N

(4.6)

A large positive average (greater than 10%) indicates that positive cost overruns outweighed the
negative cost overruns (or underruns). A small positive average (less than 10%) indicates that the
positive cost overrun marginally outweighed the negative cost overrun. A large negative value of
the average cost overrun indicates that the negative cost overrun outweighed the positive cost
overrun. A cost estimate within +/-10% of the final cost is generally considered as an acceptable
estimate by most state DOTs.
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(e) Determine the standard deviation (S1) and the 95% confidence interval (C.I) of the average cost
overrun. The confidence interval represents a range of likely values of the average cost overrun
assuming that cost overrun is normally distributed.

∑ (Y
N

j =1

S1 =

1j

− Y1

)

2

N −1

⎛
S ⎞
× 1 ⎟
95% C.I : Y1 ± ⎜ t 0.95
N⎠
⎝ (1− 2 , N −1)

(4.7)

The upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval indicate the risk of cost overrun. The
variation in the planning stage cost overrun across the ‘N’ contracts can be calculated using the
coefficient of variation (C.V), which is calculated as follows:

C.V1 =

S1
Y1

(4.8)

(f) Repeat steps (a)-(e) to calculate and analyze the post-programming stage cost overrun (Y2), design
stage cost overrun (Y3), advertisement stage cost overrun (Y4), and letting stage (Y4) cost overrun
associated with the ‘N’ contracts. The steps (a)-(e) can also be repeated to compare two cost
estimates with each other.

4.2.2.2. Step 2.2: Analysis of Cost Overrun by Cost Overrun Category
Cost overruns and underruns (defined by Step 2.1(d)) were analyzed separately to determine the inaccuracy
associated with the respective cost estimate. Four categories of cost over(under)run can be further defined:
a) Category I: Contracts with ‘cost overrun’ < -10% (or cost underrun > 10%),
b) Category II: Contracts with ‘cost overrun’ between -10% & 0% (or cost underrun between 0% & 10%),
c) Category III: Contracts with ‘cost overrun’ between 0% & 10%, and
d) Category IV: Contracts with ‘cost overrun’ greater than 10%.
The contracts that belong to categories II or III are referred to as belonging to the ‘+/-10% cost
overrun bracket’. Figure 4.2 presents a schematic representation of the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’.
‘+/- 10% COST OVERRUN BRACKET’
0%
- 10%
10%
Category 1

Category 2
Cost Underrun

Category 3

Category 4

Cost Overrun

Figure 4.2: Schematic Representation of the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun Bracket’
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The step-by-step procedure for analysis of cost overrun by cost overrun category is as follows:
(a) Start with the analysis of the planning stage cost overrun. Calculate the planning stage cost
overrun, Y1j, for each contract ‘j’ as described in Section 4.2.2.1.
(b) Categorize the contracts into the four categories of cost overrun based on the planning stage cost
overrun. Determine the number of contracts ‘Nk’ in each cost overrun category ‘k’.
(c) For the contracts in each cost overrun category ‘k’, calculate the average planning stage cost
overrun ( Y 1k ), the standard deviation (S1k) and the 95% confidence interval (C.I1k) of the average
planning stage cost overrun, as follows:
Nk

Y 1k =

∑ (Y )
j =1

1j

∑ (Y
Nk

S1k =

for k = 1, 2,3, 4

Nk

j =1

1j

− Y1

Nk −1

)

(4.9)

2

for k = 1, 2,3, 4

⎛
S
95% C.I : Y1k ± ⎜ t 0.95
× 1k
⎜ (1− 2 , Nk −1)
Nk
⎝

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠

for k = 1, 2,3, 4

(4.10)

(4.11)

The confidence interval represents a range of likely values of the average planning stage cost
overrun assuming that it is normally distributed.
(d) Tabulate the analysis results of planning stage cost overrun as shown in Table 4.4. The contracts
in categories 1 and 4 are of particular interest as they are outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun
bracket’.
(e) Repeat steps (a)-(d) to analyze the post-programming stage cost overrun (Y2), design stage cost
overrun (Y3), advertisement stage cost overrun (Y4), and letting stage (Y4) cost overrun by cost
overrun category.

42

Table 4.4: Illustrating the Framework for Analysis of Cost Overrun by Cost Overrun Category
Planning stage cost overrun

⎛ Final Cost - Proposed Cost ⎞
Y1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠
Planning stage cost overrun Category

Y1 < −10%

−10% ≤ Y1 < 0%

0% ≤ Y1 ≤ 10%

Y1 > 10%

Number of Contracts
Average Cost Overrun
Standard Deviation
95% Confidence
Interval

4.2.2.3. Step 2.3: Categorical Analysis of Cost Overrun by Contract Specific Factors
Categorical analysis involves analysis of contracts in each cost overrun category by contract specific
factors such as work category, contract size, contract type, route type, NHS status, district, and area type.
The trends in frequency and severity of cost overrun across geographic locations, work categories, route
types, contract types, and NHS status are examined. The step-by-step procedure for categorical analysis is
presented as follows:
(a) Start with the analysis of planning stage cost overrun by work category. Determine the number of
contracts (Nkp) in each work category ‘p’, that belong to planning stage cost overrun category ‘k’.
(b) Calculate the average planning stage cost overrun, its standard deviation and 95% confidence
interval by work category (‘p’) and cost overrun category (‘k’) as follows:
N kp

Y 1kp =

∑ (Y )
1kpj

j =1

N kp

S1kp =

(4.12)

N kp

∑ (Y
j =1

1kpj

− Y 1kp

)

2

(4.14)

N kp − 1

⎛
S
95% C .I : Y 1kp ± ⎜ t 0.95
× 1kp
⎜ (1− 2 , N kp −1)
N kp
⎝

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠

(4.15)
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where,
k = Cost Overrun Category; 1, 2, 3, 4
P = Total Number of Work Category factor Levels
p = Work Category Factor Level; 1, 2, .... P
N kp = Number of Contracts that belong to Cost Overrun Category k and
Work Category Factor Level p
Y1 kpj = Planning Stage Cost Overrun (Y1 ) of Contract j, belonging to
Cost Overrun Category k and Work Category Factor Level p
Y1 kp = Average PlanningStage Cost Overrun (Y1 ), across Contracts belonging to
Cost Overrun Category k and Work Category Factor Level p
S1 kp = Standard Deviation of the Average Planning Stage Cost Overrun (Y1 ), across Contracts
those belonging to Cost Overrun Category k and Work Category Factor Level p
Tabulate the results as shown in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Illustrating the Categorical Cost Overrun Analysis by Work and Cost Overrun Categories
Planning stage cost overrun

⎛ Final Cost - Proposed Cost ⎞
Y1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠
PLANNING STAGE COST OVERRUN CATEGORY

Expansion
Contracts
WORK
CATEGORY
FACTOR
LEVELS

Bridge
Contracts
Pavement
Contracts
Weighted
Average

Y1 < −10%

−10% ≤ Y1 < 0%

0% ≤ Y1 ≤ 10%

Y1 > 10%

Average:
Contracts:
C.I:
Average:
Contracts:
C.I:
Average:
Contracts:
C.I:
Average:
Contracts:
C.I:

Average:
Contracts:
C.I:
Average:
Contracts:
C.I:
Average:
Contracts:
C.I:
Average:
Contracts:
C.I:

Average:
Contracts:
C.I:
Average:
Contracts:
C.I:
Average:
Contracts:
C.I:
Average:
Contracts:
C.I:

Average:
Contracts:
C.I:
Average:
Contracts:
C.I:
Average:
Contracts:
C.I:
Average:
Contracts:
C.I:

Weighted
Average
Average:
Contracts:
C.I:
Average:
Contracts:
C.I:
Average:
Contracts:
C.I:
Average:
Contracts:
C.I:

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval of the Average

(c) Determine the frequency of occurrence of planning stage cost overrun that are greater than 10% in
magnitude, by work category (‘p’), as follows:
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Frequency of high cost overrun for
=
contracts belonging to work category 'p'

N kp
4

∑(N )

k = 1, 4
p = 1, 2, .... P

(4.16)

kp

k=1

(d) For contracts that experience a positive or negative cost overrun, at the planning stage, that
exceeds 10%, plot the average planning stage cost overrun and its 95% confidence intervals by
work category. The upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval indicate the severity of
cost overrun. Figure 4.5 presents a hypothetical scenario where the severity of cost overrun and
underrun is compared across the work categories.
(e) Repeat steps (a)-(d) to analyze planning stage cost overrun by other contract specific factors (in
addition to work category) such as contract size, contract type, route type, area type, district, and
NHS status.
(f) Repeat steps (a)-(e) to conduct categorical analysis of post programming stage, design stage,
advertisement stage, and letting stage cost overrun. Table 4.6 presents the framework.
Table 4.6: Framework for Categorical Analysis of Cost Overrun
Planning stage
cost overrun
Categories

Post
Programming
Stage Cost
Overrun
Categories

Design Stage
Cost Overrun
Categories

Advertisement
Stage Cost
Overrun
Categories

Letting Stage
Cost Overrun
Categories

Work Category
Contract Size
Contract Type
Route Type
Area Type
District
NHS Status

Steps (a) – (d)

In addition to the comparison of the final cost with each of the cost estimates (cost overrun
analysis), Steps (a)-(e) can be used for comparison of two cost estimates as well. However, the percentage
difference between two cost estimates is not referred to as cost overrun. In this study, the term cost overrun
is used to represent the comparison of the final cost with one of the cost estimates. The pair-wise
comparisons of the cost estimates do not provide information about the accuracy of the cost estimates but
provide information about how cost estimates change from one project development stage to another. Table
4.7 presents the framework for pair-wise comparisons of costs.

45

Table 4.7: Framework for Pair-wise Comparison of Cost Estimates
Proposed
Cost

Engineer’s
Assessment

Design
Cost

Engineer’s
Estimate

Letting
Cost

Proposed Cost
Engineer’s
Assessment Cost

-

Design Cost

-

-

Engineer’s
Estimate

-

-

-

Letting Cost

-

-

-

4.2.3.

-

Step 3: Analyses of Escalation Pattern of Cost Estimates

A methodology for analysis of the escalation pattern of the cost estimates from planning to final
construction is presented in this section (Step 3). Using the proposed methodology, common trends in the
escalation pattern can be identified and compared across the contract-specific factor levels. The noninflated cost estimates are analyzed in Step 3. If the non-inflated estimates are not available Step 3 is
skipped and the analysis proceeds to Step 4. The procedure for analysis in Step 3 is as follows:
(a) Define the Cost Escalation Patterns
Define the escalation patterns that are expected to be most commonly exhibited by the contracts. For
example, contracts may exhibit a pattern (say Pattern ‘A’, Figure 4.3), wherein the cost estimate increases
or remains constant from the planning stage until the advertisement stage, decreases from the advertisement
stage to the letting stage, and then increases or remains constant from letting to final construction. That is,
the estimate prepared at a later stage is higher or the same compared to the estimate prepared at the
immediate preceding stage, except at the letting stage when the letting cost is lower than the preceding
estimate. Such patterns are likely in an extremely competitive bidding scenario. Identification of contracts
that exhibit this pattern can provide insights about the reliability of low bidding estimates. For example, if
contracts of a certain type exhibit pattern ‘A’ more frequently than other contract types, then the low bids
for such contracts can be dealt with appropriately in the future.
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Cost Decreases at the
Letting Stage

Proposed

Engineer’s

Design

Engineer’s

Letting

Final

Cost

Assessment

Cost

Estimate

Cost

Cost

Estimated cost increases or remains the same between any two stages of project development, except
between Advertisement (Engineer’s Estimate) and Bidding Stage (Letting Cost)
Figure 4.3: Graphical Representation of Cost Escalation Pattern ‘A’
The escalation patterns may also be defined from the perspective of the level of interest planners
and decision-makers have in any particular trend that is shown by the cost estimates. For example, a
pattern, say Pattern ‘B’ (Figure 4.4), wherein the cost estimate increases or remains constant from the
planning stage until the final construction is considered to be an important pattern from the point of view of
the risk of cost overrun, and from the point of view of budget management. Once the contracts that exhibit
such a pattern have been identified, studies can be carried out to determine the nature of such contracts. The
percentage difference between final cost and proposed cost is likely to be high for the contracts that exhibit
this pattern. Moreover, contracts that exhibit pattern ‘B’ may be the ones that generally undergo scope
changes as they proceed through the planning and development phase. Also, contracts which are
deliberately underestimated at the planning stage so that they can be programmed in the statewide
transportation improvement program may exhibit such a pattern. Such assumptions can be validated by
defining pattern ‘B’ and conducting exploratory studies about the contracts that exhibit it.
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Cost Increases

Proposed

Engineer’s

Design

Engineer’s

Letting

Final

Cost

Assessment

Cost

Estimate

Cost

Cost

Estimated cost increases or remains constant between any two stages of project development
Figure 4.4: Graphical Representation of Cost Escalation Pattern ‘B’

Figure 4.5 shows another pattern (herein called Pattern ‘C’) that may interest decision-makers. For
the contracts that exhibit this pattern, the cost estimate increases or remains constant from the planning
stage to the letting stage, but the final incurred cost is less than the letting cost. Identification of such
contracts can help planners and decision-makers in determining the type of contracts that are overestimated by contractors. Contractors may overestimate to cover potential losses due to uncertainty
associated with the construction process. If overestimation on the part of the contractor is found to be the
reason for the high letting cost, then such construction risk-related uncertainties can be identified and
incorporated in the in-house estimates of proposed cost, engineer’s assessment, and design estimates to
ensure proper budget planning in case the uncertainties were to occur. On the other hand, the construction
process may be responsible for the completion of the project below the awarded amount. In such a scenario,
those contracts that exhibit this pattern can be set as role models. The identification of contracts that exhibit
such a pattern can allow planners and contractors to study why they were completed below the contracted
amount.
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Cost Decreases

Proposed

Engineer’s

Design

Engineer’s

Letting

Final

Cost

Assessment

Cost

Estimate

Cost

Cost

Estimated cost increases or remains constant between any two stages of project development except
between Bidding Stage (Letting Cost) and Construction Stage (Final Cost)
Figure 4.5: Graphical Representation of Cost Escalation Pattern ‘C’

4.2.4.

Step 4: Impact of Inflation

The impact of inflation is determined using the with / without approach (cost overrun with inflation vs. cost
overrun without inflation). Under this approach, first, the cost estimates at each stage are compared to the
final cost without adjusting for inflation and their accuracy is recorded. The percentage overrun of the final
cost compared to each estimate is determined using the equations 4.1 to 4.5 as discussed in Section 4.2.2.
Second, the cost estimates corresponding to each stage are adjusted to the year when the final construction
cost is incurred using the construction price index (CPI). The adjusted cost estimates are recorded as
inflated cost estimates. The ith inflated cost estimate (proposed, engineer’s assessment, design, engineer’s
estimate, and letting) is calculated as follows:
⎛ Construction Price Index ( Date6 ) ⎞
Inflated Estimate(i) = Non-Inflated Estimate(i) × ⎜
⎟
⎝ Construction Price Index ( Datei ) ⎠
where,
Date6 = Date when the final construction cost is incurred (refer to Figure 4.1)
Datei = Date when the ith cost estimate was prepared

(4.17)
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Equations 4.1 to 4.5 are used again, but this time with inflated cost estimates to calculate the
overrun of the final cost. Figure 4.6 presents this framework for determining the overrun corresponding to
inflated and non-inflated cost estimates.
The inflated cost estimates may be obtained directly from the highway agency instead of using the
construction price index to calculate the inflated estimates. The impact of inflation cannot be determined if
the inflated cost estimates are available but the non-inflated cost estimates are not. The methodology in
Steps 2 and 3 is then used to analyze the inflated cost estimates only.
Once the inflated and non-inflated cost estimates have been calculated, the role played by inflation
is determined by comparing the ‘without inflation cost overrun’ results with the ‘with inflation cost
overrun’ results. The impact of inflating the cost estimate is studied by plotting the ‘non-inflated cost
estimate’, the ‘inflated cost estimate’, and the ‘final construction cost’. Six possible cases are analyzed
depending upon the relative location of these numbers (as shown in Figure 4.7).
The first case represents a scenario in which the final cost is significantly higher than the noninflated proposed cost estimate. After adjusting the proposed cost for inflation, the inflated proposed cost
accounts for some of the overrun of the final cost but is still less than the final cost. While this case is
expected to be the most commonly exhibited, the possibility of occurrence of other cases should also be
studied. The second case represents a scenario in which the final cost is higher than the non-inflated
proposed cost (as in Case 1). However, after adjusting for inflation, the inflated proposed cost exceeds the
final cost. That is, without inflation adjustment a cost overrun is observed and with inflation adjustment a
cost underrun is observed. The third case represents a scenario in which the final cost is lower than the noninflated proposed cost. After adjustment for inflation the inflated proposed cost becomes even higher. That
is, inflation adjustment magnifies the cost underrun that was observed corresponding to the non-inflated
cost estimate.
The first three cases represent scenarios where inflation adjustment results in increasing the noninflated cost estimate, reflecting the growing trend of construction price index. However, construction price
index may also experience a decreasing trend across some years during a certain time period.
Consequently, the adjustment of non-inflated cost estimate for inflation will result in a lower inflated cost
estimate. Such scenarios, while rare, should also be considered for the sake of completeness. Cases 4, 5,
and 6 represent such scenarios. In Case 4, the non-inflated cost estimate is lower than the final cost and
becomes even lower after inflation adjustment. In Case 5, the non-inflated cost estimate is greater than the
final cost (indicating negative cost overrun or cost underrun) but becomes lower than the final cost after
inflation adjustment (indicating positive cost overrun). In Case 6, the non-inflated cost estimate is greater
than the final cost (as in Case 5) but remains greater than the final cost after inflation adjustment.
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Proposed
Cost
PCost

Engineer’s
Assessment

First
Estimate
(Stage 1)

Second
Estimate
(Stage 2)

EACost

Design
Cost
DCost
Third
Estimate
(Stage 3)

Engineer’s
Estimate
EECost
Fourth
Estimate
(Stage 4)

Letting
Cost
LCost

Final Cost

Fifth
Estimate
(Stage 5)

Incurred
Cost
(Stage 6)

FCost

Time
Date 1

Date 2

Date 3

WITHOUT INFLATION:DO STEPS 2 - 3

Date 4

Date 5

WITH INFLATION: DO STEPS 2 – 3

Accuracy of Stage 1 Estimate

Accuracy of Stage 1 Estimate

⎛ FCost − P Cost ⎞
Y1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
P Cost
⎝
⎠

⎛ FCost − PCost * ⎞
Y1* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
PCost *
⎝
⎠

Accuracy of Stage 2 Estimate

Accuracy of Stage 2 Estimate

⎛ FCost − EACost ⎞
Y2 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
EACost
⎝
⎠
Accuracy of Stage 3 Estimate

⎛ FCost − DCost ⎞
Y3 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
DCost
⎝
⎠
Accuracy of Stage 4 Estimate

⎛ F Cost − EE Cost ⎞
Y4 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
EECost
⎝
⎠

Date 6

⎛ FCost − EACost * ⎞
Y2* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
EACost *
⎝
⎠
Accuracy of Stage 3 Estimate

⎛ FCost − DCost * ⎞
Y3* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
DCost *
⎝
⎠
Accuracy of Stage 4 Estimate

⎛ FCost − EECost * ⎞
Y4* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
EECost *
⎝
⎠

Accuracy of Stage 5 Estimate

Accuracy of Stage 5 Estimate

⎛ FCost − LCost ⎞
Y5 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
LCost
⎝
⎠

⎛ FCost − LCost * ⎞
Y5* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
LCost *
⎝
⎠
* Indicates the Inflated Estimate

Figure 4.6: Analysis Framework for Calculating Cost Overrun With / Without Inflation
The number of contracts exhibiting each case is determined. The most commonly exhibited case is
identified. If Case 1 is the most commonly exhibited scenario, it is concluded that the cost estimate is an
underestimate of the final cost, but the extent of underestimation decreases with inflation adjustment. The
impact of inflation is calculated as follows:

51

Impact of Inflation =

% Deviation of

% Deviation of

Final Cost from

− Final Cost from

(4.18)

Non-Inflated Estimate Inflated Estimate

Impact of
Final Cost - Non Inflated Estimate Final Cost - Inflated Estimate
=
−
*
Inflation (I1 *)
Non Inflated Estimate
Inflated Estimate

(4.19)

On the other hand, if contracts exhibiting other cases are significantly more than contracts
exhibiting Case 1, the data implied that non-inflated estimates were possibly better estimates of final cost
than the inflated estimates were. In order to verify this implication, the methodology used for preparation of
non-inflated cost estimates is studied to determine if any inflation adjustments were made implicitly.

4.2.5.

Step 5: Development of Risk-Based Econometric Analysis Framework

In Steps 2 and 3, a methodology for analysis of the accuracy and escalation pattern of the historical cost
estimates was presented. This methodology involved a macroscopic statistical analysis to study the trends
in cost overrun and underrun associated with historical contracts. However, in order to examine and
elucidate any relationships, theories, or principles corresponding to the observed cost difference, there is a
need to conduct econometric analysis of the historical contract data. Econometric models can throw more
light on the possible relationships between cost overrun and the contract-specific factors.
Several studies have been conducted to relate cost overrun with contract-specific factors such as
geographic location, contract size, contract classification, contract work characteristics, contract schedule,
and contract letting characteristics. Some of these studies went further to develop models so as to predict
cost overrun or to simply relate cost overrun with one or more contract specific factors, so that cost
overruns could be mitigated in the future. Some of these studies are described as follows.
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Figure 4.7: Framework for Analyzing of the Impact of Inflation

Construction
Cost ($)

53

Bordat et al. (2004) found that project type, location, weather, difference between first and second
lowest bids, difference between engineer’s estimate and lowest bid, and project duration were significant
factors that explained cost overrun in Indiana during the period 1996-2001. In a subsequent study, ordinary
least square regression models were developed to predict cost overrun as a function of these projectspecific factors. Gkritza and Labi (2008) found that contracts with larger size and longer construction
contracts were more likely to incur cost overrun. Further, it was found that for contracts that incur cost
overrun, the cost overrun rate decreases non-linearly with increasing contract size until a certain point after
which the cost overrun rate increases with increasing contract size. Several other researchers found that
cost overrun tends to increase with the size of the project (Hinze et al., 1992; Korman and Daniel, 1998).
In addition to analyzing statistical relationships, Williams (2001) developed neural network and
regression models to predict the completed cost of highway construction projects using the bidding data.
The bid variables that were found significant in the prediction models included: lowest bid, median bid,
standard deviation of the bids, expected project construction duration, and number of bids. The models
which were developed for the New Jersey Department of Transportation and were found to produce good
predictions of final cost, and generally had good R-squared values.
Schexnayder et al. (2003) observed that the schedule of the project development phases plays an
important role in determining whether the final cost is higher than the proposed cost. Projects that are
planned, designed, and developed over a long period of time generally tend to have more room for scope
changes and consequently cost overruns.
The nature of work at construction sites has also been identified as a factor of cost overrun.
Thurgood et al. (1990) found that rehabilitation and reconstruction projects are more likely to have greater
cost overrun compared to maintenance projects. Bhargava et al. (2008) and Bordat et al., (2004) developed
models by work category to analyze and predict cost overrun. Across contracts of similar work categories
and work types, the changes in design that eventually lead to change orders and cost overrun during
construction are likely to be of a similar nature. Such changes in design are often one of the major causes of
cost overrun (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; JLARC, 2001; MacDonald et al., 2005; Jacoby, 2001).
In the present study, a methodology is proposed for the development of econometric models that
can be used to study the relationship of cost overrun and underrun with deterministic and random contractspecific factors. The deterministic factors include: geographic location, work category, highway functional
class, area type, NHS status, and contract size. The random contract-specific factors include: probability of
occurrence of an escalation pattern and variability in the occurrence probability of an escalation pattern.
The probability of an escalation pattern and its variability indicate the risk of a contract to experience cost
overrun. The econometric models that are developed using such random variables as independent variables
are therefore referred to as ‘risk-based econometric models’ in this study. Consequently, the framework
comprising of such models is referred to as ‘risk-based econometric analysis framework’. Figure 4.8, the
proposed framework, comprises three modules each of which uses a set of econometric models to
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determine an aspect related to cost overrun / underrun. Module I’s econometric models determine the
probability and variability in probability of an escalation pattern based on the deterministic contract
specific factors; Module II’s econometric models determine probability of cost overrun based on
deterministic and random variables; Module III’s econometric models determine magnitude of cost
overrun.
Module I: Discrete Choice Logit Models to Determine
Probability of Escalation Pattern

Module II: Risk-Based Discrete Choice Logit Models to
Determine Probability of Cost Overrun

Module III: Truncated Regression Models or Simple Averages
to Determine Magnitude of Cost Overrun
Figure 4.8: Proposed Risk-Based Econometric Analysis Framework
The step-by-step procedures used in this study for developing of the econometric models in each
module are outlined in Sections 4.2.5.1 to 4.2.5.4. The methodology can be replicated by planners and
decision-makers for analyzing of cost overruns at each stage of project development. Before developing the
econometric models, it is useful to identify the deterministic contract-specific factors.
The quantity and quality of information on the deterministic contract-specific factors increases as
the contract evolves through the planning and development stages. Therefore, the econometric models
corresponding to the three modules can be developed for each project development stage using the
contract-specific factors that are available at that stage. Table 4.8 shows the contract-specific factors that
are typically available in Indiana at each project development stage. For example, at the letting stage,
information on time taken to complete design plans and time taken to let a project are available. Models
developed on the basis of such data are more useful in attempts to predict probability and magnitude of cost
overrun compared to those based on information available at planning stage.
Figure 4.9 presents the preliminary steps that are carried out before proceeding to the development
of the risk-based econometric analysis framework. First, the project development stage (planning, or postprogramming or design or letting), for which the econometric models have to be developed, is selected.
Next, the deterministic contract-specific factors that are available at the selected stage are identified from
Table 4.8 and information on historical highway contracts is selected corresponding to each of the
identified factors. Once the deterministic contract-specific factors have been identified, development of the
econometric models corresponding to the three modules can begin.
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Preliminary Step 1: Select Project Development Stage
(Planning or Post Programming or Design or Letting)

Preliminary Step 2: Identify Contract Specific Factors
Available at the Selected Stage

Develop Risk-Based Econometric Framework
To Analyze Cost Overrun at the Selected Stage
Figure 4.9: Steps Involved in Preparing for the Development of Econometric Analysis Framework

56

Table 4.8: Contract-Specific Factors for Econometric Analysis Framework

Project Development Stage for which the
Econometric Analysis Framework is being Developed
Contract-Specific Factor

Geographic
Location

Contract
Classification

Work
Characteristics

Cost Estimate

Time Schedule

Letting
Characteristics

Planning
Stage

Post
Programming
Stage

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Project Proposal to Design
Completion

-

-

Project Proposal to Letting

-

-

Expected Construction Duration

-

-

Number of Bids Received

-

-

-

Bid Amounts

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

District
County
North / South / East / West
Urban vs. Rural Area
FMIS Area (Based on
Population )
Highway Functional Class
Route Type
NHS Status
Program Class
Work Category (Bridge,
Pavement, etc)
Work Type (Pavement
Resurfacing, Rehabilitation,
Bridge Rehab / Replacement)
Basic Nature of Site Work
(Paving, Excavation, Utilities,
RW etc)
Proposed Cost
Engineer’s Assessment
Design Cost
Engineer’s Estimate
Bid Amounts

Time Allotted for Bid
Preparation
Contract Completion Deadline
Specification (AD, DT, CD)
Contract Classification
(Standalone vs. Kin)

Final Design
Stage

-

Letting
Stage
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4.2.5.1. Step 5.1: Development of Module I for Analysis of Escalation Patterns
The procedure for the development of Module I discrete choice models is as follows:
a)

Determine the escalation pattern of the cost estimates for each of the ‘N’ historical contracts in the
database. Section 4.2.3 described the procedure for determining the escalation pattern.

b) For each historical contract, tabulate the observed escalation pattern and the corresponding contract
specific factors that are believed to influence the escalation pattern.
c)

The discrete choice modeling framework is based on the premise, that, given a set of possible
escalation patterns, {A, B,…, K}, the cost estimates of a contract are likely to exhibit each pattern with
a certain probability. For each historical contract, the pattern that was exhibited was the one which had
the maximum probability for this contract. The extent to which a contract is likely to exhibit a
particular pattern depends upon the ‘U-function’ of the pattern. The ‘U-function’ of a pattern is a
function of contract specific factors (X). Mathematically, the U-function of a pattern ‘i’ can be
expressed as follows:
Ri

U Pattern 'i ' = ∑ηir X ir

i ∈{ A, B,...., K }

(4.20)

r =1

where,
i= Indicates the escalation pattern of the cost estimates, i Î{A, B,...., K}
r = Indicates the contract specific factor in the U-Function of pattern 'i', r Î{1, 2,...., R i }
U Pattern 'i' =U-Function of Pattern 'i'
X ir = Contract specific factor 'r' that affects probability of contract exhibiting pattern 'i'
ηir = Coefficient of the contract specific factor 'r'in the U-function of pattern 'i'
R i = Number of statistically significant contract specific factors in the U-function of pattern 'i'

d) Using the multinomial logit regression approach, the contract specific factors that significantly
influence the U-function of an escalation pattern are identified and the coefficients of each of these
factors in the corresponding U-function equation are calibrated using data from historical contracts.
Statistical software such as SAS, NLogit, Minitab, and Limdep can be used for calibration. The
calibrated U-function equations are used to calculate the U-function of each pattern given the contract
type. The probability of a contract to exhibit pattern ‘i’ is calculated as follows:

P Pattern ' i ' =

eU Pattern ' i '
K

∑e

for i = { A, B , ....., K }

(4.21)

U Pattern ' i '

i= A

e)

Use the nested logit regression approach to calibrate the U-function equations if two or more patterns
are expected to be significantly correlated to each other. The nested logit approach accounts for the
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) limitation of the multinomial logit approach in a scenario
when the patterns are highly correlated. The nested logit modeling technique classifies the patterns into
categories based on the common characteristics of the patterns. For example, the non-decreasing
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escalation pattern of the cost estimates from the proposed cost to the engineer’s estimate is a common
characteristic between the patterns ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ that were defined in Figures 4.3 through 4.5.
Therefore, these patterns could be nested as shown in Figure 4.10, with pattern ‘D’ representing any
escalation pattern not covered by patterns ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C', and the nested logit approach can be used
to calibrate the U-function equations. Statistical software such as SAS and Limdep can be used to test
the appropriateness of the nesting structure. If the nesting structure is found to be inappropriate, it can
be concluded that the correlation between the nested patterns is not significant and therefore the
calibrated multinomial logit U-function equations (in Step (d)) can be used to study the impact of
contract-specific factors. However, if the nesting structure is found to be significant, the calibrated
multinomial logit model in Step (d) is discarded.
Escalation Pattern

Nested Patterns
Category 1

Pattern A

Pattern B

Nested Patterns
Category 2

Pattern C

Pattern D

Figure 4.10: A Hypothetical Nested Structure of Four Cost Escalation Patterns
f)

Use the mixed logit regression approach for calibrating the U-function equations if the coefficients of
the U-function equations are expected to vary randomly across the contracts. The multinomial logit
regression approach in Step (d) assumes that the coefficients of the contract-specific factors in the Ufunction equations are the same for all the historical contracts. The validity of this assumption is tested
by calibrating the U-function equations using the mixed logit approach. If the standard deviation
corresponding to a coefficient that is randomly varied across the contracts is found to be significant,
the mixed logit models are used to study the influence of contract-specific factors on the probability of
escalation pattern. However, if the coefficients are not found to vary randomly, the multinomial logit
models or nested logit models are used depending upon whichever is appropriate in Step (e).

g) The transferability of the parameters of the developed model across the factor levels such as the
various districts, the different work categories, or the different contract types is then ascertained.
Therefore, the Steps (d), (e) and (f) are repeated to calibrate the discrete choice econometric models
separately for each work category, contract type (stand-alone vs. kin contract), or contract size.
Separate models are developed for each factor level corresponding to any contract-specific factor using
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the methodology in Steps (d), (e), and (f). A likelihood ratio test (Washington et al., 2003) is conducted
to determine if ‘separate’ models are required by factor level (say work category types) or if a ‘single
model’ for all factor levels explains the cost escalation patterns better. The likelihood test is conducted
by comparing the log-likelihoods (LL) of the models. The log-likelihood of the ‘single model’ for all
factor levels (say, work categories) is compared with the log-likelihood of the ‘separate’ models
corresponding to the ‘I’ different factor levels (say, work categories). The comparison is done by
computing the following test-statistic:

⎧ ⎛ Single Model
⎞ I
⎛ Model for
⎞⎫
D = 2 × ⎨ LL ⎜
⎟ − ∑ LL ⎜
⎟⎬
⎝ factor level ' i ' ⎠ ⎭
⎩ ⎝ for all factor levels ⎠ i =1

(4.22)

The test statistic ‘D’ is chi-squared distributed with ‘df’ degrees of freedom (DF). The degree of
freedom is calculated as:

⎧
⎛ Single Model
⎞ I
⎛ Model for
⎞⎫
df = ⎨ DF ⎜
⎟ − ∑ DF ⎜
⎟⎬
⎝ for all factor levels ⎠ i =1
⎝ factor level ' i ' ⎠ ⎭
⎩

(4.23)

The p-value corresponding to the test-statistic ‘D’ is computed and if less than 0.05, it is
concluded that separate models by factor level are required to explain the cost overrun, that is the
parameters of the econometric model are not transferable across the factor levels.
Econometric models are calibrated using the Steps (a)-(g) for all the risk-based econometric
frameworks using the contract specific factors that are available corresponding to that stage. The predictive
capability of each framework is determined using the McFadden R-squared value (Washington et al.,
2003). The economic relationships between cost overrun and the contract specific factors are studied using
the calibrated coefficients of the various contract specific factors that are found significant in the
econometric models (at 95% confidence level).

4.2.5.2. Step 5.2: Development of Module II to Analyze Probability of Cost Overrun
Module II comprises of a set of discrete choice econometric models that are used to analyze the probability
of overrun of the final cost compared to the proposed estimate, engineer’s assessment, design estimate,
engineer’s estimate, and letting cost. The models are used to determine the probability and to study the
factors that influence the probability of a contract type having a cost overrun of less than -10% (cost
overrun category ‘1’), between -10% and 0% (cost overrun category ‘2’), between 0% and 10% (cost
overrun category ‘3’), and greater than 10% (cost overrun category ‘4’). Calibration of the models is done
based on the observed cost overrun corresponding to the historical contracts. The contract-specific factors
and the risk of a contract to exhibit a particular cost escalation pattern (as measured in Module I) are used
as independent variables in the model calibration. The step-by-step procedure for the development of the
models is presented in this section. The methodology for determining the risk associated with predicting
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whether a contract has a cost overrun of greater than 10%, between -10% and 10% or less than -10%, has
also been presented.
The methodology presented in this section can also be used to develop models for comparison of
cost estimates with final cost as well as for pair-wise comparison of cost estimates. The framework for pairwise comparison of any two cost estimates is discussed in Section 4.2.2 (Table 4.7). The procedure for
development of the discrete choice models for Module II is:
a)

For all the ‘N’ historical contracts that were used for calibrating the models in Module I, determine the
risk that a contract will exhibit each of the ‘K’ cost escalation patterns.

Calculation of Risk of Occurrence of a Cost Escalation Pattern (Based on Module I Models)
The risk of occurrence of a cost escalation pattern is measured by the probability of its occurrence. The
probability of occurrence of an escalation pattern is estimated using the econometric models in Module
I. However, the calibrated discrete choice models in Module I use the contract-specific factors as
independent variables to predict a point estimate of the probability of a contract to exhibit a certain
cost escalation pattern. The contract-specific factors such as district, area, size, work category, route,
and functional class define a category of contract types instead of a specific contract. The predicted
point estimate of the probability (based on the contract-specific factors) is therefore an estimate of the
average probability that is expected across all the contracts that fit the specified type. Because each
contract is unique, the probability of cost overrun may vary across contracts of the same type.
Therefore, there is a risk associated in using the same deterministic point estimate of the predicted
probability across all the contracts of a particular type. For each contract type, Monte Carlo simulation
is carried out to randomly select the coefficients of the calibrated models from their respective
distributions and to predict the probability of a particular escalation pattern in each simulation run. The
multivariate normal distribution of the calibrated coefficients is expressed as:

η ~ N (η , Ση )

(4.24)

where,

η = Mean vector comprising of the calibrated model coefficients
∑ n = Variance Covariance Matrix of the model coeffcients

⎡η A1 ⎤
⎢
⎥
.
⎥
r ⎢
η = ⎢ηir ⎥
⎢
⎥
⎢.
⎥
⎢η ⎥
⎣ KRK ⎦

⎡ Var (η A1 )
⎢
.
⎢
⎢
Ση = Cov (η ir ,η A1 )
⎢
.
⎢
⎢
⎣Cov (η KRK ,η A1 )

.
.
.
.
.

Cov (η A1 ,η ir )

. Cov (η A1 ,η KRK ) ⎤
⎥
.
.
.
⎥
Var (η ir )
. Cov (η ir ,η KRK ) ⎥
⎥
.
.
.
⎥
⎥
Cov (η KRK ,η ir ) .
Var (η KRK ) ⎦
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ηir = Calibrated coefficient of factor 'r' in the U-Function of pattern 'i'
Var(ηir ) = Variance of the coefficient 'ηir '
Cov(ηir ,ηA1 ) = Covariance of the coefficients 'ηir 'and 'ηA1'
The calibrated coefficients of the U-function equations in Steps (d), (e), and (f) are the mean of the
normal distribution corresponding to the respective coefficient. The variance-covariance matrix of the
coefficients is obtained from the software that is used to calibrate the models. For each contract type,
repeated random sampling of the coefficients is done from the multivariate normal distribution of the
coefficients. Based on the value of the coefficients in each draw, the point estimate of the U-function
of each pattern is calculated, and consequently the probability of the contract exhibiting the
corresponding escalation pattern is determined. However, the computation time with this approach can
be very high as the time required for repeated random sampling from a multivariate normal distribution
is directly proportional to the dimension of the vector of the calibrated coefficients. As the number of
contract-specific factors that are found significant in the pattern U-function equations increase, the
number of calibrated coefficients increases, and consequently the multivariate normal distribution of
the coefficients achieves a higher dimension and becomes more complicated. Repeated random
sampling from such a multivariate normal distribution takes significantly more time.
Hsu and Wilcox (2000) suggested a dimensionality reduction technique for multinomial logit
models (MNL). For each contract, the calibrated MNL model coefficients are used to determine the
value of the U-function for each pattern. Since the calibrated coefficients are normally distributed, the
values of the U-functions are also normally distributed. The values of the U-functions that are
calculated using the calibrated coefficients are mean values corresponding to their normal
distributions. This is because the calibrated coefficients in Steps (d), (e), and (f) were mean values
corresponding to the normal distributions of the coefficients. The variance-covariance matrix of the Ufunctions is calculated from the variance-covariance matrix of the model coefficients and the contractspecific factors (X), as follows:
Ai

Ai

Ai

Var (U Pattern ' i ' ) = ∑ X ri2Var (η ir ) + 2 × ∑ ∑ X ri X r 'i Co v(η ir ,η ir ' )
r =1

(4.25)

r =1 r ' < r

Ai

Aj

Cov(U Pattern 'i ' , U Pattern ' j ' ) = ∑∑ X ri X r ' j Co v(ηir ,η jr ' )

(4.26)

r =1 r ' =1

Based on the calculated value and variance-covariance matrix of the U-functions, their
multivariate normal distribution can be specified as follows:

62

U ~ N (U , ΣU )

(4.27)

⎡U Pattern ' A ' ⎤
⎢
⎥
⎢.
⎥
⎢
U = U Pattern 'i ' ⎥
⎢
⎥
⎢.
⎥
⎢
⎥
⎢⎣U Pattern ' K ' ⎥⎦
⎡
Var (U Pattern ' A ' )
⎢
.
⎢
⎢
ΣU = Cov(U Pattern ' i ' , U Pattern ' A ' )
⎢
⎢
.
⎢
⎢⎣Cov(U Pattern ' K ' , U Pattern ' A ' )

. Cov (U Pattern ' A ' , U Pattern 'i ' ) . Cov (U Pattern ' A ' , U Pattern ' K ' ) ⎤
⎥
.
.
.
.
⎥
.
. Cov(U Pattern 'i ' , U Pattern ' K ' ) ⎥
Var (U Pattern 'i ' )
⎥
⎥
.
.
.
.
⎥
Cov (U Pattern ' K ' ,ηir )
Var (U Pattern ' K ' )
.
.
⎥⎦

where,
U= Mean Vector comprising of Mean Values of the U-Functions

∑ U = Variance Covariance Matrix of the Pattern U-Functions
Var(U Pattern 'i' ) = Variance of U-Function of Pattern 'i'
Cov(U Pattern 'i' ,U Pattern 'j' ) = Covariance of U-Functions of Patterns 'i'and 'j'

The variance-covariance matrix of the U-functions is a function of the contract-specific factors.
Therefore, for each contract type a unique multivariate normal distribution is obtained. Figure 4.11
shows an illustration of a hypothetical 2-dimensional multivariate normal distribution of the Ufunction, corresponding to a particular contract type. Repeated random sampling of the value of Ufunction from the multivariate normal distribution of each contract type is conducted to determine the
variability across the contracts of the same type to exhibit pattern ‘i’. In each draw, the probability of
the pattern is calculated on the basis of the randomly sampled value of the U-function. For any
contract, the probability of pattern ‘i’ in the ‘dth’ draw, is calculated as follows:
d

d
Pattern ' i '

P

=

e U Pattern ' i '
K

∑e

U

d
P attern ' i '

i= A

where, D = Total number of random draws

for i = A , B , ....., K
for d = 1, 2, 3 ..... D

(4.28)
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Probability

Value of
U-function
For Pattern ‘B’

Value of
U-function
For Pattern ‘A’

Figure 4.11: 3-Dimensional Illustration of a Multivariate Normal Distribution of the U-functions
For the given contract type, based on the ‘D’ draws in the Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) process,
the mean and standard deviation of the probability to exhibit pattern ‘i’ are calculated as:

∑ (P
D

MCS
Pattern 'i'

P

=

d =1

d
Pattern 'i'

)

for i = A, B ,....., K

D

∑ (P
D

MCS
Pattern 'i'

S_P

=

i =1

d
Pattern 'i'

MCS
Pattern 'i'

-P

)

(4.29)

2

D −1

(4.30)

where,
D = Total number of draws
d
th
PPattern
'i' = Probability of a contract to exhibit Pattern 'i' in 'd ' draw
MCS
PPattern
'i' = Mean Probability of a contract to exhibit Pattern 'i' (MCS Based)
MCS
S_PPatter
n 'i' = Standard deviation of the probability of a contract to exhibit Pattern 'i'

MCS
The Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) based mean probability, PPattern
' i ' , approaches the point

estimate of the probability,

P Pattern 'i ' , as the number of draws in Monte Carlo Simulation is increased.

The risk associated with the probability of a contract to exhibit a pattern ‘i’ is determined based on the
variability of the probability across the ‘D’ repeated random draws. In addition to the standard
deviation, the coefficient of variation and the 95% confidence interval of the mean probability are used
as measures of the variability. The 95% confidence interval of the mean probability indicates the
reliability of the mean probability by specifying the interval in which the mean probability is likely to
be. The coefficient of variation measures the dispersion of the true distribution of the probability of a
contract type to exhibit pattern ‘i’.
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The coefficient of variation and the 95% confidence intervals are calculated as follows:
MCS
MCS
MCS
C.V_PPattern
'i' : S_PPattern 'i' PPattern 'i'
MCS
Pattern 'i'

C.I_P

MCS
Pattern 'i'

: P

MCS
⎛
S_PPattern
'i'
± ⎜ t 0.95 ×
⎜ (1- ,D-1)
D
2
⎝

(4.31)

⎞
⎟⎟
⎠

where,
MCS
C.V_PPattern
'i' = Coefficient of Variation of the Probability of a contract to exhibit Pattern 'i'
MCS
C.I_PPattern
'i' = 95% Confidence Interval of the Mean Probability of a contract to exhibit Pattern 'i'

The true distribution of the probability of a particular contract type to exhibit pattern ‘i’ is
specified based on the Monte Carlo Simulation results as follows:
MCS
MCS
PPattern 'i ' ~ N (PPattern
'i' ,S_PPattern 'i' )

for i = A, B,......, K

(4.32)

b) For each of the ‘N’ historical contracts, calculate the observed cost overrun of the final cost compared
to the proposed cost (planning stage cost overrun), engineer’s assessment cost (post-programming
stage cost overrun), design cost (design stage cost overrun), engineer’s estimate (advertisement stage
cost overrun), and letting cost (letting stage cost overrun).
c)

Determine the cost overrun category (<-10%, -10% to 0%, 0% to 10%, and >10%), in which each of
the ‘N’ historical contracts lie, on the basis of each of the computed cost overrun in Step (b).

d) Tabulate the results of Steps (a), (b), and (c) for each of the ‘N’ historical contracts. Also, tabulate the
contract-specific factors. This database will be used for calibrating the discrete choice models in this
module.
e)

The discrete choice modeling framework is based on the premise that given the four cost overrun
categories (<-10%, -10% to 0%, 0% to 10%, and >10%), the cost overrun of a contract is likely to lie
in each of the categories with a certain probability. The probability of a contract to have a cost overrun
in the cost overrun category ‘c’ is influenced by the contract specific factors (X) and the probability of
occurrence of an escalation pattern. Mathematically, the U-function of a cost overrun category ‘c’ is
expressed as:
Ac

MCS
MCS
MCS
⎤
U Category ' c ' = f c ⎡⎣ X r , PPattern
' i ' , S _ PPattern ' i ' , C . I _ PPattern ' i ' ⎦ = ∑ ω ca Z ca
a =1

for c = 1, 2, 3, 4

(4.33)
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where,
i= Indicates the escalation pattern of cost estimates, i ∈ {A, B,...., K}
r = Indicates the contract specific factor X, r ∈ {1, 2,...., R}
c = Indicates the Cost Overun Category, c ∈ {1, 2,3, 4}
U Category 'c' =Mean Value of U-Function for cost overrun category 'c'
X r = Contract specific factor 'r'
Z ca = Factor 'a' that significantly affects the U-Function of cost overrun category 'c'

ωca = Coefficient of the factor 'c' in the U-Function equation of cost overrun category 'c'
Ac = Number of statistically significant factors in the U-Function equation of cost overrun category 'c'

f)

Using the multinomial logit regression approach, identify the factors ‘Z’, that significantly influence
the U-function of a cost overrun category. Calibrate the coefficients of each of these factors in the
corresponding U-function equations using the historical contract database prepared in Step (d).
Statistical software such as SAS, NLogit, and Minitab can be used for calibration. The procedure is
carried out to calibrate discrete choice models corresponding to the planning stage, post-programming
stage, design stage, advertisement stage, and letting stage cost overruns. The calibrated U-function
equations are used to calculate the probability of each cost overrun category given the factors ‘Z’
corresponding to a contract. The probability of a contract to lie in cost overrun category ‘c’ is
calculated as follows:

P Category ' c ' =

eU Category ' c '
K

∑e

for c = 1, 2, 3, 4

(4.34)

U Category ' c '

I =1

g) Use the nested logit regression approach to calibrate the U-function equations if two or more cost
overrun categories are expected to be correlated to each other. The nested logit approach accounts for
the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) limitation of the multinomial logit approach in such a
scenario. The cost overun categories are classified into one nest depending upon the common
characteristics that are believed to exist between any two categories. For example, the cost overrun
categories ‘1’ (cost overrun < -10%) and ‘2’ (cost overrun between -10% and 0%) can be nested
together, as both of them represent a negative cost overrun (i.e., a cost underrun); similarly, the
categories ‘3’ (cost overrun between 0% and 10%) and ‘4’ (cost overrun > 10%) as both categories
represent a cost overrun. Figure 4.12 shows the schematic representation of this nesting structure. The
nested logit regression approach can be used to calibrate the U-function equations using such nested
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structures. Statistical software such as SAS and Limdep can be used to test the appropriateness of the
nesting structure. If the nesting structure is found to be inappropriate, it is concluded that the
correlation between the nested categories is not significant and therefore the calibrated multinomial
logit U-function equations (in Step (f)) are used. However, if the nesting structure is found to be
significant, the calibrated multinomial logit model in Step (f) is discarded.

Cost Overrun

Negative Cost Overrun (Underrun)

< -10%

[-10%, 0%]

Positive Cost Overrun

[0%, 10%]

> 10%

Figure 4.12: A Hypothetical Nested Structure of Cost Overrun Categories

h) Use the mixed logit regression approach for calibrating the U-function equations if the coefficients of
the U-function equations are expected to vary randomly across the contracts. The multinomial logit
regression approach in Step (f) assumes that the coefficients of the contract-specific factors in the Ufunction equations are the same for all the historical contracts. The validity of this assumption is tested
by calibrating the U-function equations using the mixed logit approach. If the standard deviation
corresponding to a coefficient that is randomly varied across the contracts is found to be significant,
the mixed logit models are used to study the influence of the factors ‘Z’, on the probability of cost
overrun. However, if the coefficients are not found to vary randomly, the multinomial logit models or
nested logit models are used depending upon whichever is found appropriate in Step (g).
i)

Repeat Steps (f), (h), and (i) to calibrate the discrete choice econometric models separately for each
work category, contract type, or contract size. Separate models can be developed for each factor level
corresponding to any contract-specific factor using the same methodology as described in Steps (d),
(e), and (f). A likelihood test is conducted as described in Step (g) of Module I, to determine if
‘separate’ models are required by factor level or if a ‘single model’ for all factor levels explains the
cost escalation patterns better.
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4.2.5.3. Step 5.3: Development of Module III for Analyzing Severity of Cost Overrun
Module III comprises of a set of regression models that are used to analyze the severity of overrun of the
final cost compared to the proposed estimate, engineer’s assessment, design estimate, engineer’s estimate,
and letting cost. The severity of cost overrun is measured as the expected value of the percentage overrun.
The models are calibrated on the basis of the observed cost overrun corresponding to the historical
contracts. The contract-specific factors and the risk of a contract to exhibit a particular cost escalation
pattern (as measured using the econometric models in Module I) are used as independent variables in the
model calibration. The cost estimate corresponding to which the overrun models have to be developed is
selected first. The methodology presented in this section can also be used to develop models for pair-wise
comparison of two cost estimates as well. The step-by-step procedure for the calibration of the econometric
models in this module is as follows:
a)

For all the ‘N’ historical contracts that were used for calibrating the models in Modules I and II,
determine the risk of a contract to exhibit each of the ‘K’ cost escalation patterns. The risk is calculated
as described in Step (b) in the procedure for development of Module II econometric models.

b) Calculate the percentage cost overrun (Yi: final cost vs. the selected cost estimate) for all the ‘N’
historical contracts and then categorize the contracts by cost overrun category (as shown in Table 4.9
for Planning stage cost overrun). Also, determine the average cost overrun and the 95% confidence
interval of the average cost overrun across contracts in each category.
Table 4.9: Planning Stage Cost Overrun by Cost Overrun Category
⎛ Final Cost - Proposed Cost ⎞
Y1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

Planning stage cost overrun
Category 1

Category 2

Category 3

Category 4

Y1 < −10%

−10% ≤ Y1 < 0%

0% ≤ Y1 ≤ 10%

Y1 > 10%

Average:
No. of Contracts:
C.I:

Average:
No. of Contracts:
C.I:

Average:
No. of Contracts:
C.I:

Average:
No. of Contracts:
C.I:

C.I: Confidence Interval
c)

Calibrate truncated regression models for the contracts in each cost overrun category ‘c’. Truncated
regression models are calibrated since contracts in each category are bounded by their respective cost
overrun limits. The contract-specific factors and the risk of a contract to exhibit a particular cost
escalation pattern are used as independent variables to calibrate the models.
MCS
MCS
MCS
⎤
E (Yi | Cost Overrun Category ' c ') = f c ⎡⎣ X r , PPattern
' i ' , S _ PPattern ' i ' , C .I _ PPattern ' i ' ⎦
Ac

E (Yi | Cost Overrun Category ' c ') = ∑ β ca Fca
a =1

for c =1, 2,3, 4

(4.35)
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Here, E[ | ] represents the expected value which is obtained from the calibrated regression model.

4.2.6.

Step 6: Determining Cost Overrun Relationships

A sensitivity analysis is conducted to determine the relationships between cost overrun at any stage with
the various contract-specific factors. Each of the contract-specific factors are varied and the impact on the
following is studied:
• probability that cost estimates of a contract will exhibit a particular escalation pattern (Using Module I

Discrete Choice Econometric Models),
• probability that a contract will have a cost overrun less than -10%, between -10% and 0%, between 0%

and 10%, and greater than 10% (Using Module II Discrete Choice Econometric Models),
• expected percentage cost overrun (Using Module II Discrete Choice Econometric Models and Module III

Truncated Regression Models corresponding to each cost overrun category ‘c’).

4.2.6.1. Calculating Probability of Escalation Pattern
The probability of occurrence of an escalation pattern is estimated using the econometric models in Module
I. Given a specific contract type, a Monte Carlo simulation is conducted as described in Section 4.2.5.2.

4.2.6.2. Calculating Probability of Cost Overrun Categories
The calibrated discrete choice models in Module II, regardless of whether they are multinomial logit (Step
(f)), nested logit (Step (g)), or mixed logit (Step (h)) involve the use of the contract-specific factors and the
risk associated with occurrence of a cost escalation pattern (from Module I) as independent variables. These
variables are used to predict a point estimate of the probability of cost overrun for a particular contract type.
The contract-specific factors such as district, area, size, work category, route, and functional class define a
category of contract types instead of identifying a specific contract. The predicted point estimate of the
probability of cost overrun (based on the contract-specific factors) is therefore an estimate of the average
probability across all the contracts that fit the specified type. Because each contract is unique, probability of
cost overrun may vary across the contracts of the same type. Therefore, there is a risk associated in using
the same deterministic point estimate of the probability across all the contracts of a particular type. In order
to account for the risk, the standard deviation and the 95% confidence interval of the probability of cost
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overrun are determined using Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS). Repeated random sampling of the model
coefficients from a multivariate normal distribution is carried out in Monte Carlo Simulation. The
multivariate normal distribution of the calibrated coefficients is expressed as:

ω ~ N (ω , Σω )
where,

(4.36)

ω = Parameter vector comprising of coefficients of Module II econometric models

The parameter vector and the variance-covariance matrix corresponding to Module II U-function
equations are specified as:
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where,

ωcr = Calibrated coefficient of factor 'r' in the U-function of cost overrun category 'c'
ω = Mean vector comprising of the calibrated model coefficients
∑ω = Variance Covariance Matrix of the model coeffcients
Var(ωcr ) = Variance of the coefficient 'ωcr '
Cov(ωcr ,ω11 ) = Covariance of the coefficients 'ωcr 'and 'ω11'
The calibrated coefficients of the U-function equations in steps (f), (g), and (h) are used to
construct the mean vector ω . The variance-covariance matrix ( ∑ω ) of the coefficients is obtained from the
software that is used to calibrate the models. For each contract type, repeated random sampling of the
coefficients is done from the multivariate normal distribution of the coefficients. Based on the value of the
coefficients in each draw, the point estimate of the U-function of each cost overrun category is calculated,
and consequently the probability of the contract to have a cost overrun in that category is determined.
Because the number of coefficients in the developed discrete choice models is likely to be high, the
dimension of the multivariate normal distribution of the coefficients is large. Repeated random sampling
from such a distribution takes a lot of computation time. For multinomial logit models, the dimensionality
reduction technique (Hsu and Wilcox, 2000) is used as discussed in Section 4.3.1.2. The variancecovariance matrix of the U-functions corresponding to cost overrun categories is calculated from the
variance-covariance matrix of the model coefficients ( ∑ω ), and the factors (Z) that affect the U-functions.
The calculations are carried out as follows:
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Ac

Ac

Ac

r =1

r =1 r ' < r

Var (U Category ' c ' ) = ∑ Z rc2 Var (ωcr ) + 2 × ∑∑ Z rc Z r ' c Co v(ωcr , ωcr ' )
Ai

(4.37)

Aj

Cov (U Category 'i ' , U Category ' j ' ) = ∑∑ Z ri Z r ' j Co v(ωir , ω jr ' )

(4.38)

r =1 r ' =1

Based on the calculated point estimates, variances, and covariances the multivariate normal distribution of
the utilities corresponding to the cost overrun categories is specified as:

U ~ N (U , ΣU )

(4.39)

⎡U Category '1' ⎤
⎢
⎥
⎢U Category '2' ⎥
U =⎢
⎥
⎢U Category '3' ⎥
⎢U Category '4' ⎥
⎣
⎦
⎡
Var (U Category '1' )
Cov(U Category '1' , U Category '4' ) ⎤
.
.
⎢
⎥
Var (U Category '2' )
.
.
.
⎢
⎥
ΣU = ⎢
⎥
Var (U Category '3' )
.
.
.
⎢
⎥
⎢Cov(U Category '4' , U Category '1' )
⎥
Var (U Category '4' )
.
.
⎣
⎦
where,
U= Mean Vector comprising of the point estimates of the pattern utilities
∑ U = Variance Covariance Matrix of the pattern utilities
Var(U Category 'c' ) = Variance of the Utility of Cost Overrun Category 'c'
Cov(U Category 'i' ,U Category 'j' ) = Covariance of the Utility of Cost Overrun Categories 'i'and 'j'

The U-functions of the cost overrun categories also follow a multivariate normal distribution
similar to the U-function of the pattern probabilities. Monte Carlo simulation is conducted to randomly
draw the value of the U-Functions from the multivariate normal distribution and determine the probability
of cost overrun in each draw. For any contract, the probability of cost overrun being in category ‘c’, in the
‘dth’ draw, is calculated as follows:
d
Category ' c '

P

=

e
4

d
U Category
'c '

∑e

for c = 1, 2, 3, 4

(4.40)

d
U Category
'c '

c =1

For the given contract type, based on the ‘D’ draws in the Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) process,
the mean and standard deviation of the probability of cost overrun being in category ‘c’ are calculated as:
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∑ (P
D

MCS
PCategory
'c' =

d =1

d
Category 'c'

)

for c = 1, 2,..., 4

D

∑ (P
D

MCS
Category 'c'

S_P

=

d
Category 'c'

c =1

MCS
Category 'i'

-P

)

(4.41)

2

(4.42)

D −1

where,
D = Total number of draws
d
th
PCategory
'c' = Probability of a contract to be in Cost Overrun Category 'c' in 'd ' draw
MCS
PCategory
'c' = Mean Probability of a contract to be in Cost Overrrun Category 'c' (MCS Based)
MCS
S_PCategory
'c' = Standard deviation of the probability of a contract to be in Cost Overrun

Category 'c' (MCS Based)
As the number of draws in Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) are increased, the simulation-based
MCS
mean probability, PCategory
' c ' , approaches the point estimate of the probability,

P Category ' c ' ,

that was

calculated using the calibrated models. The risk involved in associating a contract with a certain cost
overrun category is assessed by calculating the variability of its probability to belong to cost overrun
category ‘c’. The variability can be studied using standard deviation, coefficient of variation, or the 95%
MCS
confidence interval of the mean probability PCategory
' c ' , as in Module I. The calculations are carried out as

follows:
MCS
MCS
MCS
C.V_PCategory
'c' : S_PCategory 'c' PCategory 'c'
MCS
Category 'c'

C.I_P

MCS
Category 'c'

: P

MCS
⎛
S_PCategory
'c'
± ⎜ t 0.95 ×
⎜ (1- ,D-1)
D
2
⎝

⎞
⎟⎟
⎠

(4.43)

where,
MCS
C.V_PCategory
'c' = Coefficient of Variation of the Mean Probability of a contract

to be in Cost Overrun Category 'c' (Based on MCS)
MCS
Category 'c'

C.I_P

= 95% Confidence Interval of the Mean Probability of a contract
to be in Cost Overrun Category 'c' (Based on MCS)

The true distribution of the probability of a particular contract type to be in cost overrun category
‘c’ is determined based on the Monte Carlo Simulation results as follows:
MCS
MCS
PCategory ' c ' ~ N (PCategory
'c' ,S_PCategory 'c' )

for c = 1, 2,3, 4

4.2.6.3. Calculating Expected Percentage Cost Overrun for a Specified Contract Type

(4.44)
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The expected percentage cost overrun, for any contract type, is calculated as follows:
1) Expected Value of Cost Overrun (Yi) given the contract type has cost overrun in category ‘c’ and
2) Probability that the contract will have cost overrun in category ‘c’.
Because the coefficients of the models in Modules II and III are normally distributed, a Monte
Carlo simulation is done to randomly draw coefficients corresponding to each of these models from their
respective distributions. The coefficients drawn in each draw ‘d’ are used to calculate:

⎡ Expected Value of Cost Overrun (Yi )
E (Yi |Cost Overrun Category 'c')= ⎢⎢ given the contract type has
⎢⎣ cost overrun in category 'c'
d

⎡ Probability that the contract will ⎤
d
PCategory
'c' = ⎢
⎥
⎣ have cost overrun in category 'c', ⎦

⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥⎦

(4.45)

(4.46)

Bayes’ probability principle is then used to calculate the expected value of the percentage overrun
(Yi), in each draw ‘d’, as follows:

⎡ 4
⎤
d
E d (Yi ) = ⎢ ∑ E d (Yi | Cost Overrun Category ' c ') × PCategory
'c' ⎥
⎣ c =1
⎦

(4.47)

The procedure for random sampling of the regression model coefficients is the same as the
procedure that was used for random sampling of the discrete choice model coefficients.
The information on the three modules comprising the risk-based econometric analysis framework
that are used to study the cost overrun relationships is summarized in Table 4.10.
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MODULE –
OBJECTIVE
Module I –
Determine
Probability of Cost
Escalation Pattern
Based on
a) Contract specific
factors
Module II –
Determine
Probability of Cost
Overrun in each Overrun

ANALYZE

Escalation Pattern
of Cost Estimates

OUTPUT

Output:
(a) Probability of a contract exhibiting
a particular cost escalation pattern

ECONOMETRIC
MODEL

Discrete Choice
Logit Models

(b) Standard deviation & 95%
Confidence Interval of the probability
Planning stage
cost overrun
(Y1)

Probability (Y1 < -10%)
Probability (-10% ≤ Y1 < 0%)
Probability (0% ≤ Y1 ≤ 10%)
Probability (Y1 > 10%)

Discrete Choice
Logit Models
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Category
Based on
a) Contract specific
factors and,
b) Probability of Cost
Escalation Pattern
(from Module 1) and,
c) Variability (Standard
Deviation) in
Probability of \Cost
Escalation Pattern

Post-Programming
Stage Cost
Overrun
(Y2)
Design Stage Cost
Overrun
(Y3)
Advertisement
Stage Cost
Overrun
(Y4)
Letting Stage Cost
Overrun
(Y5)

Probability (Y2 < -10%)
Probability (-10% ≤ Y2 < 0%)
Probability (0% ≤ Y2 ≤ 10%)
Probability (Y2 > 10%)
Probability (Y3 < -10%)
Probability (-10% ≤ Y3 < 0%)
Probability (0% ≤ Y3 ≤ 10%)
Probability (Y3 > 10%)
Probability (Y4 < -10%)
Probability (-10% ≤ Y4 < 0%)
Probability (0% ≤ Y4 ≤ 10%)
Probability (Y4 > 10%)
Probability (Y5 < -10%)
Probability (-10% ≤ Y5 < 0%)
Probability (0% ≤ Y5 ≤ 10%)
Probability (Y5 > 10%)

Table 4.10: Risk-Based Econometric Analysis Framework for Analysis of Cost Overrun

4.3 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, a methodology for analyzing cost overrun was presented for: a) comprehensively studying
the accuracy of the various cost estimates that are prepared during the planning and development phase
based on data from historical contracts and b) developing an econometric analysis framework comprising
of statistical models to determine the influence of contract-specific factors on the probability and the
expected percentage overrun of the final cost. The models in the developed framework can also be used to
predict the probability and the expected value of cost overrun at various stages of project development, on

Expected (Y1 | Y1 < -10%)
Expected (Y1 | -10% ≤ Y1 < 0%)
Expected (Y1 | 0% ≤ Y1 ≤ 10%)
Expected (Y1 | Y1 > 10%)
Truncated
Post-Programming Expected (Y2 | Y2 < -10%)
Regression Models
Expected (Y2 | -10% ≤ Y2 < 0%)
Stage Cost
Overrun
Expected (Y2 | 0% ≤ Y2 ≤ 10%)
or
Based on
(Y2)
Expected (Y2 | Y2 > 10%)
a) Contract specific
Average Percentage
Expected (Y3 | Y3 < -10%)
Design Stage Cost
factors and,
Expected (Y3 | -10% ≤ Y3 < 0%)
Overrun Values
Overrun
d) Probability of Cost
Expected (Y3 | 0% ≤ Y3 ≤ 10%)
(Y3)
Escalation Pattern
corresponding to
Expected (Y3 | Y3 > 10%)
(from Module 1) and,
each overrun
Expected (Y4 | Y4 < -10%)
Advertisement
e) Variability (Standard
|
-10%
≤
Y
<
0%)
Expected
(Y
Stage
Cost
4
4
Deviation) in
category
Overrun
Expected (Y4 | 0% ≤ Y4 ≤ 10%)
Probability of \Cost
(Y4)
Expected (Y4 | Y4 > 10%)
Escalation Pattern
Expected (Y5 | Y5 < -10%)
Letting Stage Cost
Expected (Y5 | -10% ≤ Y5 < 0%)
Overrun
Expected (Y5 | 0% ≤ Y5 ≤ 10%)
(Y5)
Expected (Y5 | Y5 > 10%)
Expected (Yi | Yi < -10%): Expected Magnitude of Overrun given Overrun is less than -10%
Expected (Yi | -10% <= Y1 < 0%): Expected Magnitude of Overrun given Overrun is between -10% and 0%
Module III –
Determine
Percentage Overrun of
Final Cost over the Cost
Estimate

Planning stage
cost overrun
(Y1)
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the premise that the predictive capability (which is a function of the contract-specific factors that are used
for calibration of models) of the framework is appropriate.
The econometric framework developed using the proposed methodology has two distinct features.
First, the framework is risk-based. The econometric models use probability distribution function of random
variables that characterize the cost overrun to determine the probability of cost overrun and the expected
value of cost overrun. The use of random variables as independent variables for the calibration of models is
a rare and unique approach. Second, the methodology acknowledges that the calibrated model coefficients
are randomly distributed and takes the randomness into consideration by conducting a Monte-Carlo
simulation to randomly draw the calibrated coefficients from their respective distributions, and analyze cost
overrun.
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CHAPTER 5.

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF COST OVERRUN IN INDIANA

5.1. Introduction
This chapter presents a comprehensive numerical analysis of cost overrun in the state of Indiana. Cost data
was obtained for 419 contracts from the Management Information Portal of the Indiana Department of
Transportation. The data came from a period of 1990 through 2005 during which the project was initiated
and completed. All these contracts included those with a proposed cost of $1 million or more for which
consistent data was available from the planning to the completion stage. Other data that were collected
include contract-specific characteristics that are available to planners at the planning stage such as district,
route type, work category, area type, highway functional class, NHS status, and contract size and type.
Section 5.2 describes the dataset. Section 5.3 presents an analysis of the overrun (and underrun) of the final
construction cost compared to the estimates prepared during the project development phase. Section 5.4
presents an analysis of the escalation pattern of the cost estimates in current dollars over the cycle of
project development.
In order to analyze the impact of inflation, information on the dates corresponding to proposed
cost, design cost, letting cost, and the final construction cost was also extracted from the Information
Management Portal. The estimates prepared during the project development stages were inflated to the year
when the final construction cost was borne and a comparative analysis of the inflated estimate and the final
construction cost was done. The results of this analysis are shown in Section 5.5. The methodology
discussed in Chapter 4 was used for the analysis.

5.2. Dataset Description
The distribution of the 419 contracts by route type, work category, area type, highway functional class,
NHS status, contract size, and contract type are shown in Table 5.1. The 419 contracts that were analyzed
in the present study comprised 270 stand-alone contracts and 149 kin contracts. The contracts were
approximately uniformly distributed across the six districts in Indiana as follows: Crawfordsville (66), Fort
Wayne (67), Greenfield (71), Laporte (74), Seymour (73), and Vincennes (68). The 419 contracts
comprised of 71 Interstate contracts, 139 U.S. Road contracts, and 209 State Road contracts.
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Table 5.1: Distribution of the 419 Contracts in the Sample Set
No.

1

2

Factor

District

Route Type

3

Work Category

4

Area Type

5

6

7

8

Highway
Functional Class

NHS Status

Contract Size
(Based on
Proposed Cost)

Factor Levels

Number of
Contracts

Crawfordsville
Fort Wayne
Greenfield
Laporte
Seymour
Vincennes

66
67
71
74
73
68

Interstate (I)

71

U.S. Roads (U.S.)

139

State Roads (SR)

209

Expansion Contracts
Bridge Contracts
Pavement Contracts

73
107
239

Urban Area

136

Rural Area

283

Rural Interstate
Rural Principal Arterial
Rural Minor Arterial
Rural Major Collector
Rural Minor Collector / Rural Local Road
Urban Interstate
Urban Freeways and Expressways
Urban Other Principal Arterial
Urban Minor Arterial Street
Urban Collector Street

31
90
61
101
52
84

Interstate

71

Non-Interstate NHS

112

Non-NHS

236

$1 Million to $2 Million

190

$2 Million to $5 Million

138

$5 Million to $10 Million

53

>$10 Million

38

Kin Contract (Projects lumped together)

149

Standalone Contract (Only One Project)

270

Contract Type
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The work categories represented include: added travel lanes, new road construction, interchange
modification, bridge rehabilitation, replacement or removal, and major pavement projects (Table 5.2).
Contracts were grouped by work category. Major pavement contracts, district pavement contracts, and road
reconstruction contracts comprised the pavement contracts category. Bridge replacement, rehabilitation,
and removal contracts comprised the bridge contracts category. Also, added travel lanes, new road
construction, and interchange modification contracts comprised the expansion work contracts category. The
419 contracts comprised of 73 expansion contracts, 107 bridge contracts, and 239 pavement contracts.

Table 5.2: Classification and Distribution of 419 Contracts by Work Category
Work
Category
Expansion
Contracts

Bridge
Contracts

Pavement
Contracts

Work Category Description

No. of
Contracts

Added Travel Lanes
New Road Construction or Road Construction
Interchange Modification or New Interchange
Bridge Rehabilitation – Historical
Bridge Replacement – Historical
District Bridge (Rehabilitation)
District Bridge (Removal)
District Bridge (Replacement)
Major Bridge (New Bridge/Grade Separation)
District Pavement (Non-I)
Major Pavement (Interstate)
Major Pavement (NHS)
Major Pavement (Non-NHS)
Road Reconstruction

35
30
8
24
27
30
23
2
1
167
32
4
29
7

Total No. of
Contracts
73

107

239

The 419 contracts comprised 136 and 283 contracts from urban and rural areas, respectively. The
distribution by highway functional class shows that 151 contracts were implemented on rural principal and
minor arterials, 101 contracts on rural major/minor collector and rural local roads, 84 contracts on urban
principal and minor arterials, 52 contracts on urban Interstates, freeways and expressways, and 31 contracts
on rural Interstates. The distribution of contracts by NHS status shows that 71 contracts were implemented
on the Interstate system, 112 contracts on the Non-Interstate NHS system, and 236 contracts on the NonNHS system. The size of a contract was determined on the basis of the proposed cost of the contract at the
planning stage. Four categories of contract size were defined:
a) Category 1: proposed cost in between $1-$2 million (190 contracts),
b) Category 2: proposed cost in between $2-$5 million (138 contracts),
c) Category 3: proposed cost in between $5-$10 million (53 contracts), and
d) Category 4: proposed cost greater than $10 million (38 contracts).
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Contracts were analyzed first by work category, then by contract size, contract type, route type,
and area type. Table 5.3 shows the distribution of the contracts by these distributions. The distribution of
the contracts by work category and contract size indicates that over 50% of the pavement contracts (122 of
239) and bridge contracts (64 of 107) have a proposed cost in between $1-$2 million. Approximately 87%
of the pavement contracts and 95% of the bridge contracts had proposed costs less than $5 million. There
were no bridge contracts with over $10 million proposed costs and only 6% of the pavement contracts had
a proposed cost worth over $10 million. On the contrary, 75% (55 of 73) of the expansion contracts had a
proposed cost greater than $5 million and 33% (24 of 73) had a proposed cost greater than $10 million.
The distribution of the 419 contracts by work category and contract type is also shown in Table
5.3. Approximately 90% (65 of 73) of the expansion contracts were kin contracts, whereas only 28% (30 of
107) bridge contracts, and 23% (54 of 239) of pavement contracts were kin contracts. That is, expansion
projects were generally let as a group of projects (in each contract), whereas most pavement and bridge
contracts were let as stand-alone contracts.
The distribution of the 419 contracts by work category and route type (Table 5.3) indicates a
similar trend across all three work categories: the number of State Road contracts exceeds that of U.S.
roads which in turn exceeds the number of Interstate contracts. In spite of this trend, the distribution of
expansion contracts across the three route types is approximately uniform. However, only 17% (18 of 107)
of the bridge contracts and only 13% (32 of 239) of the pavement contracts were implemented on
Interstates. More than 50% of the pavement contracts in the dataset were implemented on state roads. The
number of bridge contracts on U.S. roads only marginally exceeds that on State Roads. Approximately 70%
(141 of 209) of the contracts on State Roads were pavement contracts, whereas the percentage of pavement
contracts on U.S. roads is 47% (66 of 139), and on Interstates is 45% (32 of 71).
The distribution of the 419 contracts by work category and area type (Table 5.3) shows that
approximately 78% (187 of 239) of the pavement contracts were implemented in the rural areas; in the rural
areas the corresponding percentages of bridge and expansion contracts were 64% and 38%, respectively.
Most of the expansion contracts (62%, or 45 of 73) in the database were implemented in urban areas.
Approximately 66% (187 of 283) of the contracts implemented in rural areas were pavement contracts. On
the other hand, the distribution of contracts in the urban areas was approximately uniform with 38% (52 of
136) pavement contracts, 33% (45 of 136) expansion contracts, and 29% (39 of 136) bridge contracts.
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Table 5.3: Distribution of Contracts in each Work Category by Size, Area, Route, and Contract Type

CONTRACT SIZE
(BASED ON PROPOSED COST)

WORK
CATEGORY

Expansion
Contracts
Bridge
Contracts
Pavement
Contracts
Total

$1 Million
to
$2 Million

$2 Million
to
$5 Million

$5 Million
to
$10 Million

More
than
$10 Million

Total

4

14

31

24

73

64

38

5

-

107

122

86

17

14

239

190

138

53

38

419

CONTRACT TYPE

WORK
CATEGORY

Standalone Contract
(Only One Project)

Kin Contract
(Projects lumped together)

Total

8

65

73

77

30

107

185

54

239

270

149

419

Expansion
Contracts
Bridge
Contracts
Pavement
Contracts
Total

ROUTE TYPE

WORK
CATEGORY

Expansion
Contracts
Bridge
Contracts
Pavement
Contracts
Total

Interstate
(I)

U.S. Roads
(U.S.)

State Roads
(SR)

Total

21

25

27

73

18

48

41

107

32

66

141

239

71

139

209

419

AREA TYPE

WORK
CATEGORY

Expansion
Contracts
Bridge
Contracts
Pavement
Contracts
Total

Urban Area

Rural Area

Total

45

28

73

39

68

107

52

187

239

136

283

419
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The size of a contract often plays an important role in the decision-making process. In the present
study, the size of a contract was determined on the basis of the proposed cost of the contract. Most (190 of
419) of the contracts were in the $1-$2 million category. Thirty-eight of the 419 contracts had a proposed
cost greater than $10 million. The distribution of the 419 contracts in the database, by contract size and area
type, by contract size and route type, and by contract size and contract type is shown in Table 5.4. The
analysis of the distribution of the 419 contracts by contract size and work category was presented in Table
5.3 and the distribution by contract size and district is shown in Table 5.5.

Table 5.4: Distribution of Contracts of all Sizes by Area Type, Route Type, and Contract Type
CONTRACT SIZE
(BASED ON PROPOSED COST)

AREA
TYPE

Urban
Area
Rural
Area
Total

$1 Million
to
$2 Million

$2 Million
to
$5 Million

$5 Million
to
$10 Million

More
than
$10 Million

Total

39

48

29

20

136

151

90

24

18

283

190

138

53

38

419

CONTRACT SIZE
(BASED ON PROPOSED COST)

ROUTE
TYPE

Interstates
(I)
U.S. Roads
(U.S.)
State Roads
(SR)
Total

$1 Million
to
$2 Million

$2 Million
to
$5 Million

$5 Million
to
$10 Million

More
than
$10 Million

Total

16

28

9

18

71

62

45

21

11

139

112

65

23

9

209

190

138

53

38

419

CONTRACT SIZE
(BASED ON PROPOSED COST)

CONTRACT
TYPE

Standalone
Contract
Kin
Contract
Total

$1 Million
to
$2 Million

$2 Million
to
$5 Million

$5 Million
to
$10 Million

More
than
$10 Million

Total

163

94

12

1

270

27

44

41

37

149

190

138

53

38

419
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The distribution of the contracts by contract size and area type (Table 5.4) indicated that 64% (87
of 136) of the contracts implemented in urban areas were less than $5 million in size. The percentage of
contracts in rural areas that were less than $5 million was 85% (241 of 283). Approximately 80% (151 of
190) of the contracts in the $1-$2 million contract size category were implemented in rural areas. The
percentage of contracts in the $2-$5 million category that were implemented in areas is 65%. On the other
hand, large-sized contracts (greater than $5 million) were distributed uniformly between urban (54%, 49 of
91) and rural areas (46%, 42 of 91).
The distribution of the 419 contracts by contract size and route type is also shown in Table 5.4. Of
the 190 contracts in the $1-$2 million size category, approximately 60% (112 of 190) were implemented on
the State Roads and only 8% (16 of 190) of the contracts were implemented on Interstates. For contracts of
size less than $5 million, approximately 54% (177 of 328) were implemented on State Roads and only
about 13% were on Interstates. On the other hand, of the 38 contracts that were greater than $10 million in
size, 47% (18 of 38) of the contracts were implemented on Interstates, and only about 24% of the contracts
were on State Roads.
Based on the distribution of contracts by contract size and contract type, it was found that most
(95%, 257 of 270) of the stand-alone contracts were in the $1-$5 million size category. Only 5% (13 of
270) of the stand-alone contracts were greater than $5 million in size and only one stand-alone contract was
greater than $10 million in size. That is, almost all (37 of 38) of the large size contracts (greater than $10
million) were kin contracts. However, the analysis of the distribution of the kin contracts reveals that 149
kin contracts comprised of: 18% (27 of 149) of contracts in the $1-$2 million category, 30% (44 of 149) of
contracts in the $2-$5 million category, 28% (41 of 149) of contracts in the $5-$10 million category, and
25% (37 of 149) of contracts of size greater than $10 million. Therefore, the kin contracts comprise
contracts of all sizes and almost all the contracts greater than $10 million in size were let as kin contracts.
The geographic location of a contract often has an impact on cost overrun as was discussed in
Chapter 3. Therefore, the distributions of the 419 contracts by district and contract size, by district and
work category, by district and area type, and by district and route type were analyzed (Table 5.5). In all the
districts in Indiana (except Laporte) the number of contracts implemented decreased with an increase in
contract size. Laporte district was the only district where the number of contracts in the $2-$5 million
category exceed that of the $1-$2 million category. Also, Laporte had the highest percentage (20%, 15 of
74) of contracts in the $5-$10 million category, whereas all the other districts had approximately 10%
contracts in the $5-$10 million category. Contracts greater than $10 million (38 contracts) were distributed
uniformly across all the districts except Crawfordsville, which had only three contracts in this category.
An analysis of the contracts by district and work category (Table 5.5) shows that most (29%, 21 of
73) of the expansion contracts were implemented in Laporte District. An analysis of the contract size and
work category (Table 5.3) revealed that 63% (24 of 38) of the large contracts (greater than $10 million)
contracts were expansion contracts. Also, it was found that 72% (48 of 67) of the contracts in the Fort
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Wayne district were pavement contracts whereas only 26% (19 of 74) of the contracts in Laporte district
were pavement contracts. Approximately 46% (34 of 74) of the contracts in Laporte district were bridge
contracts and 29% (21 of 74) were expansion contracts. Seymour and Crawfordsville districts showed
similar distribution of contracts as Fort Wayne district with respect to the dominance of the pavement
contracts in these districts. Greenfield and Laporte accounted for 50% of the large scale (greater than $10
million) expansion contracts.
The distribution of the 419 contracts by area type is shown in Table 5.5. The districts of
Greenfield and Laporte accounted for 58% (78 of 136) of the contracts implemented in the urban areas.
This finding is not surprising considering that Greenfield and Laporte comprise largely of urban areas. For
the other four districts, on average, approximately 80% of the contracts in these districts were implemented
in the rural areas.
The analysis of the distribution of the contracts by district and route type indicated that
approximately 50% (35 of 71) of the Interstate contracts were taken up in the districts of Greenfield and
Laporte. Approximately 54% (40 of 74) of the contracts in the Laporte district were implemented on U.S.
roads. The Seymour and Vincennes district accounted for 44% (91 of 209) of the State Roads contracts.
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Table 5.5: Distribution of Contracts by Size, Work Category, and Area and Route Type in Each District
CONTRACT SIZE
(BASED ON PROPOSED COST)

DISTRICT

Crawfordsville
Fort Wayne
Greenfield
Laporte
Seymour
Vincennes
Total

$1 Million
to
$2 Million
32
34
32
21
39
32

$2 Million
to
$5 Million
23
21
24
30
21
19

$5 Million
to
$10 Million
8
5
8
15
8
9

More
than
$10 Million
3
7
7
8
5
8

190

138

53

38

Total
66
67
71
74
73
68
419

WORK CATEGORY

DISTRICT

Crawfordsville
Fort Wayne
Greenfield
Laporte
Seymour
Vincennes
Total

Expansion
Contracts

Bridge
Contracts

Pavement
Contracts

Total

5
11
16
21
8
12

12
8
14
34
22
17

49
48
41
19
43
39

66
67
71
74
73
68

73

107

239

419

AREA TYPE

DISTRICT

Crawfordsville
Fort Wayne
Greenfield
Laporte
Seymour
Vincennes

Urban Area
13
15
39
39
20
10

Rural Area
53
52
32
35
53
58

Total
66
67
71
74
73
68

136

283

419

Total

ROUTE TYPE

DISTRICT

Crawfordsville
Fort Wayne
Greenfield
Laporte
Seymour
Vincennes
Total

Interstates (I)

U.S. Roads (U.S.)

State Roads (SR)

Total

9
13
21
14
12
2
71

23
24
17
40
12
23
139

34
30
33
20
49
43
209

66
67
71
74
73
68
419
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5.3. Accuracy of Cost Estimates
For the cost estimates prepared at each stage of project development, accuracy was determined by
comparing the corresponding estimate with the final cost. The following comparisons were made: (a) Final
cost vs. Proposed cost, (b) Final cost vs. Engineer’s Assessment cost, (c) Final cost vs. Design cost, and (d)
Final cost vs. Letting cost. The cost overrun associated with each stage was analyzed by work category,
contract size, contract type, route type, NHS status, and district and area type. In particular, an emphasis
was placed on the analysis of the contracts that had a cost overrun of greater than 10% or a cost overrun of
less than -10% (i.e., cost underrun > 10%). The results presented in this section are based on the
comparison of these costs in current dollars. The impact of inflation is presented in Section 5.5.

5.3.1.

Final Cost vs. Proposed Cost

The cost overrun associated with the planning stage estimate was calculated as follows:

⎛ Final Cost - Proposed Cost ⎞
Planning Stage Cost Overrun : Y1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

(5.1)

Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of the planning stage cost overrun for 419 contracts. The average
planning stage cost overrun was 4.51% and the standard deviation was 27%. The 95% confidence interval
of the average planning stage cost overrun was [1.9%, 7.1%]. The low value of the average planning stage
cost overrun is because positive cost overrun is compensated by the negative cost overrun (i.e. cost
underrun). The positive value of average planning stage cost overrun (4.51%) and the 95% confidence
interval [1.9%, 7.1%] indicated a dominance of cost overrun at the planning stage.
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Figure 5.1: Histogram Distribution of Planning Stage Cost Overrun
⎛ Final Cost - Proposed Cost ⎞
Y1 =100 ⎜
⎟%
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⎝
⎠
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To determine the inaccuracy of the proposed cost estimate, the contracts were analyzed by cost
overrun category (defined in Chapter 4). Table 5.6 presents an analysis of the average planning stage cost
overrun by cost overrun category. It was found that for 27% of the contracts (112 of the 419 contracts), the
final cost exceeded the proposed cost by over 10%. For 22% of the contracts (91 of the 419 contracts), the
proposed cost exceeded the final cost by more than 10%. That is, 49% of the contracts (203 of 419
contracts) were outside ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’.
Table 5.6: Analysis of Average Planning Stage Cost Overrun by Cost Overrun Category

⎛ Final Cost - Proposed Cost ⎞
Y1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

Y1 < −10%
Number of Contracts
Weighted Average
95% Confidence
Interval

−10% ≤ Y1 < 0%

0% ≤ Y1 ≤ 10%

Y1 > 10%

91

93

123

112

419

-26 %

-2.4 %

2.7 %

37 %

4.5%

[-29%, -23%]

[-3%, -1.8%]

[2.2%, 3.2%]

[32%, 42%]

[1.9%, 7.1%]

For the 112 contracts with planning stage cost overrun exceeding 10%, the average overrun was
37%, and the 95% confidence interval of the average was [32%, 42%] (Figure 5.2). For the 91 contracts
where planning stage cost underrun exceeded 10%, the average underrun was 26% and the 95% confidence
interval was [23%, 29%]. The contracts that lie within the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ did not have a
significant cost overrun at the planning stage, as indicated by the confidence interval. The lower limit of the
confidence interval indicates that contracts that have a planning stage cost overrun of greater than 10% are
expected to have a cost overrun of at least 32%. Also, contracts that have a cost underrun of greater than

Average Planning Stage
Cost Overrun (%)

10% are expected to have a cost underrun of at least 23%.
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
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< -10%

-10% TO 0%
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Cost Overrun Category

Figure 5.2: Analysis of Average Planning Stage Cost Overrun by Cost Overrun Category
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Sections 5.3.1.1 through 5.3.1.7 present a detailed analysis of the contracts for which the cost
estimate at the planning stage exceeds the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’. The objective was to determine
the work category, contract size, contract type, route type, NHS status, area type, and district to which such
contracts belong.

5.3.1.1 Descriptive Analysis by Work Category
The average planning stage cost overrun for the 73 expansion contracts, 107 bridge contracts, and 239
pavement contracts is as shown in Table 5.7, as well as the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The
average planning stage cost overrun was highest for pavement contracts (6.4%) and the 95% confidence
interval of this average [2.5%, 10.2%] indicated that the cost overrun was dominant compared to cost
underrun for pavement contracts. The average planning stage cost overrun for expansion and bridge
contracts was 2.3% and 1.8%, respectively, and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals of [3.6%,8.2%] and [-1.9%, 5.6%], respectively, indicated that the probability of cost overrun was marginally
higher than that of a cost underrun.
Table 5.7: Analysis of Planning Stage Cost Overrun by Work Category and Cost Overrun Category

⎛ Final Cost - Proposed Cost ⎞
Y1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

Y1 < −10%
Expansion
Contracts
Bridge
Contracts
Pavement
Contracts
Weighted
Average

Y1 > 10%

−10% ≤ Y1 < 0%

0% ≤ Y1 ≤ 10%

Average: -25 %

Average: -1.71 %

Average: 2.96 %

Average: 34%

Average: 2.3%

Contracts: 16

Contracts: 19

Contracts: 22

Contracts: 16

Contracts: 73

C.I: [-33%, -18%]

C.I: [-2.8%, -0.6%]

C.I: [1.7%, 4.3%]

C.I: [17%, 50%]

C.I: [-3.6%, 8.2%]

Average: -23 %

Average: -1.34%

Average: 1.65%

Average: 34 %

Average: 1.8%

Contracts: 17

Contracts: 29

Contracts: 45

Contracts: 16

Contracts: 107

Weighted Average

C.I: [-30%, -17%]

C.I: [-2.4%, -0.3%]

C.I: [0.8%, 2.5%]

C.I: [20%, 48%]

C.I: [-1.9%, 5.6%]

Average: -27 %

Average: -3.43%

Average: 3.36%

Average: 38 %

Average: 6.4%

Contracts: 58

Contracts: 45

Contracts: 56

Contracts: 80

Contracts: 239

C.I: [-31%, -24%]

C.I: [-4.4%, -2.5%]

C.I: [2.6%, 4.1%]

C.I: [32%, 44%]

C.I: [2.5%, 10.2%]

Average: -26 %

Average: -2.4 %

Average: 2.7 %

Average: 37 %

Average: 4.5%

Contracts: 91

Contracts: 93

Contracts: 123

Contracts: 112

Contracts: 419

C.I: [-29%, -23%]

C.I: [-3%, -1.8%]

C.I: [2.2%,3.2%]

C.I: [32%, 42%]

C.I: [1.9%, 7.1%]

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)

(A) Frequency of Planning Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The expansion, bridge, and pavement contracts for which the planning stage cost overrun was outside the
‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ were analyzed in greater detail to determine whether ‘extreme’ cost overruns
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and underruns are more frequent across contracts of any particular work type. The following conclusions
were made (Figure 5.3):
i.

The percentage of bridge contracts that were outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ was 31%
(33 of the 107 contracts), which was less than the corresponding percentage for expansion
contracts (44%: 32 of 73) and pavement (58%: 138 of 239) contracts.

ii.

The percentage of bridge contracts for which the planning stage cost overrun was greater than
10% was 15% (16 of 107), whereas the corresponding percentage for expansion contracts was
22% (16 of 73) and for pavement contracts was 34% (80 of 239 contracts).

iii.

The percentage of bridge contracts for which the planning stage cost underrun was greater than
10% was 16% (17 of 107), whereas the corresponding percentage for expansion contracts was
22% (16 of 73) and for pavement contracts was 24% (58 of 239 contracts).
Based on these findings it was concluded that planning stage cost overrun and underrun were more

frequent among pavement contracts and least frequent amongst bridge contracts.

Percentage of Contracts

80

60

40

20

0
Pavement

Expansion

Bridge

Work Category

Represents Percentage of Contracts where Cost Overrun < -10% (i.e. Cost Underrun > 10%)
Represents Percentage of Contracts where Cost Overrun > 10%

Figure 5.3: Percentage of Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun Bracket’ at the Planning Stage by
Work Category
(B) Severity of Planning Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The average planning stage cost overrun was determined for contracts that lie outside the ‘+/-10% cost
overrun bracket’ by work category. The objective of this analysis was to determine whether contracts
belonging to any particular work category had a higher average percentage cost overrun (i.e., more severe
cost overrun) compared to others. The conclusions made on the basis of cost overrun severity were as
follows:
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i.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun > 10%: The average planning stage cost overrun was 34% for
expansion and bridge contracts, with a 95% confidence interval of the average [17%, 50%] and
[20%, 48%], respectively. Therefore, in this respect, the expansion and bridge contracts were
found not to differ significantly. The pavement contracts, on the other hand, had a higher average
planning stage cost overrun (38%) and a narrower 95% confidence interval of [32%, 42%]
compared to expansion and bridge contracts. The 95% confidence intervals indicated that
expansion and bridge contracts had an average overrun between 20% and 30%, whereas pavement
contracts had an average overrun between 30% and 40% (Figure 5.4).

ii.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun < -10% (i.e. Cost Underrun > 10%): The average planning stage
cost underrun was 27%, 25%, and 23% for pavement, expansion, and bridge contracts,
respectively (Table 5.7). The 95% confidence interval of these average cost underrun was [24%,
31%], [18%, 33%], and [17%, 30%] for pavement, expansion, and bridge contracts respectively.
Expansion and bridge contracts are not significantly different in terms of underrun. Pavement
contracts, on the other hand, had a consistently high cost underrun (Figure 5.4).

Average Planning Stage Cost
Overrun (%)

60
40
20
0
Expansion

Bridge

Pavement

-20
-40
Work Category

Figure 5.4: Average Planning Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun
Bracket’ by Work Category

5.3.1.2. Descriptive Analysis by Contract Size
The statistics of the average planning stage cost overrun by contract size and cost overrun category are as
shown in Table 5.8. The 190 contracts with proposed cost of $1-$2 million had an average planning stage
cost overrun of 8.8% and a 95% confidence interval of [4.8%, 13%]. For contracts in this category, the
positive value of average cost overrun and its confidence interval indicate that cost overruns generally
outweigh cost underruns in this category. It was observed that at the planning stage, contracts with
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proposed cost $2-$5 million had a comparatively lower average cost overrun (2.5%) and a 95% confidence
interval [-2.4%, 7.3%]. The upper limit of the confidence interval indicates that cost overrun of higher
magnitude is possible for contracts in this category. The contracts with proposed cost in between $5-$10
million and the contracts with proposed cost greater than $10 million had similar average planning stage
cost overrun (-1.4%). The 95% confidence interval [-7.5%, 4.8%] for the average planning stage cost
overrun was also similar indicating that contracts in these categories experienced similar cost overruns.
Further, the lower limit of the 95% confidence interval indicates that the cost underruns were marginally
more prominent for contracts greater than $5 million in size.
Table 5.8: Analysis of Planning Stage Cost Overrun by Contract Size and Cost Overrun Category

⎛ Final Cost - Proposed Cost ⎞
Y1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

Y1 < −10%
$1 M –
$2 M
$2 M –
$5 M
$5 M $10 M

> $10 M

Weighted
Average

Y1 > 10%

Weighted

−10% ≤ Y1 < 0%

0% ≤ Y1 ≤ 10%

Average: -23 %

Average: -2 %

Average: 3 %

Average: 41%

Average: 8.8%

Contracts: 31

Contracts: 49

Contracts: 52

Contracts: 58

Contracts: 190

C.I: [-27%, -20%]

C.I: [-2.8%, -1%]

C.I: [1.7%, 3.3%]

C.I: [33%, 48%]

C.I: [4.8%, 13%]

Average: -28 %

Average: -3 %

Average: 2 %

Average: 39 %

Average: 2.5%

Contracts: 34

Contracts: 29

Contracts: 42

Contracts: 33

Contracts: 138

C.I: [-33%, -23%]

C.I: [-4.5%, 2%]

C.I: [1.3%, 3%]

C.I: [28%, 50%]

C.I: [-2.4%, 7.3%]

Average: -29 %

Average: -2 %

Average: 2.9 %

Average: 25 %

Average: -1.3%

Contracts: 14

Contracts: 12

Contracts: 14

Contracts: 13

Contracts: 53

C.I: [-38%, -22%]

C.I: [-4%, -0.8%]

C.I: [1.3%, 4.5%]

C.I: [18%, 33%]

C.I: [-7.4%, 4.7%]

Average: -25 %

Average: -1 %

Average: 4.3 %

Average: 23 %

Average:-1.4%

Contracts: 12

Contracts: 3

Contracts: 15

Contracts: 8

Contracts: 38

C.I: [-31%, -19%]

C.I: [-4%, 1.9%]

C.I: [2.9%, 5.8%]

C.I: [16%, 30%]

C.I:[-7.6%, 4.8%]

Average: -26 %

Average: -2.4 %

Average: 2.7 %

Average: 37 %

Average: 4.5%

Contracts: 91

Contracts: 93

Contracts: 123

Contracts: 112

Contracts: 419

C.I: [-29%, -23%]

C.I: [-3%, -1.8%]

C.I: [2.2%,3.2%]

C.I: [32%, 42%]

C.I: [1.9%, 7.1%]

Average

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)

(A) Frequency of Planning Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The contracts that lie outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ were analyzed by contract size to determine
whether high cost overrun / underrun were more frequent for contracts of any particular size. The following
conclusions were made (Figure 5.5):
i.

Approximately 49% (89 of 190) of $1-$2 million contracts were outside the ‘+/-10%’ planning
stage cost overrun bracket and this percentage was higher for bigger contract sizes as follows
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(Figure 5.5): 49% (67 of 138) for contracts with size $2-$5 million, 51% (27 of 53) for contracts
with size $5 to $10 million; and 53% (20 of 38) for contracts greater than $10 million in size.
ii.

The percentage of $1-$2 million contracts for which the planning stage cost overrun exceed 10%
was 31% (58 of 190) and it decreased with increase in contract size as follows (Figure 5.5): 24%
(33 of 138) for contracts with size $2-$5 million, 24% (13 of 53) for contracts with size $5 to $10
million, and 21% (8 of 38) for contracts greater than $10 million in size.

iii.

The percentage of $1-$2 million contracts for which the planning stage cost underrun was greater
than 10% was 16% (31 of 190) and it increased with increase in contract size as follows (Figure
5.5): 25% (34 of 138) for contracts with size $2-$5 million, 26% (14 of 53) for contracts with size
$5 to $10 million, and 32% (12 of 38) for contracts greater than $10 million in size.
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Represents Percentage of Contracts where Cost Overrun < -10% (i.e. Cost Underrun > 10%)
Represents Percentage of Contracts where Cost Overrun > 10%

Figure 5.5: Percentage of Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun Bracket’ at the Planning Stage by
Contract Size
(B) Severity of Planning Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The average planning stage cost overrun was determined for contracts that lie outside the ‘+/-10% cost
overrun bracket’ by contract size to analyze if there were differences in cost overrun severity across work
categories. The following findings were made:
i.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun > 10%: The average planning stage cost overrun decreases with
increased contract size (Figure 5.6): 41% for contracts with proposed cost between $1-$2M, 39%
for $2-$5M contracts, 25% for $5-$10M contracts, and 23% for contracts greater than $10M
contracts. The length of the 95% confidence interval (Table 5.8) of the average planning stage cost
overrun did not vary significantly across the various categories of contract size. This indicates that
the variance in the planning stage cost overrun was the same across all contract sizes. However, it
was found that the 95% confidence interval for $1-$2 million contracts [33%, 48%] and the $2-$5
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million [28%, 50%] contracts exceeded that for $5M-$10M [18%, 33%] and was greater than
$10M [16%, 30%] contracts. This indicates that the planning stage cost overrun is expected to be
higher for relatively small-sized contracts (proposed cost < $5 Million).
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Figure 5.6: Average Planning Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun
Bracket’ by Contract Size
ii.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun < -10% (i.e., Cost Underrun > 10%): The average planning stage
cost underrun increases with increase in contract size up to $10 million (Figure 5.6). The average
planning stage cost underrun was 23% for contracts with proposed cost in between $1-$2M, 28%
for contracts with size in between $2-$5M, 29% for contracts with size in between $5-$10M, and
25% for contracts with size greater than $10M. The 95% confidence interval (Table 5.8) for of
these average cost underruns was [20%, 27%], [23%, 33%], [22%, 38%], and [19%, 31%] for
contracts with size $1-$2 million, $2-$5 million, $5-$10 million and greater than $10 million,
respectively. The length of the confidence interval increases with an increase in contract size up to
$10 million. The upper limit of the confidence interval also increases with increase in contract size
(up to $10 million), which indicates that large-sized contracts are susceptible to higher cost
underruns at the planning stage (Figure 5.4).

5.3.1.3. Descriptive Analysis by Contract Type
The average planning stage cost overrun by contract type and cost overrun category is presented in Table
5.9. The 270 stand-alone contracts have an average planning stage cost overrun of 4.7% and a 95%
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confidence interval of [1.6%, 7.7%]. The positive cost overrun and confidence interval indicates that cost
overrun is more prominent compared to cost underrun for contracts in this category. The kin contracts had a
similar average planning stage cost overrun (4.2%) and a 95% confidence interval [-0.6%, 9%].

Table 5.9: Analysis of Planning Stage Cost Overrun by Contract Type and Cost Overrun Category

⎛ Final Cost - Proposed Cost ⎞
Y1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

Y1 < −10%

−10% ≤ Y1 < 0%

0% ≤ Y1 ≤ 10%

Y1 > 10%

Weighted
Average

Stand

Average: - 24%

Average: -2.5 %

Average: 2.4 %

Average: 37 %

Average: 4.7%

Alone

Contracts: 58

Contracts: 59

Contracts: 81

Contracts: 72

Contracts: 270

C.I: [-27%, -21%]

C.I: [-3.2%, -1.7%]

C.I: [1.8%, 3%]

C.I: [31%, 42%]

C.I: [1.6%, 7.7%]

Average: - 29%

Average: -2.4 %

Average: 3.2 %

Average: 38 %

Average: 4.2%

Contracts: 33

Contracts: 34

Contracts: 42

Contracts: 40

Contracts: 149

C.I: [-33%,-24%]

C.I: [-3.4%, -1.3%]

C.I: [2.3%, 4%]

C.I: [27%, 48%]

C.I: [-0.6%, 9%]

Average: -26 %

Average: -2.4 %

Average: 2.7 %

Average: 37 %

Average: 4.5%

Contracts: 91

Contracts: 93

Contracts: 123

Contracts: 112

Contracts: 419

C.I: [-29%, -23%]

C.I: [-3%, -1.8%]

C.I: [2.2%,3.2%]

C.I: [32%, 42%]

C.I: [1.9%, 7.1%]

Contracts
Kin
Contracts
Weighted
Average

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)

(A) Frequency of Planning stage cost overrun / Underrun
The contracts that lie outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ were analyzed by contract type to
determine the frequency of cost overrun and underrun across kin and stand-alone contracts.
i.

The percentage of stand-alone and kin contracts that were outside the ‘+/-10%’ planning stage cost
overrun bracket was 48% (130 of 270) and 49% (73 of 149), respectively (Table 5.9).

ii.

The percentage of stand-alone and kin contracts for which the planning stage cost overrun was
greater than 10% was 27% (72 of 270) and 27% (49 of 149), respectively.

iii.

The percentage of stand-alone and kin contracts for which the planning stage cost underrun was
greater than 10% was 21% (58 of 270) and 22% (33 of 149), respectively.
Therefore, frequency of planning stage cost overrun and underrun did not vary by contract type.

(B) Severity of Planning Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
Based on the analysis of the average planning stage cost overrun of the kin and stand-alone contracts that
lie outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’, the following findings were made:
i.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun > 10%: The average planning stage cost overrun for stand-alone
and kin contracts was 37% and 38%, respectively. The length of 95% confidence interval of the
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average planning stage cost overrun for stand-alone contracts [31%, 42%] was half the length of
the confidence interval for kin contracts [27%, 48%]. In other words, the variability of average
cost overrun at the planning stage cost for kin contracts exceeded that for stand-alone contracts.
The upper limit of the confidence interval for kin contracts (48%) was higher compared to that of
stand-alone contracts (42%), which indicated that kin contracts experienced higher planning stage
cost overrun compared to stand-alone contracts.
ii.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun < -10% (i.e. Cost Underrun > 10%): The average planning stage
cost underrun for kin contracts (29%) was higher compared to stand-alone contracts (24%). The
95% confidence interval of the average planning stage cost overrun for kin contracts [24%, 33%]
and stand-alone contracts [21%, 27%] indicated that the kin contracts are expected to have more
severe cost underrun. This is because upper and lower limits of the confidence interval for kin
contracts were higher compared to those for stand-alone contracts.

5.3.1.4. Descriptive Analysis by Route Type
There were 71 Interstate contracts, 139 U.S. Road contracts, and 209 State Road contracts. The average
planning stage cost overrun and 95% confidence interval of the average are shown in Table 5.10. The
average planning stage cost overrun was highest for State Road contracts (5.8%) and the 95% confidence
interval was [2.2%, 9.4%]. This indicated that the cost overrun is more prominent compared to cost
underrun for State Road contracts. The average planning stage cost overrun for U.S. Road contracts was
4.6%, and the 95% confidence interval was [0.3%, 9%] implying that the U.S. Road contracts had similar
behavior as the State Road contracts. The average planning stage cost overrun was smallest for Interstate
contracts (0.5%) and the 95% confidence interval [-6.7%, 7.7%] was symmetrically distributed around
zero, thereby indicating that the cost overrun is balanced by the cost underrun for Interstate contracts.
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Table 5.10: Analysis of Planning Stage Cost Overrun by Route Type and Cost Overrun Category

⎛ Final Cost - Proposed Cost ⎞
Y1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

Y1 > 10%

Weighted

Average: 3%

Average: 42%

Average: 0.5%

Contracts: 24

Contracts: 13

Contracts: 71

C.I: [-3.5%, -0.4%]

C.I: [1.9%, 4.2%]

C.I: [18%, 66%]

C.I:[-6.7%,7.7%]

Average: -22 %

Average: -2.4%

Average: 2.54%

Average: 36%

Average: 4.6%

Contracts: 31

Contracts: 32

Contracts: 40

Contracts: 36

Contracts: 139

C.I: [-26%, -18%]

C.I: [-3.5%,-1.4%]

C.I: [1.6%, 3.5%]

C.I: [27%, 46%]

C.I: [0.3%,9%]

Average: -27%

Average: -2.6%

Average: 2.6%

Average: 36 %

Average: 5.8%

Contracts: 42

Contracts: 45

Contracts: 59

Contracts: 63

Contracts: 209

Y1 < −10%

Interstates

U.S. Roads

State
Roads
Weighted
Average

−10% ≤ Y1 < 0%

0% ≤ Y1 ≤ 10%

Average: - 31%

Average: -2%

Contracts: 18

Contracts: 16

C.I: [-39%, -23%]

Average

C.I: [-30%, -23%]

C.I: [-3.5%, -1.6%]

C.I: [1.8%, 3.3%]

C.I: [31%, 42%]

C.I: [2.2%,9.4%]

Average: -26 %

Average: -2.4 %

Average: 2.7 %

Average: 37 %

Average: 4.5%

Contracts: 91

Contracts: 93

Contracts: 123

Contracts: 112

Contracts: 419

C.I: [-29%, -23%]

C.I: [-3%, -1.8%]

C.I: [2.2%,3.2%]

C.I: [32%, 42%]

C.I: [1.9%, 7.1%]

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)

(A) Frequency of Planning Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The Interstate, U.S. Road, and State Road contracts for which the planning stage cost overrun was outside
the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ were analyzed to investigate differences in cost overrun across route
types. The following observations were made (Figure 5.7):
i.

The percentage of Interstate contracts that were outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ was
44% (31 of the 71 contracts), which was less than the corresponding percentage for U.S. Road
contracts (48%, 67 of 139) and State Road (50%, 105 of 209) contracts.

ii.

The percentage of Interstate contracts for which the planning stage cost overrun exceeded 10%
was 18% (13 of 71), whereas the corresponding percentage for U.S. Road contracts was 26% (36
of 139) and for State Road contracts was 30% (63 of 209 contracts).

iii.

The percentage of Interstate contracts for which the planning stage cost underrun was greater than
10% was 25% (18 of 71), whereas the corresponding percentage for U.S. Road contracts was 22%
(31 of 139) and for State Road contracts was 20% (42 of 209 contracts).
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Figure 5.7: Percentage of Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun Bracket’ at the Planning Stage by
Route Type

(B) Severity of Planning Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The average planning stage cost overrun was determined for contracts that lie outside the ‘+/-10% cost
overrun bracket’ by route type. The objective of this analysis was to determine whether contracts of any
particular route type had a higher average planning stage cost overrun (i.e., more severe cost overrun)
compared to others. The following conclusions were made:
i.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun > 10%: The average planning stage cost overrun was 42%, 38%
and 36% for Interstate, State Road, and U.S. Road contracts, respectively. While the average
planning stage cost overrun was not significantly different across the route types, an analysis of
the 95% confidence intervals indicated that the Interstate contracts [18%, 66%] experience a wider
range of cost overrun compared to State Road [31%, 42%] and U.S. Road [27%, 46%] contracts
(Figure 5.8). The upper limit of the 95% confidence interval for Interstate contracts was 66%
compared to 46% for U.S. Road and 42% for State Road contracts, which indicated that Interstate
contracts experienced high cost overrun more frequently compared to U.S. and State Road
contracts. Also, the width of the confidence interval for State Road contracts was less than the
corresponding width of U.S. Road and Interstate contracts, indicating that State Road contracts
experienced less variability in cost overrun.

ii.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun < -10% (i.e. Cost Underrun > 10%): The average planning stage
cost underrun for Interstate contracts (31%) was higher compared to State Road (27%) and U.S.
Road (22%) contracts. The 95% confidence intervals corresponding to these averages were [23%,
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39%], [23%, 30%], and [18%, 26%] for Interstate, State Road, and U.S. Road contracts,
respectively. Based on the plot of the 95% confidence intervals and the average planning stage
cost overrun (Figure 5.8), it was concluded that the Interstate contracts are more susceptible to
high cost underrun, compared to State Road and U.S. Road contracts.
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Figure 5.8: Average Planning Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun
Bracket’ by Route Type

5.3.1.5. Descriptive Analysis by NHS Status
The average planning stage cost overrun for the 71 Interstate contracts, 112 Non-Interstate NHS contracts,
and 236 Non-NHS contracts is as shown in Table 5.11. The 95% confidence interval of the average
planning stage cost overrun is also shown in the table. Both Non-Interstate NHS and Non-NHS contracts
experienced an average planning stage cost overrun of 5.4%. The 95% confidence intervals of the average
planning stage cost overrun were also similar for Non-Interstate NHS [0.6%, 10.2%] and Non-NHS [1.9%,
8.7%] contracts. The positive average and 95% confidence intervals indicated that cost overruns are more
prominent compared to cost underrun for Non-Interstate NHS and Non-NHS contracts. The average
planning stage cost overrun was least for Interstate contracts (0.5%) and the 95% confidence interval
[-6.7%, 7.7%] was symmetrically distributed around zero, thereby indicating that the cost overrun is
balanced by the cost underrun for Interstate contracts.
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Table 5.11: Planning Stage Cost Overrun by NHS Status and Cost Overrun Category

⎛ Final Cost - Proposed Cost ⎞
Y1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

Y1 < −10%

Interstate

Non
Interstate
NHS
Non
NHS
Weighted
Average

Y1 > 10%

Weighted

−10% ≤ Y1 < 0%

0% ≤ Y1 ≤ 10%

Average: -31 %

Average: -2%

Average: 3%

Average: 42%

Average: 0.5%

Contracts: 18

Contracts: 16

Contracts: 24

Contracts: 13

Contracts: 71

C.I: [-39%, -23%]

C.I: [-3.5%, -0.4%]

C.I: [2%, 4%]

C.I: [18%, 66%]

C.I:[-6.7%,7.7%]

Average: -23%

Average: -2.2%

Average: 2.9%

Average: 36%

Average: 5.4%

Contracts: 23

Contracts: 24

Contracts: 35

Contracts: 30

Contracts: 112

C.I: [-28%, -18%]

C.I: [-3.4%, -1%]

C.I: [1.9%, 3.9%]

C.I: [26%, 46%]

C.I:[0.6%,10.2%]

Average: - 26%

Average: -2.7%

Average: 2.4%

Average: 36%

Average: 5.4%

Contracts: 50

Contracts: 53

Contracts: 64

Contracts: 69

Contracts: 236

C.I: [-29%, -23%]

C.I: [-3.5%, -1.8%]

C.I: [1.7%, 3.1%]

C.I: [31%, 42%]

C.I:[1.9%,8.7%]

Average: -26 %

Average: -2.4 %

Average: 2.7 %

Average: 37 %

Average: 4.5%

Contracts: 91

Contracts: 93

Contracts: 123

Contracts: 112

Contracts: 419

C.I: [-29%, -23%]

C.I: [-3%, -1.8%]

C.I: [2.2%,3.2%]

C.I: [32%, 42%]

C.I:[1.9%,7.1%]

Average

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)

(A) Frequency of Planning Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The Interstate, Non-Interstate NHS, and Non-NHS contracts, for which the planning stage cost overrun was
outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’, were analyzed in more detail to determine if ‘extreme’ cost
overrun and underrun are more frequent across contracts of any particular NHS status type. The following
conclusions were made (Figure 5.9):
i.

The percentage of Interstate contracts that were outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ was
44% (31 of the 71 contracts), which was less than the corresponding percentage for Non-Interstate
NHS contracts (47%, 53 of 112) and Non-NHS (50%, 119 of 236) contracts.

ii.

The percentage of Interstate contracts for which the planning stage cost overrun exceeded 10%
was 18% (13 of 71), whereas the corresponding percentage for Non-Interstate NHS contracts was
27% (30 of 112) and for Non-NHS contracts was 36% (69 of 236 contracts).

iii.

The percentage of Interstate contracts for which the planning stage cost underrun was greater than
10% was 25% (18 of 71), whereas the corresponding percentage for Non-Interstate NHS contracts
was 21% (23 of 112) and for Non-NHS contracts was 21% (50 of 236 contracts).
Based on these findings, it was concluded that the planning stage cost overrun is more frequent for

Non-NHS contracts, followed by Non-Interstate NHS and Interstate contracts. Cost underrun on the other
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hand are marginally more frequent among Interstate contracts, compared to Non-Interstate NHS and NonNHS contracts.
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Figure 5.9: Percentage of Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun Bracket’ at the Planning Stage by
NHS Status
(B) Severity of Planning Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The average planning stage cost overrun was calculated for contracts that lie outside the ‘+/-10% cost
overrun bracket’ for each NHS status to analyze severity. The following observations were made:
i.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun > 10%: The average planning stage cost overrun was 42% for
Interstate contracts, 36% for Non-Interstate NHS contracts, and 36% for Non-NHS contracts.
While the average planning stage cost overrun was not significantly different across the three NHS
status level, an analysis of the 95% confidence intervals indicated that the Interstate contracts
[18%, 66%] experience a wider range of cost overrun compared to Non-Interstate NHS [26%,
46%] and Non-NHS [31%, 42%] contracts (Figure 5.10). The upper limit of the 95% confidence
interval for Interstates contracts was 66% compared to 46% for Non-Interstate NHS contracts and
42% for Non-NHS, which implied that Interstate contracts were more susceptible to higher cost
overrun compared to Non-Interstate NHS and Non-NHS contracts. Also, the lower limit of the
confidence interval for Non-NHS (31%) contracts exceeded that for Non-Interstate NHS (26%)
and Interstate (18%) contracts: this indicates that Non-NHS and Non-Interstate NHS contracts
experienced comparatively lower cost overrun than Interstate contracts.

ii.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun < -10% (i.e., Cost Underrun > 10%): The average planning stage
cost underrun for Interstate contracts (31%) was higher compared to Non-NHS (26%) and Non-
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Interstate NHS (23%) contracts. The 95% confidence intervals corresponding to these averages
were [23%, 39%], [23%, 29%], and [18%, 28%] for Interstate, Non-NHS, and Non-Interstate NHS
contracts respectively. Based on the 95% confidence intervals and the average planning stage cost
overrun (Figure 5.10) it was concluded that the Interstate contracts were more susceptible to
severe cost underrun, compared to Non-NHS and Non-Interstate NHS contracts.
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Figure 5.10: Average Planning Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun
Bracket’ by NHS Status

5.3.1.6. Descriptive Analysis by Administrative District
Table 5.12 shows the average planning stage cost overrun for all districts. The Greenfield district had the
highest average planning stage cost overrun (9.4%), followed by Crawfordsville (6.2%), Vincennes (5.3%),
Seymour (3.4%), Fort Wayne (2.9%), and Laporte (0.18%). The 95% confidence interval of the average
planning stage cost overrun in the Greenfield and Crawfordsville districts was [1.6%, 17%] and [-0.4%,
13%] which indicated that cost overrun is significantly more prominent than cost underrun in both districts,
with Greenfield in particular. In the districts of Seymour, Fort Wayne, and Vincennes, the 95% confidence
interval of the average planning stage cost overrun indicated that cost overrun is marginally prominent than
cost underrun but the average overrun is not significantly different from zero.

101

Table 5.12: Analysis of Planning Stage Cost Overrun by District and Cost Overrun Category

⎛ Final Cost - Proposed Cost ⎞
Y1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

Y1 > 10%

Weighted

Average: 2.7%

Average: 34%

Average:6.2%

Contracts: 12

Contracts: 19

Contracts: 22

Contracts: 66

C.I: [-6.4%, -1.9%]

C.I: [1.4%, 4.1%]

C.I: [23%, 45%]

C.I:[-0.4%,13%]

Average: -30.5 %

Average: -2.8%

Average: 2.5%

Average: 34%

Average: 2.9%

Contracts: 12

Contracts: 15

Contracts: 24

Contracts: 16

Contracts: 67

C.I: [-41%, -20%]

C.I: [-4.6%, -1%]

C.I: [1.4%, 3.5%]

C.I: [19%, 49%]

C.I:[-3.4%,9.2%]

Average: -21.5 %

Average: -1.4%

Average: 3.5%

Average: 49%

Average: 9.4%

Contracts: 17

Contracts: 16

Contracts: 18

Contracts: 20

Contracts: 71

C.I: [-27%, -16%]

C.I: [-2.6%, -0.1%]

C.I: [1.9%, 5.0%]

C.I: [33%, 65%]

C.I:[1.6%,17%]

Average: -23.6 %

Average: -1.4%

Average: 2.5%

Average: 34%

Average: 0.18%

Contracts: 17

Contracts: 19

Contracts: 27

Contracts: 11

Contracts: 74

C.I: [-31%, -16%]

C.I: [-2.4%, -0.4%]

C.I: [15%, 3.6%]

C.I: [21%, 46%]

C.I:[-4.5%,4.8%]

Average: -26.8%

Average: -2.4%

Average: 1.1%

Average: 31%

Average: 3.4%

Contracts: 15

Contracts: 18

Contracts: 18

Contracts: 22

Contracts: 73

C.I: [-31%, -22%]

C.I: [-3.9%, -0.9%]

C.I: [.2%, %2]

C.I: [19%, 42%]

C.I:[-2.5%,9.3%]

Average: -28.3%

Average: -3.2%

Average: 3.9%

Average: 39 %

Average: 5.3%

Contracts: 17

Contracts: 13

Contracts: 17

Contracts: 21

Contracts: 68

C.I: [-35%, -21%]

C.I: [-5.3%, -1.2%]

C.I: [2%, 5.7%]

C.I: [28%, 51%]

C.I:[-2%,12.3%]

Average: -26 %

Average: -2.4 %

Average: 2.7 %

Average: 37 %

Average: 4.5%

Contracts: 91

Contracts: 93

Contracts: 123

Contracts: 112

Contracts: 419

C.I: [-29%, -23%]

C.I: [-3%, -1.8%]

C.I: [2.2%,3.2%]

C.I: [32%, 42%]

C.I:[1.9%,7.1%]

Y1 < −10%

CRAWF

FW

GRE

LAP

SEY

VIN

Weighted
Average

−10% ≤ Y1 < 0%

0% ≤ Y1 ≤ 10%

Average: -26.4 %

Average: -4.1%

Contracts: 13
C.I: [-32%, -21%]

Average

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)

(A) Frequency of Planning Stage Cost overrun / Underrun
The distribution of the contracts that lie outside the ‘+/-10% planning stage cost overrun bracket’ by district
is shown in Figure 5.11. The following observations were made:
i.

The percentage of contracts outside the +/-10% cost overrun bracket was least in Laporte district
(38%) followed by Fort Wayne (42%), Seymour (51%), Greenfield (52%), Crawfordsville (53%)
and Vincennes (56%). On the average, approximately 49% of contracts across all districts have a
planning stage cost overrun outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’.

ii.

Approximately 30% of contracts in each of the three districts of Crawfordsville, Seymour, and
Vincennes had a cost overrun greater than 10%. Only 15% of the contracts in the Laporte district
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had a planning stage cost overrun greater than 10%. In the districts of Fort Wayne and Greenfield
24% of the contracts had a planning stage cost overrun of greater than 10%.
iii.

The percentage of contracts having a cost underrun of greater than 10% was found to be least for
the Fort Wayne district (18%). The percentage of contracts having a cost underrun of greater than
10% was 20% for Crawfordsville, 21% for Seymour, 23% for Laporte, 24% for Greenfield, and
25% for Vincennes districts.
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Figure 5.11: Percentage of Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun Bracket’ at the Planning Stage by
Administrative District
(B) Severity of Planning Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The average planning stage cost overrun was determined for contracts that lie outside the ‘+/-10% cost
overrun bracket’ by administrative district. The objective of this analysis was to identify the districts with
high cost overrun at the planning stage.
i.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun > 10%: The average planning stage cost overrun was highest for
Greenfield district (49%), followed by Vincennes (39%), Crawfordsville (34%), Fort Wayne
(34%), Laporte (34%), and Seymour (34%). The 95% confidence intervals of the average planning
stage cost overrun were also plotted for each district (Figure 5.12). The analysis of the 95%
confidence intervals indicated that the average planning stage cost overrun for Greenfield district
was high compared to all the other districts. Other districts did not have significant differences.

ii.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun < -10% (i.e. Cost Underrun > 10%): The average planning stage
cost underrun was 31% in Fort Wayne, 28% in Vincennes, 27% in Seymour, 26% in
Crawfordsville, 24% in Laporte, and 22% in Greenfield district. An analysis of the 95%
confidence interval of these average planning stage cost underrun indicates that the contracts in
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Fort Wayne district were more susceptible to high planning stage cost underrun. The upper limit
of the average planning stage cost under run in all the other districts was comparatively lower and

Average Planning Stage Cost Overrun
(%)

in the range of 31%-35%. Hence, contracts in Fort Wayne had more frequent high cost underrun.
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Figure 5.12: Average Planning Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun
Bracket’ by District

5.3.1.7. Descriptive Analysis by Area Type
The average planning stage cost overrun in the urban area was 7.4% and the 95% confidence interval of the
average was [2.5%, 12%] (Table 5.13). The average planning stage cost overrun in the rural area was 3.2%
and the 95% confidence interval of the average was [0.1%, 6.2%]. Based on the comparison of the averages
and the upper limits of the 95% confidence interval, it was seen that urban areas had more cost overrun
compared to rural areas.
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Table 5.13: Analysis of Planning Stage Cost Overrun by Area Type and Cost Overrun Category

⎛ Final Cost - Proposed Cost ⎞
Y1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

Y1 < −10%
Urban

Rural

Weighted
Average

Y1 > 10%

Weighted

−10% ≤ Y1 < 0%

0% ≤ Y1 ≤ 10%

Average: -23.4 %

Average: -2.3 %

Average: 2.5 %

Average: 46%

Average: 7.4%

Contracts: 23

Contracts: 37

Contracts: 43

Contracts: 33

Contracts: 136

C.I: [-29%, -18%]

C.I: [-3.3%, -1.2%]

C.I: [1.7%, 3.4%]

C.I: [35%, 57%]

C.I:[2.5%,12%]

Average: -27%

Average: -2.5 %

Average: 2.7 %

Average: 33%

Average: 3.2%

Contracts: 68

Contracts: 56

Contracts: 80

Contracts: 79

Contracts: 283

C.I: [-30%, -24%]

C.I: [-3.3%, -1.7%]

C.I: [2.1%, 3.4%]

C.I: [28%, 39%]

C.I:[0.1%,6.2%]

Average: -26 %

Average: -2.4 %

Average: 2.7 %

Average: 37 %

Average: 4.5%

Contracts: 91

Contracts: 93

Contracts: 123

Contracts: 112

Contracts: 419

C.I: [-29%, -23%]

C.I: [-3%, -1.8%]

C.I: [2.2%,3.2%]

C.I: [32%, 42%]

C.I:[1.9%,7.1%]

Average

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)

(A) Frequency of Planning Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The contracts that lie outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ were analyzed by area type. The following
observations were made based on the results presented in Table 5.13:
i.

The planning stage cost overrun was outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ for 41% (56 of
136) of the urban area contracts and 52% (147 of 283) of the rural area contracts.

ii.

The planning stage cost overrun exceeded 10% for 24% (33 of 136) of the urban area contracts
and 28% (79 of 283) of the rural area contracts.

iii.

The planning stage cost underrun exceeded 10% for 17% (23 of 136) of the urban area contracts
and 24% (68 of 283) of the rural area contracts.
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Figure 5.13: Percentage of Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun Bracket’ at the Planning Stage by
Area Type
(B) Severity of Planning Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The analysis of the average planning stage cost overrun for urban and rural area contracts that lie outside
the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ is presented in Figure 5.14. The following observations were made:
i.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun > 10%: The average planning stage cost overrun in urban and
rural areas was 46% and 33%, respectively. The length of 95% confidence interval of the average
planning stage cost overrun for urban area contracts [35%, 57%] was twice the length of the
confidence interval for rural area contracts [28%, 39%]. In other words, the variability of the
planning stage cost overrun was greater for urban area contracts. The upper limit of the confidence
interval for urban area contracts (57%) was higher compared to that of rural area contracts (39%),
which indicated that urban area contracts experienced higher planning stage cost overrun
compared to rural area contracts.

ii. For Contracts with Cost Overrun < -10% (i.e. Cost Underrun > 10%): The average planning stage
cost underrun in the urban and rural areas was 23%. The 95% confidence interval of the average
planning stage cost underrun for urban area contracts [18%, 29%] and for rural area contracts
[24%, 30%] indicated that rural area contracts higher cost underrun compared to urban area
contracts.
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Figure 5.14: Average Planning Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun
Bracket’ by Area Type

5.3.2. Final Cost vs. Engineer’s Assessment Cost
The overrun of the final construction cost compared to the engineer’s assessment cost was calculated to
determine the accuracy of the estimate prepared after the project has been programmed. The overrun was
calculated as:

100

%

(5.2)

The overrun of the final cost over the engineer’s assessment cost was analyzed by contract size,
work category, district, area type, route type, NHS status, and contract type. The results were similar to
those for the planning stage cost overrun, which implied that the engineer’s assessment cost was not
significantly different from the proposed cost. In order to verify this implication, the proposed cost was
compared to the engineer’s assessment cost. The percentage difference between the engineer’s assessment
cost and proposed cost was calculated as follows:

100

%

(5.3)

Table 5.14 presents the difference between the proposed cost and the engineer’s assessment cost
by cost overrun category and work category. It was found that the proposed cost and engineer’s assessment
cost did not differ significantly from each other for 394 of the 419 contracts. The average percentage
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difference was greater than +/-10% for only 22 of the 419 contracts; nineteen of these 22 contracts were
pavement contracts. Because of the similarity in the engineer’s assessment cost and the proposed cost for
most of the contracts in the state, results of the detailed analysis of the overrun of the final construction cost
over the engineer’s assessment cost were not presented in this report.
Table 5.14: Analyzing the Difference between Proposed Cost and Engineer’s Assessment Cost

100

Y < −10%
Expansion

Average: -36 %
Contracts: 1

%

−10% ≤ Y < 0%
-

0% ≤ Y ≤ 10%
Average: 0.11%
Contracts: 72

Y > 10%

-

Weighted
Average
Average: 0.21%
Contracts: 73

Average: -4.8%

Average: 0.04%

Average: 21%

Average: 0.77%

Contracts: 1

Contracts: 102

Contracts: 4

Contracts: 107

Average: - 28%

Average: -5.5%

Average: 0.02%

Average: 39%

Average: 1.04%

Contracts: 6

Contracts: 2

Contracts: 220

Contracts: 11

Contracts: 239

Weighted

Average: -30 %

Average: -5.26%

Average: 0.04%

Average: 37 %

Average: 0.82%

Average

Contracts: 7

Contracts: 3

Contracts: 394

Contracts: 15

Contracts: 419

Bridge
Pavement

-

Contracts: Number of Contracts

5.3.3. Final Cost vs. Design Cost
The overrun of the final construction cost over the design estimate of the construction cost was calculated
to determine the accuracy of the estimate prepared at the final design stage. This cost overrun is referred to
as the design stage cost overrun. The design stage cost overrun was calculated as follows:

⎛ Final Cost - Design Cost ⎞
Design StageCost Overrun : Y3 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Design Cost
⎝
⎠

(5.4)

The distribution of design stage cost overrun is shown in Figure 5.15 for 419 contracts. The
average design stage cost overrun was 1.85% and the standard deviation was 24%. The 95% confidence
interval of the average design stage cost overrun was [-0.4%, 4.1%]. However, these numbers are not a true
reflection of the accuracy of the cost estimate prepared at the design stage. This is because the positive cost
overrun is compensated by the negative cost overrun. The positive value of average design stage cost
overrun (1.85%) and the 95% confidence interval [-0.4%, 4.1%] indicated that the cost overrun are either
more severe or more frequent compared to cost underrun at the design stage. Table 5.15 presents the
average design stage cost overrun by design stage cost overrun category (as defined in Chapter 4).
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Figure 5.15: Histogram Distribution of Design Stage Cost Overrun
The design stage cost overrun exceeded 10% for 22% of the contracts (94 of the 419 contracts).
For 25% of the contracts (105 of the 419 contracts) the design stage cost overrun was less than -10% (i.e.,
the design stage cost underrun exceeded 10%). Overall, for 47% of the contracts (199 of 419 contracts) the
difference between the design estimate and the final cost was outside ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’.
Table 5.15: Analysis of Average Design Stage Cost Overrun by Cost Overrun Category

⎛ Final Cost - Design Cost ⎞
Y3 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Design Cost
⎝
⎠

Number of
Contracts
Weighted
Average
95%
Confidence
Interval

Y3 < −10%

−10% ≤ Y3 < 0%

0% ≤ Y3 ≤ 10%

Y3 > 10%

Total

105

103

117

94

419

-22.97%

-2.58%

2.66%

33.44%

1.85%

[-25%, -21%]

[-3.15 %, -2.01 %]

[2.12 %, 3.19 %]

[28%, 38%]

[-0.4%, 4.1%]
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For the 94 contracts which had the design stage cost overrun greater than 10%, it was found that
the average design stage cost overrun across these contracts was 33% and the 95% confidence interval of
the average was [28%, 38%] (Figure 5.16). For the 105 contracts which had the design stage cost underrun
of greater than 10%, the average design stage cost underrun was 23% and the 95% confidence interval was
[21%, 25%]. The average design stage cost overrun and the limits of the 95% confidence interval were less
than 5% for the contracts that lie within the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’. Therefore, contracts that fall
outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ were those that resulted in a high cost overrun or underrun at the
design stage. Sections 5.3.3.1 through 5.3.3.7 present a detailed analysis of the contracts that exceed the
‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ at the design stage.
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Figure 5.16: Analysis of Average Design Stage Cost Overrun by Cost Overrun Category

5.3.3.1. Descriptive Analysis by Work Category
The average design stage cost overrun for the 73 expansion contracts, 107 bridge contracts and 239
pavement contracts is as shown in Table 5.16, as well as the corresponding 95% confidence interval of the
averages. The average design stage cost overrun was highest for pavement contracts (4%) and the 95%
confidence interval of the average [0.5%, 7%] indicated that the cost overrun is more dominant than cost
underrun for pavement contracts. For expansion contracts, the average design stage cost overrun (0.7%)
and the 95% confidence interval [-4.0%, 5.5%] of the average, indicated that cost overrun and underrun
balance each other. For bridge contracts, the average design state cost overrun (-2%) and the 95%
confidence interval of the average [-5%, 1%] indicated that cost underrun are dominant over cost overrun
for the contracts in this work category.

110

Table 5.16: Analysis of Average Cost Overrun of Final Cost over Design Cost by Work Category

⎛ Final Cost − Design Cost ⎞
Y3 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Design Cost
⎝
⎠
Y3 < −10%
Expansion
Contracts

Bridge
Contracts
Pavement
Contracts
Weighted
Average

Y3 > 10%

Weighted

−10% ≤ Y3 < 0%

0% ≤ Y3 ≤ 10%

Average: -26 %

Average: -2.1 %

Average: 3.1 %

Average: 28%

Average: 0.7%

Contracts: 15

Contracts: 21

Contracts: 22

Contracts: 15

Contracts: 73

C.I: [-35%, -18%]

C.I: [-3%, -1%]

C.I: [1.7%, 4.6%]

C.I: [18%, 38%]

C.I:[-4%,5.5%]

Average: -20 %

Average: -1.89%

Average: 1.45%

Average: 33%

Average: -2%

Contracts: 24

Contracts: 30

Contracts: 45

Contracts: 8

Contracts: 107

C.I: [-25%, -16%]

C.I: [-3%, -0.7%]

C.I: [0.7%, 2.1%]

C.I: [11%, 55%]

C.I:[-5%,1%]

Average: -23 %

Average: -3.1%

Average: 3.5%

Average: 35%

Average: 4%

Contracts: 66

Contracts: 52

Contracts: 50

Contracts: 71

Contracts: 239

Average

C.I: [-26%, -21%]

C.I: [-3.9%, -2.4%]

C.I: [2.7%, 4.3%]

C.I: [29%, 41%]

C.I:[0.5%,7%]

Average: -23%

Average: -2.6 %

Average: 2.7 %

Average: 33 %

Average:1.85%

Contracts: 105

Contracts: 103

Contracts: 117

Contracts: 94

Contracts: 419

C.I: [-25%, -21%]

C.I: [-3.1%, 2.0%]

C.I: [2.1%,3.2%]

C.I: [28%, 38%]

C.I:[-0.4%,4%]

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)

(A) Frequency of Design Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The expansion, bridge, and pavement contracts for which the design stage cost overrun was outside the ‘+/10% cost overrun bracket’ were analyzed in greater detail to determine if cost overrun or underrun was
more frequent across contracts of any particular work type. The following findings were made (Figure
5.17):
i.

The percentage of bridge contracts that fell outside the ‘+/-10%’ design stage cost overrun bracket
was 30% (32 of the 107 contracts), which was less than the corresponding percentage for
expansion contracts (41%: 30 of 73) and pavement (57%: 137 of 239) contracts.

ii.

The percentage of bridge contracts for which the design stage cost overrun exceeded 10% was 7%
(8 of 107), whereas the corresponding percentage for expansion contracts was 21% (15 of 73) and
for pavement contracts was 30% (71 of 239 contracts).

iii.

The percentage of bridge contracts for which the design stage cost underrun exceeded 10% was
22% (24 of 107), whereas the corresponding percentage for expansion contracts was 21% (15 of
73) and for pavement contracts was 28% (66 of 239 contracts).
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Based on these findings it was concluded that the design stage cost overrun and underrun are more
frequent amongst pavement contracts and least frequent amongst bridge contracts.
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Figure 5.17: Percentage of Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10%’ Design Stage Cost Overrun Bracket by Work
Category
(B) Severity of Design Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The average design stage cost overrun was determined by work category. The following findings were
made based on the analysis of the severity of cost overrun:
i.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun > 10%: The average design stage cost overrun was 28%, 33%,
and 35% for expansion, bridge, and pavement contracts, respectively (Table 5.16). The 95%
confidence interval of these averages was [18%, 38%], [11%, 55%], and [29%, 41%] for
expansion, bridge, and pavement contracts, respectively. The confidence intervals indicated that
pavement contracts experienced lower variability in cost overrun compared to expansion and
bridge contracts. The upper limit of the confidence interval for bridge contracts (55%) was
significantly larger compared to the upper limit of expansion (38%) and pavement (41%)
contracts, which implied that bridge contracts were more susceptible to high design stage cost
overrun.

ii. For Contracts with Cost Overrun < -10% (i.e. Cost Underrun > 10%): The average design stage
cost underrun was 26%, 23%, and 20% for expansion, pavement, and bridge contracts,
respectively (Table 5.16). The 95% confidence interval of these average cost underrun was [18%,
35%], [21%, 26%], and [16%, 25%] for expansion, pavement, and bridge contracts, respectively.
The confidence intervals indicated that expansion contracts experienced higher cost underrun
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compared to pavement and bridge contracts (Figure 5.18), while pavement contracts tend to
exhibit a low variability of cost underrun.
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Figure 5.18: Average Design Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun Bracket’
by Work Category

5.3.3.2. Descriptive Analysis by Contract Size
The analysis of the design stage cost overrun by contract size and cost overrun category is illustrated in
Table 5.17. The 190 contracts with proposed cost between $1-$2 million have an average design stage cost
overrun of 3.8% and a 95% confidence interval of [0.5%, 7%]. The positive cost overrun and confidence
interval indicates that cost overrun is more significant compared to cost underrun for contracts in this
category. The contracts with proposed cost $2-$5 million have a comparatively lower average design stage
cost overrun (1.5%) and 95% confidence interval [-2.8%, 6%]. The upper limit of the confidence interval
indicated that cost overrun is marginally more likely for contracts in this category. The contracts with
proposed cost between $5-$10 million and the contracts with proposed cost greater than $10 million have
average design stage cost overrun of -1% and -2.6%, respectively. The 95% confidence interval of the
average design stage cost overrun was similar for contracts in these categories, [-7%, 5%] and [-9%, 4%],
respectively. Further, the lower limit of the 95% confidence interval indicates that contracts exceeding $5
million were more susceptible to cost underrun.
Table 5.17: Analysis of Average Design Stage Cost Overrun by Contract Size and Cost Overrun Category
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⎛ Final Cost - Design Cost ⎞
Y3 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Design Cost
⎝
⎠

Y3 < −10%
$1 M –
$2 M

$2 M –
$5 M
$5 M $10 M

> $10 M

Weighted
Average

−10% ≤ Y3 < 0%

0% ≤ Y3 ≤ 10%

Y3 > 10%

Weighted
Average

Average: -19.5 %

Average: -2 %

Average: 2.5 %

Average: 35%

Average:3.8%

Contracts: 42

Contracts: 56

Contracts: 48

Contracts: 44

Contracts: 190

C.I: [-22%, -17%]

C.I: [-2.9%, -1.3%]

C.I: [1.6%, 3.3%]

C.I: [27%, 43%]

C.I:[0.5%,7%]

Average: -23.7 %

Average: -3.5 %

Average: 2.1 %

Average: 37 %

Average:1.54%

Contracts: 37

Contracts: 30

Contracts: 41

Contracts: 30

Contracts: 138

C.I: [-28%, -20%]

C.I: [-4.7%, -2.4%]

C.I: [1.3%, 3%]

C.I: [27%, 47%]

C.I:[-2.8%,6%]

Average: -28.4 %

Average: -2.6 %

Average: 3.3 %

Average: 25 %

Average:-1.0%

Contracts: 14

Contracts: 11

Contracts: 15

Contracts: 13

Contracts: 53

C.I: -37%, -20%]

C.I: [-4.3%, -0.9%]

C.I: [1.5%, 5%]

C.I: [17%, 33%]

C.I:[-7%,5%]

Average: -26.2 %

Average: -2.3 %

Average: 4.1 %

Average: 25 %

Average:-2.6%

Contracts: 12

Contracts: 6

Contracts: 13

Contracts: 7

Contracts: 38

C.I: -34%, -19%]

C.I: [-4.3%, -0.4%]

C.I: [2.5%, 5.8%]

C.I: [15%, 35%]

C.I:[-9.2%,4%]

Average: -23%

Average: -2.6 %

Average: 2.7 %

Average: 33 %

Average:1.85%

Contracts: 105

Contracts: 103

Contracts: 117

Contracts: 94

Contracts: 419

C.I: [-25%, -21%]

C.I: [-3.1%, 2.0%]

C.I: [2.1%,3.2%]

C.I: [28%, 38%]

C.I:[-0.4%,4%]

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)

(A) Frequency of Design Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The following conclusions were made based on the analysis of design stage cost overrun by contract size
(Figure 5.19):
i.

The percentage of $1-$2 million contracts that were outside the ‘+/-10%’ design stage cost
overrun bracket was 45% (86 of 190), which was smaller compared to 49% (67 of 138) for
contracts of size $2-$5 million, 51% (27 of 53) for contracts of size $5-$10 million, and 50% (19
of 38) for contracts exceeding $10 million.

ii.

The percentage of $1-$2 million contracts for which the design stage cost overrun exceeded 10%
was 23% (44 of 190), and this percentage decreased with increase in contract size as follows
(Figure 5.19): 22% (30 of 138) for contracts with size $2-$5 million, 22% (13 of 53) for contracts
of size $5 to $10 million, and 18% (7 of 38) for contracts greater than $10 million in size.

iii.

The percentage of $1-$2 million contracts for which the design stage cost underrun exceeded 10%
was 22% (42 of 190), and this percentage increased with increase in contract size as follows
(Figure 5.19): 26% (37 of 138) for contracts of size $2-$5 million, 26% (14 of 53) for contracts of
size $5 to $10 million, and 32% (12 of 38) for contracts exceeding $10 million.
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Figure 5.19: Percent Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10%’ Design Stage Cost Overrun Bracket by Contract Size
(B) Severity of Design Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The average design stage cost overrun was determined for contracts that lie outside the ‘+/-10% cost
overrun bracket’ by contract size. The following observations were made based on the analysis of the
severity of cost overrun were as follows:
i.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun > 10%: The average design stage cost overrun decreases with an
increase in contract size (Figure 5.20). The average design stage cost overrun was 35% for
contracts with a proposed cost between $1-$2M, 37% for contracts with size between $2-$5M,
25% for contract sizes between $5-$10M, and 25% for contracts with size greater than $10M. The
width of the 95% confidence interval (Table 5.17) for the average design stage cost overrun did
not vary significantly across the various categories of contract size, indicating that the variance in
the design stage cost overrun was the same across contract sizes. However, it was found that for
contracts with proposed cost between $1-$2 million [27%, 43%] and between $2-$5 million [27%,
47%], was higher compared to the 95% confidence interval for contracts with proposed cost
between $5M-$10M [17%, 33%] and for contracts with a proposed cost greater than $10M [15%,
35%]. This indicates that the design stage cost overrun is expected to be higher for small-sized
contracts (proposed cost < $5 Million).

ii.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun < -10% (i.e. Cost Underrun > 10%): It was observed that average
design stage cost underrun increased as contract size increased from $1 million to $10 million
(Figure 5.20). The average design stage cost underrun was 20% for contracts with size in between
$1-$2M, 24% for contract sizes between $2-$5M, 28% for contract sizes between $5-$10M, and
26% for contracts with size greater than $10M. The 95% confidence intervals of the averages were
[17%, 22%], [20%, 28%], [20%, 37%], and [19%, 34%] for contracts with size $1-$2 million, $2-
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$5 million, $5-$10 million, and greater than $10 million, respectively. The upper limit of the
confidence interval also increased with an increase in contract size from $1 million to $10 million,
which indicated that large contracts were susceptible to higher design stage cost underrun (Figure
5.20).
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Figure 5.20: Average Design Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun Bracket’
by Contract Size

5.3.3.3. Descriptive Analysis by Contract Type
The analysis of the average design stage cost overrun by contract type and cost overrun category is
presented in Table 5.18. The 270 stand-alone contracts have an average design stage cost overrun of 2%
and a 95% confidence interval of [0.6%, 4.6%]. The positive cost overrun and confidence interval indicates
that cost overrun is more prominent compared to cost underrun for stand-alone contracts. The kin contracts
had an average design stage cost overrun of 1.6% and a 95% confidence interval of [-2.7%, 6%].
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Table 5.18: Analysis of Average Cost Overrun of Final Cost over Design by Contract Type

⎛ Final Cost - Design Cost ⎞
Y3 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Design Cost
⎝
⎠

Y3 < −10%
Stand
Alone

Kin

Weighted
Average

Y3 > 10%

Weighted

−10% ≤ Y3 < 0%

0% ≤ Y3 ≤ 10%

Average: -21 %

Average:-2.7 %

Average: 2.4%

Average: 32%

Contracts: 67

Contracts: 67

Contracts: 77

Contracts: 59

C.I: [-23%, -18%]

C.I: [-3.5%, 2%]

C.I: [1.7%, 3.1%]

C.I: [26%, 38%]

Average: -27 %

Average: -2.2%

Average: 3.1%

Average: 35%

Average:1.6%

Contracts: 38

Contracts: 36

Contracts: 40

Contracts: 35

Contracts: 149

C.I: [-32%, -23%]

C.I: [-3%, -1.4%]

C.I: [2.2%, 3.9%]

C.I: [26%, 45%]

C.I:[-2.7%,6%]

Average: -23%

Average: -2.6 %

Average: 2.7 %

Average: 33 %

Average:1.85%

Contracts: 105

Contracts: 103

Contracts: 117

Contracts: 94

Contracts: 419

C.I: [-25%, -21%]

C.I: [-3.1%, 2.0%]

C.I: [2.1%,3.2%]

C.I: [28%, 38%]

C.I:[-0.4%,4%]

Average
Average: 2%
Contracts: 270
C.I:[0.6%,4.6%]

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)

(A) Frequency of Design Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
Standalone and kin contracts were analyzed and following observations were made regarding the frequency
of occurrence of high cost overrun and underrun (Figure 5.21):
i.

The percentage of stand-alone and kin contracts that were outside the ‘+/-10%’ design stage cost
overrun bracket was 47% (126 of 270) and 49% (73 of 149), respectively.

ii.

The percentage of stand-alone and kin contracts for which the design stage cost overrun exceeded
10% was 22% (59 of 270) and 24% (35 of 149), respectively.

iii.

The percentage of stand-alone and kin contracts for which the design stage cost underrun exceeded
10% was 25% (67 of 270) and 26% (38 of 149), respectively.
Therefore, the frequency of design stage cost overrun and underrun was not found to vary by

contract type.

117

Percentage of Contracts

60.00
50.00
40.00
30.00
20.00
10.00
0.00
StandAlone
Stand
AloneContracts
Contracts

Kin Contracts

Contract Type
Represents Percentage of Contracts where Cost Overrun < -10% (i.e. Cost Underrun > 10%)
Represents Percentage of Contracts where Cost Overrun > 10%

Figure 5.21: Percentage of Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10%’ Design Stage Cost Overrun Bracket by Contract
Size
(B) Severity of Design Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The following observations were made based on the analysis of average design stage cost overrun of standalone and kin contacts (Figure 5.22):
i.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun > 10%: The average design stage cost overruns for stand-alone
and kin contracts were 32% and 35%, respectively. The width of the 95% confidence interval of
the average design stage cost overrun for stand-alone contracts [26%, 38%] was half the width of
the confidence interval for kin contracts [26%, 45%]. That is, the variability of the average design
stage cost overrun for kin contracts was more compared to stand-alone contracts. The upper limit
of the confidence interval for kin contracts (45%) was higher compared to that of stand-alone
contracts (38%), which indicated that kin contracts were susceptible to higher design stage cost
overrun compared to stand-alone contracts.

ii.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun < -10% (i.e. Cost Underrun > 10%): The average design stage
cost underrun for kin contracts (27%) was higher compared to stand-alone contracts (21%). The
95% confidence interval of the average design stage cost overrun for kin contracts [23%, 32%]
and stand-alone contracts [18%, 23%] indicated that the kin contracts have more severe cost
underrun. This is because upper and lower limits of the confidence interval for kin contracts were
higher compared to those for stand-alone contracts.
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Figure 5.22: Average Design Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun Bracket’
by Contract Type

5.3.3.4. Descriptive Analysis by Route Type
The average design stage cost overrun for the 71 Interstate contracts, 139 U.S. Road contracts, and 209
State Road contracts and corresponding 95% confidence intervals are as shown in Table 5.19. The average
design stage cost overrun was highest for State Road contracts (3.5%) and the 95% confidence interval of
the average [0.3%, 6.8%] indicated that the cost overrun is more prominent compared to cost underrun for
State Road contracts. The analysis showed that the average design stage cost overrun for U.S. Road
contracts is 1%, and the 95% confidence interval of the average is [-2.6%, 4.6%]. The average design stage
cost overrun was least for Interstate contracts (-1.5%) and the 95% confidence interval [-7.5%, 4.6%]
indicated that cost overrun is more prominent for Interstate contracts.
(A) Frequency of Design Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The Interstate, U.S. Road and State Road contracts for which the design stage cost overrun was outside the
‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ were analyzed to determine if cost overrun and underrun are more frequent
across contracts of any particular route type. The following conclusions were made (Figure 5.23):
i.

The percentage of Interstate contracts that were outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ was
44% (31 of the 71 contracts), which was less than the corresponding percentage for U.S. Road
contracts (48%, 66 of 139) and State Road (49%, 102 of 209) contracts.

ii.

The percentage of Interstate contracts for which the design stage cost overrun exceeded 10% was
14% (10 of 71), whereas the corresponding percentage for U.S. Road contracts was 22% (31 of
139) and for State Road contracts was 25% (53 of 209 contracts).
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iii.

The percentage of Interstate contracts for which the design stage cost underrun exceeded 10% was
29% (21 of 71), whereas the corresponding percentage for U.S. Road contracts was 25% (35 of
139) and for State Road contracts was 23% (49 of 209 contracts).
Table 5.19: Analysis of Average Cost Overrun of Final Cost over Design Cost by Route Type

⎛ Final Cost - Design Cost ⎞
Y3 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Design Cost
⎝
⎠

Y3 < −10%
Interstates

U.S. Roads
State
Roads
Weighted
Average

−10% ≤ Y3 < 0%

0% ≤ Y3 ≤ 10%

Y3 > 10%

Weighted
Average

Average: - 26 %
Contracts: 21
C.I: [-32%, -20%]

Average: -2.4%
Contracts: 18
C.I: [-4%, -0.9%]

Average: 2.8 %
Contracts: 22
C.I: [1.6%, 4%]

Average: 42%
Contracts: 10
C.I: [18%, 66%]

Average:-1.5%
Contracts: 71
C.I:[-7.5%,4.6%]

Average: - 22 %
Contracts: 35
C.I: [-26%, -18%]
Average: - 23%
Contracts: 49
C.I: [-26%, -20%]
Average: - 23%
Contracts: 105
C.I: [-25%, -21%]

Average: -2.4%
Contracts: 36
C.I: [-3.2%, 1.6%]
Average: -2.8%
Contracts: 49
C.I: [-3.6%, 1.9%]
Average: -2.6 %
Contracts: 103
C.I: [-3.1%, 2.0%]

Average: 2.5%
Contracts: 37
C.I: [1.5%, 3.4%]
Average: 2.8%
Contracts: 58
C.I: [2%, 3.5%]
Average: 2.7 %
Contracts: 117
C.I: [2.1%,3.2%]

Average: 29%
Contracts: 31
C.I: [20%,38%]
Average: 34%
Contracts: 53
C.I: [28%, 41%]
Average: 33 %
Contracts: 94
C.I: [28%, 38%]

Average: 1%
Contracts: 139
C.I:-2.6%,4.6%]
Average: 3.5%
Contracts: 209
C.I:0.3%,6.8%]
Average:1.85%
Contracts: 419
C.I:[-0.4%,4%]

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)
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Figure 5.23: Percentage of Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10%’ Design Stage Cost Overrun Bracket by Route
Type
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(B) Severity of Design Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The average design stage cost overrun was determined for contracts that lie outside the ‘+/-10% cost
overrun bracket’ by route type. This was to determine whether there were differences in cost overrun across
route types.
i.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun > 10%: The average design stage cost overrun was 42%, 34%,
and 29% for Interstate, State Road, and U.S. Road contracts, respectively. The 95% confidence
intervals indicated that the Interstate contracts [18%, 66%] experience a wider range of cost
overrun compared to State Road [28%, 41%] and U.S. Road [20%, 38%] contracts (Figure 5.24).
The upper limit of the 95% confidence interval for Interstate contracts was 66% compared to 38%
for U.S. Road and 41% for State Road contracts. This indicated that Interstate contracts were more
susceptible to high cost overrun compared to U.S. Road and State Road contracts. Also, the lower
limit of the confidence interval for State Road (28%) contracts was more than that of U.S. Road
(20%) and Interstate Road (18%) contracts which indicated that State Road contracts experienced
lower design stage cost overrun.

ii.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun < -10% (i.e. Cost Underrun > 10%): The average design stage
cost underrun for Interstate road contracts (26%) was higher compared to State Roads (23%) and
U.S. Roads (22%). The 95% confidence interval of the average was [20%, 32%], [20%, 26%], and
[18%, 26%] for Interstate, State Road, and U.S. Road contracts, respectively. Based on the plot of
the 95% confidence intervals and the average design stage cost overrun (Figure 5.24), it was
concluded that the Interstate contracts are more vulnerable to high design stage cost underrun
compared to State Road and U.S. Roads contracts.
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Figure 5.24: Average Design Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun Bracket’
by Route Type
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5.3.3.5. Analysis by NHS Status
The average design stage cost overrun for the 71 Interstate contracts, 112 Non-Interstate NHS contracts,
and 236 Non-NHS contracts is as shown in Table 5.20, as well as the corresponding 95% confidence
interval of these average design stage cost overrun. Non-Interstate NHS and Non-NHS contracts
experienced an average design stage cost overrun of 2.1% and 2.7%, respectively. The 95% confidence
intervals of the average design stage cost overrun were similar for Non-Interstate NHS [-1.5%, 5.8%] and
Non-NHS [-0.4%, 5.9%] contracts. The positive average and the largely positive 95% confidence interval
indicated that the cost overrun is more prominent compared to cost underrun for Non-Interstate NHS and
Non-NHS contracts. For Interstate contracts, the average design stage cost overrun (-1.5%) and the 95%
confidence interval [-7.6%, 4.5%] indicated that the cost underruns are relatively more prominent
compared to cost overruns.
Table 5.20: Analysis of Average Design Stage Cost Overrun by Cost Overrun Category and NHS Status

⎛ Final Cost - Design Cost ⎞
Y3 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Design Cost
⎝
⎠

Y3 < −10%

−10% ≤ Y3 < 0%

0% ≤ Y3 ≤ 10%

Y3 > 10%

Weighted
Average

Interstate

Average: -26%
Contracts: 21
C.I: [-32%, -20%]

Average: -2.4%
Contracts: 18
C.I: [-4%, -0.9%]

Average: 2.8%
Contracts: 22
C.I: [1.6%, 4%]

Average: 42%
Contracts: 10
C.I: [18%, 66%]

Average:-1.5%
Contracts: 71
C.I:[-7.6%,4.5%]

NonInterstate
NHS

Average: -21%
Contracts: 24
C.I: [-27%, -16%]

Average: -2%
Contracts: 26
C.I: [-3%, -1%]

Average: 3.1%
Contracts: 36
C.I: [2.1%, 4.1%]

Average: 27%
Contracts: 26
C.I: [19%, 34%]

Average: 2.1%
Contracts: 112
C.I:[-1.5%,5.8%]

Non
NHS

Average: -23%
Contracts: 60
C.I: [-25%, -20%]

Average: -2.9%
Contracts: 59
C.I: [-3.7%, -2%]

Average: 2.3%
Contracts: 59
C.I: [1.6%, 3.1%]

Average: 35%
Contracts: 58
C.I: [29%, 41%]

Average: 2.7%
Contracts: 236
C.I:[-0.4%,5.9%]

Weighted
Average

Average: -23%
Contracts: 105
C.I: [-25%, -21%]

Average: -2.6 %
Contracts: 103
C.I: [-3.1%, 2.0%]

Average: 2.7 %
Contracts: 117
C.I: [2.1%,3.2%]

Average: 35 %
Contracts: 94
C.I: [28%, 38%]

Average:1.85%
Contracts: 419
C.I:[-0.4%,4%]

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)

(A) Frequency of Design Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The Interstate, Non-Interstate NHS, and Non-NHS contracts were analyzed and following observations
were made (Figure 5.25):
i.

The percentage of Interstate contracts that were outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ was
44% (31 of the 71 contracts), which was less than the corresponding percentage for Non-Interstate
NHS contracts (45%, 50 of 112) and Non-NHS (50%, 118 of 236) contracts.
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ii.

The percentage of Interstate contracts for which the design stage cost overrun exceeded 10% was
14% (10 of 71), whereas the corresponding percentage for Non-Interstate NHS contracts was 23%
(26 of 112) and for Non-NHS contracts was 25% (58 of 236 contracts).

iii.

The percentage of Interstate contracts for which the design stage cost underrun exceeded 10% was
30% (21 of 71), whereas the corresponding percentage for Non-Interstate NHS contracts was 21%
(24 of 112) and for Non-NHS contracts was 25% (60 of 236 contracts).
Based on these findings, it was found that the design stage cost overrun is more frequent for Non-

NHS contracts followed by Non-Interstate NHS and Interstate contracts. Cost underruns on the other hand
are more frequent amongst Interstate contracts, compared to Non-Interstate NHS and Non-NHS contracts.
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Figure 5.25: Percentage of Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10%’ Design Stage Cost Overrun Bracket by NHS
Status
(A) Severity of Design Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The average design stage cost overrun was determined for contracts that lie outside the ‘+/-10% cost
overrun bracket’ by NHS status. The objective of this analysis was to determine whether contracts
belonging to any particular NHS status experienced a higher average design stage cost overrun or underrun
compared to others. The following conclusions were made:
i.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun > 10%: The average design stage cost overrun was 42% for
Interstate contracts, 27% for Non-Interstate NHS contracts, and 35% for Non-NHS contracts. An
analysis of the 95% confidence intervals indicated that the Interstate contracts [18%, 66%]
experience a wider range of cost overrun compared to Non-Interstate NHS [19%, 34%] and Non-
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NHS [29%, 41%] contracts (Figure 5.26). The upper limit of the 95% confidence interval for
Interstates-NHS contracts was 66% compared to 34% for Non-Interstate NHS contracts and 41%
for Non-NHS, which implied that Interstate contracts experienced higher cost overrun compared
to Non-Interstate NHS and Non-NHS contracts.
ii.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun < -10% (i.e. Cost Underrun > 10%): The average design stage
cost underrun for Interstate contracts (26%) was higher compared to Non-NHS (23%) and NonInterstate NHS (21%) contracts. The 95% confidence intervals corresponding to these averages
were [20%, 32%], [20%, 25%], and [16%, 27%] for Interstate, Non-NHS, and Non-Interstate NHS
contracts, respectively. Based on the plot of the 95% confidence intervals and the average design
stage cost overrun (Figure 5.26), it was found that the Interstate contracts were more vulnerable to
high cost underrun, compared to Non-NHS and Non-Interstate NHS contracts.
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Figure 5.26: Average Design Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun Bracket’
by NHS Status

5.3.3.6. Descriptive Analysis by District
Table 5.21 shows the average design stage cost overrun for all districts. The Greenfield district had the
highest average design stage cost overrun (9.4%), followed by Crawfordsville (6.2%), Vincennes (5.3%),
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Seymour (3.4%), Fort Wayne (2.9%), and Laporte (0.18%). The 95% confidence interval of the average
design stage cost overrun in the Greenfield and Crawfordsville districts was [1.6%, 17%] and [-0.4%,
13%], which indicated that cost overrun is significantly more prominent than cost underrun in both these
districts, particularly in Greenfield. In the districts of Seymour, Fort Wayne, and Vincennes, the 95%
confidence interval of the average design stage cost overrun indicated that cost overrun is marginally more
prominent than cost underrun, but the average overrun is not significantly different from zero.
Table 5.21: Analysis of Average Cost Overrun of Final Cost over Design Cost by District

⎛ Final Cost - Design Cost ⎞
Y3 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Design Cost
⎝
⎠

Y3 < −10%

−10% ≤ Y3 < 0%

0% ≤ Y3 ≤ 10%

Y3 > 10%

Weighted
Average

CRAWF

Average: -23.6%
Contracts: 18
C.I: [-29%, -19%]

Average: -3.8%
Contracts: 11
C.I: [5.8%, -1.7%]

Average: 3%
Contracts: 18
C.I: [1.4%, 4.6%]

Average: 33%
Contracts: 19
C.I: [22%, 44%]

Average:3.2%
Contracts: 66
C.I:[-3%,9.5%]

FW

Average: -22 %
Contracts: 12
C.I: [-30%, -14%]

Average: -2.2%
Contracts: 17
C.I: [-3.6%, -0.7%]

Average: 2.5%
Contracts: 22
C.I: [1.4%, 3.7%]

Average: 31%
Contracts: 16
C.I: [18%, 43%]

Average: 3.7%
Contracts: 67
C.I:[-1.6%,8.9%]

GRE

Average: -20 %
Contracts: 18
C.I:[-25%, -14%]

Average: -2.4%
Contracts: 21
C.I: [-3.8%,-1%]

Average: 3.2%
Contracts: 16
C.I: [1.5%, 4.9%]

Average: 37%
Contracts: 16
C.I: [22%, 52%]

Average: 3.3%
Contracts: 71
C.I:[-2.5%,9.1%]

LAP

Average: -21.6%
Contracts: 19
C.I:[-28%,-16%]

Average: -2.3%
Contracts: 21
C.I: [-3.6%, -1%]

Average: 2.6 %
Contracts: 28
C.I: [1.5%, 3.8%]

Average: 34%
Contracts: 6
C.I: [10%, 57%]

Average:-2.4%
Contracts: 74
C.I:[-6.4%,1.5%]

SEY

Average: -25.3%
Contracts: 17
C.I:[-30%,-21%]

Average: -2.5%
Contracts: 18
C.I: [-4%, -1%]

Average: 1.4%
Contracts: 18
C.I: [0.4%, 2.5%]

Average: 32%
Contracts: 20
C.I: [19%, 44%]

Average: 2.5%
Contracts: 73
C.I:[-3.4%,8.4%]

VIN

Average: -25%
Contracts: 21
C.I:[-31%,-19%]

Average: -2.9%
Contracts: 15
C.I: [-4.5%, -1.2%]

Average: 3.3%
Contracts: 15
C.I: [1.5%, 5.2%]

Average: 35%
Contracts: 17
C.I: [23%, 48%]

Average: 1.2%
Contracts: 68
C.I:[-5.2%,7.7%]

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)

(A) Frequency of Design Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The distribution of the contracts that lie outside the ‘+/-10%’ design stage cost overrun bracket by district is
shown in Figure 5.27.
i.

The percentage of contracts outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ was least in Laporte district
(33%), followed by Fort Wayne (42%), Greenfield (48%), Seymour (51%), Crawfordsville (56%),
and Vincennes (56%). On average, approximately 48% of contracts have a design stage cost
overrun outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’.

125
ii.

The percentage of contracts having a cost overrun of greater than 10% was least in Laporte district
(8%), followed by Greenfield (23%), Vincennes (25%), Seymour (27%), Crawfordsville (29%),
and Fort Wayne (44%).

iii.

The percentage of contracts having a cost underrun exceeding 10% was least in the Fort Wayne
district (18%), followed by Seymour (23%), Greenfield (25%), Laporte (26%), Crawfordsville
(27%), and Vincennes (30%).
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Figure 5.27: Percentage of Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10%’ Design Stage Cost Overrun Bracket by District
(B) Severity of Design Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The average design stage cost overrun was determined for contracts that lie outside the ‘+/-10% cost
overrun bracket’ by district. The objective was to identify the districts with high design stage cost overrun.
i.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun > 10%: The average design stage cost overrun was largest for
Greenfield district (37%), as compared to Vincennes (35%), Laporte (34%), Crawfordsville
(33%), Seymour (32%), and Fort Wayne (31%). Based on the plot of the average design stage cost
overrun and the corresponding 95% confidence interval (Figure 5.28), it was concluded that the
cost overrun is not significantly different across the districts at the design stage.

ii.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun < -10% (i.e. Cost Underrun > 10%): The average design stage
cost underrun was 20% in Greenfield, 22% in Laporte and Fort Wayne, 24% in Crawfordsville,
and 25% in Vincennes and Seymour districts. An analysis of the 95% confidence interval indicates
no significant difference in average design stage cost overrun across the districts.
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Figure 5.28: Average Design Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun Bracket’
by District

5.3.3.7. Descriptive Analysis by Area Type
The analysis of the average design stage cost overrun by area type and cost overrun category is presented in
Table 5.22. Design stage cost overrun in urban areas was not significantly different from that in rural areas.
The average design stage cost overrun in the urban area was 2.7% with a 95% confidence interval of
[-1.5%, 6.8%]. The average design stage cost overrun in the rural area was 1.5% and the 95% confidence
interval of the average was [-1.2%, 4.2%].
Table 5.22: Average Design Stage Cost Overrun by Cost Overrun Category and Area Type

⎛ Final Cost - Design Cost ⎞
Y3 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Design Cost
⎝
⎠

Y3 < −10%

−10% ≤ Y3 < 0%

0% ≤ Y3 ≤ 10%

Y3 > 10%

Weighted
Average

Urban

Average: -23 %
Contracts: 30
C.I: [-27%, -19%]

Average: -2.3%
Contracts: 39
C.I: [-3.2%, -1.4%]

Average: 2.6%
Contracts: 43
C.I: [1.7%, 3.5%]

Average: 43%
Contracts: 24
C.I: [31%, 54%]

Average: 2.7%
Contracts: 136
C.I:[-1.5%,6.8%]

Area

Average: -23%
Contracts: 75
C.I: [-26%, -20%]

Average: -2.7%
Contracts: 64
C.I: [-3.5%, -2.0%]

Average: 2.7%
Contracts: 74
C.I: [2%, 3.4%]

Average: 30%
Contracts: 70
C.I: [25%, 36%]

Average: 1.5%
Contracts: 283
C.I:-1.2%,4.2%]

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)
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(A) Frequency of Design Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The contracts that were outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ were analyzed by area type. The
following observations were made based on the results presented in Table 5.22 and Figure 5.29:
1.

The design stage cost overrun was outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ for 40% (54 of 136)
of the urban area contracts and for 51% (145 of 283) of the rural area contracts.

2.

The design stage cost overrun exceeded 10% for 17% (24 of 136) of the urban area contracts and
24% (70 of 283) of the rural area contracts.

3.

The design stage cost underrun exceeded 10% for 22% (30 of 136) of the urban area contracts and
27% (75 of 283) of the rural area contracts.
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Figure 5.29: Percent Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10%’ Design Stage Cost Overrun Bracket by Area Type
(B) Severity of Design Stage Cost Overrun / Underrun
The average design stage cost overrun was plotted for urban and rural area contracts that lie outside the
‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ (Figure 5.30). The findings were as follows:
i.

For Contracts with Cost Overrun > 10%: The average design stage cost overrun in the urban and
rural areas was 43% and 30%, respectively. The width of 95% confidence interval of the average
design stage cost overrun for urban area contracts [31%, 54%] was twice the width of the
confidence interval for rural area contracts [25%, 36%]. That is, the variability of the design stage
cost overrun was greater for the urban area contracts. The upper limit of the confidence interval
for urban area contracts (54%) was higher than that of rural area contracts (36%), which indicated
that urban area contracts experienced higher design stage cost overrun compared to rural area
contracts.

ii. For Contracts with Cost Overrun < -10% (i.e. Cost Underrun > 10%): The average design stage
cost underruns for the urban and rural areas was are both approximately 23%, and the 95%
confidence interval is [19%, 27%] and [20%, 26%], respectively. Therefore, cost underrun at the
design stage was not significantly different for contracts in the urban and rural areas.
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Figure 5.30: Average Design Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts Outside the ‘+/-10% Cost Overrun Bracket’
by Area Type

5.3.4.

Final Cost vs. Letting Cost

The difference between the final construction cost and the letting cost (winning bid amount) was calculated
to determine the accuracy of the cost estimate at the letting stage. The letting stage cost overrun was
calculated as:

⎛ Final Cost - Letting Cost ⎞
Letting Stage Cost Overrun : Y4 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Letting Cost
⎝
⎠

(5.5)

The distribution of letting stage cost overrun is shown in Figure 5.31 for 419 contracts. The
average letting stage cost overrun was 6.3% and the standard deviation was 13%. The 95% confidence
interval of the average letting stage cost overrun was [5.1%, 7.6%]. The low value of the average letting
stage cost overrun is because the positive cost overrun is compensated by the negative cost overrun (i.e.
cost underrun). However, the positive value of average letting stage cost overrun (6.3%) and the 95%
confidence interval [5.1%, 7.6%] indicated that overruns outweighs underruns at the letting stage.
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Figure 5.31: Histogram Distribution of Letting Stage Cost Overrun
Table 5.23 presents the average letting stage cost overrun by cost overrun category (as defined in
Chapter 4). The final cost exceeded the letting cost by over 10% (cost overrun) for 25% of the contracts
(104 of the 419 contracts); the letting cost exceeded the final cost (cost underrun) by over 10% for only 3%
of the contracts (13 of the 419 contracts). That is, for 72% of the contracts (302 of 419 contracts) the
difference between the final cost and the letting cost was within the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ and only
28% of the contracts were outside the bracket.

Table 5.23: Analysis of Average Letting Stage Cost Overrun by Cost Overrun Category

⎛ Final Cost - Letting Cost ⎞
Y4 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Letting Cost
⎝
⎠

Number of Contracts
Weighted Average
95% Confidence
Interval

Y4 < −10%

−10% ≤ Y4 < 0%

0% ≤ Y4 ≤ 10%

Y4 > 10%

Total

13
-17 %

47
-3.74 %

255
2.82 %

104
22 %

419
3.91 %

[-23%, -11%]

[-4.6 %, -2.9 %]

[2.4 %, 3.2 %]

[19%, 25%]

[5.1%,7.6%]
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Figure 5.32: A 95% Confidence Interval Analysis of Average Letting Stage Cost Overrun by Cost Overrun
Category
Figure 5.32 shows the average letting stage cost overrun and the 95% confidence intervals for the
contracts in each cost overrun category. For the 104 contracts for which the letting stage cost overrun
exceeds 10%, it was found that the average letting stage cost overrun for these contracts was 22%. Further,
it was determined with 95% confidence that the average letting stage cost overrun for contracts that belong
to this category fall between 19% and 25%. Cost underrun of greater than 10% (i.e. cost overrun < -10%)
were found to be infrequent (only 13 of 419 contracts) at the letting stage. For these 13 contracts, the
average letting stage cost underrun was 17% and the 95% confidence interval was [11%, 23%]. The
contracts that lie within the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’ did not have a significant cost overrun / underrun
at the letting stage. The average letting stage cost overrun and the limits of the 95% confidence interval
were less than 5% for these contracts. Chapter 6 presents models that were developed to determine the
probability of a contract belonging to any one of the four categories of letting stage cost overrun.
Sections 5.3.4.1 through 5.3.4.7 present a detailed analysis of the contracts that have a cost
overrun of greater than 10% by contract size, type, work category, area type, route type, NHS status, and
administrative district.

5.3.4.1. Descriptive Analysis by Work Category
The average letting stage cost overrun and the 95% confidence interval of the average are shown in Table
5.24 by work category. The average letting stage cost overrun (8.8%) and the 95% confidence interval
[8.8%, 12.2%] of the expansion contracts exceeded that for pavement contracts (5.6%; [3.0%, 8.2%]) and
bridge contracts (5.9%, [4.4%, 7.4%]).

131

Table 5.24: Analysis of Average Letting Stage Cost Overrun by Cost Overrun and Work Category

⎛ Final Cost - Letting Cost ⎞
Y4 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Letting Cost
⎝
⎠
Y4 < −10%

−10% ≤ Y4 < 0%

0% ≤ Y4 ≤ 10%

Y4 > 10%

Weighted
Average

Average: -10 %
Contracts: 1

Average: - 2.8 %
Contracts: 9
C.I: [-4.8%,0.8%]

Average: 3.2 %
Contracts: 42
C.I: [2.2%, 4.1%]

Average: 26%
Contracts: 21
C.I: [17%, 35%]

Average: 8.8%
Contracts: 73
C.I:[5.2%,12.5%]

Average: - 44 %
Contracts: 1

Average: - 4%
Contracts: 11
C.I: [-6%, -1.8%]

Average: 2.9%
Contracts: 75
C.I: [2.3%, 3.5%]

Average: 23%
Contracts: 20
C.I: [13%, 33%]

Average: 5.6%
Contracts: 107
C.I:[3%, 8.2%]

Pavement
Contracts

Average: -16 %
Contracts: 11
C.I:[-19%,-12%]

Average: - 4%
Contracts: 27
C.I: [-5%, -2.9%]

Average: 2.7%
Contracts: 138
C.I: [2.1%, 3.2%]

Average: 21%
Contracts: 63
C.I: [18%, 24%]

Average: 5.9%
Contracts: 239
C.I:[4.4%,7.4%]

Weighted
Average

Average: -17%
Contracts: 13
C.I:[-23%,-11%]

Average: -3.7%
Contracts: 47
C.I: [-4.6%, -2.9%]

Average: 2.8%
Contracts: 255
C.I: [2.4%,3.2%]

Average: 22%
Contracts: 104
C.I: [19%, 25%]

Average: 6.3%
Contracts: 419
C.I:[5.1%,7.6%]

Expansion
Contracts

Bridge
Contracts

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)

The letting stage cost overrun exceeded 10% for 19% (20 of 107) of the bridge contracts, 26% (63
of 239) of the pavement contracts, and 29% (21 of 73 contracts) of the expansion contracts (Figure 5.33).
For contracts with letting stage cost overrun exceeding 10%, the average letting stage cost overrun was
26%, 23%, and 21% for expansion, bridge, and pavement contracts, respectively (Figure 5.34). This
indicates that pavement contracts had the least average letting stage cost overrun. The 95% confidence
intervals of the average letting stage cost overrun was [17%, 35%], [13%, 33%], and [18%, 24%] for
expansion, bridge, and pavement contracts, respectively. The upper limit of the confidence interval for
pavement contracts (24%) was less than that of expansion (35%) and bridge (33%) contracts (Figure 5.34),
which implied that the pavement contracts were less susceptible to high letting stage cost overrun
compared to expansion and bridge contracts. The 95% confidence also indicated that the variability of the
letting stage cost overrun was lowest for pavement contracts.
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Figure 5.33: Percent Contracts with Letting Stage Cost Overrun > 10% by Work Category

60

40

20

0
Expansion

Bridge

Pavement

Work Category

Figure 5.34: Average Letting Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts with Overrun > 10% by Work Category

5.3.4.2. Descriptive Analysis by Contract Size
The average letting stage cost overrun increased with increase in contract size from $1 million to $10
million (Table 5.25). The average letting stage cost overrun was 4.5% for contracts of size $1-$2 million,
7.2% for contracts of size $2-$5 million, and 9.3% for contracts sized $5-$10 million. The 95% confidence
intervals of the average letting stage cost overrun was [3.2%, 5.9%], [4.6%, 9.7%], and [4%, 14.7%] for
contracts in the $1-$2 million, $2-$5 million, and $5-$10 million size categories, respectively. The upper
limit of the 95% confidence interval increased with an increase in contract size from $1-$10 million,
suggesting that large-sized contracts are more vulnerable to cost overrun at the letting stage. The contracts
with proposed cost exceeding $10 million had an average letting stage cost overrun of 8% and a 95%
confidence interval of [5%, 11%], which were marginally lower than the corresponding values for contracts

133

in the $5-$10 million size category, but higher than the corresponding values for contracts in the $1-$5
million size category.
Table 5.25: Average Letting Stage Cost Overrun by Contract Size and Cost Overrun Category

⎛ Final Cost - Letting Cost ⎞
Y4 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Letting Cost
⎝
⎠
Y4 < −10%

−10% ≤ Y4 < 0%

0% ≤ Y4 ≤ 10%

Y4 > 10%

Weighted
Average

$1 M –
$2 M

Average: -14.5 %
Contracts: 4
C.I: [-24%, 5.5%]

Average: - 3.3 %
Contracts: 28
C.I: [-4.4%, -2.1%]

Average: 2.5 %
Contracts: 121
C.I: [1.9%, 3%]

Average: 19%
Contracts: 37
C.I: [16%, 22%]

Average: 4.5%
Contracts: 190
C.I:[3.2%,5.9%]

$2 M –
$5 M

Average: -17.5 %
Contracts: 8
C.I: [-27%, -8%]

Average: - 4.5 %
Contracts: 11
C.I: [-6.2%, -2.8%]

Average: 2.8 %
Contracts: 78
C.I: [-2%, 3.5%]

Average: 23.3 %
Contracts: 41
C.I: [18%, 29%]

Average: 7.2%
Contracts: 138
C.I:[4.6%,9.7%]

Average: -27.5%
Contracts: 1

Average: - 3.5 %
Contracts: 6
C.I:[- 6.3%, -0.8%]

Average: 3.3 %
Contracts: 32
C.I: [2.4%, 4.2%]

Average: 31.3 %
Contracts: 14
C.I: [16%, 46%]

Average: 9.3%
Contracts: 53
C.I:[4%,14.7%]

Average: - 6.8%
Contracts: 2
C.I: [-8.5%, -5%]

Average: 3.9%
Contracts: 24
C.I: [2.6%, 5.2%]

Average: 18.6 %
Contracts: 12
C.I: [14%, 24%]

Average: 8.0%
Contracts: 38
C.I:[ 5%,11%]

$5 M $10 M

> $10 M

-

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)

The letting stage cost overrun exceeded 10% for 19% (37 of 190) of the $1-$2 million contracts,
30% (41 of 138) of $2-$5 million contracts, 26% (14 of 53) of $2-$5 million contracts, and 32% (12 of 38
contracts) of contracts greater than $10 million (Figure 5.35). Therefore, letting stage cost overrun greater
than 10% was found to be least frequent for small-sized contracts.
For the contracts with letting stage cost overrun greater than 10%, the average letting stage cost
overrun was 19% for contracts with size $1-$2 million, 23% for contracts of size $2-$5 million, 31% for
contracts with size $5-$10 million, and 19% for contracts of size exceeding $10 million (Figure 5.36).
Therefore, the average letting stage cost overrun increased with contract size from $1-$10 million. The
95% confidence interval of the average letting stage cost overrun for contracts of size in between $1-$2
million [16%, 22%], for contracts of size $2-$5 million [18%, 29%], and for contracts of size $5-$10
million [16%, 46%], also indicated that cost overruns generally increase with contract size (Figure 5.36).
However, for contracts of size exceeding $10M, the average letting stage cost overrun (19%) and the 95%
confidence interval [14%, 24%] were lower compared to $1-$10 million contracts.
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Figure 5.35: Percent Contracts with Letting Stage Cost Overrun > 10% by Contract Size
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Figure 5.36: Average Letting Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts with Cost Overrun > 10% by Contract Size

5.3.4.3. Analysis by Contract Type
The average letting stage cost overrun by contract type and cost overrun category is shown in Table 5.26.
The average letting stage cost overrun was higher for stand-alone contracts (8.3%) compared to kin
contracts (5.2%). The 95% confidence intervals of the average letting stage cost overrun was [4%, 6.4%]
and [5.5%, 11%] for kin and stand-alone contracts, respectively, which further confirmed that cost overrun
are more significant for stand-alone contracts, as the upper limit of the confidence interval was higher for
stand-alone contracts.
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Table 5.26: Analysis of Average Cost Overrun of Final Cost over Letting Cost by Contract Type

⎛ Final Cost - Letting Cost ⎞
Y4 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Letting Cost
⎝
⎠

Y4 < −10%

−10% ≤ Y4 < 0%

0% ≤ Y4 ≤ 10%

Y4 > 10%

Weighted
Average

Kin

Average: - 15%
Contracts: 7
C.I: [-20%, -9.3%]

Average: -3.4%
Contracts: 32
C.I: [-4.3%, -2.5%]

Average: 2.7%
Contracts: 169
C.I: [2.2%, 3.1%]

Average:18.9%
Contracts: 62
C.I: [17%, 21%]

Average: 5.2%
Contracts: 270
C.I:[4%, 6.4%]

Stand
Alone

Average: - 20%
Contracts: 6
C.I: [-34%, -6.8%]

Average: - 4.5%
Contracts: 15
C.I: [-6.2%, -2.7%]

Average: 3.1%
Contracts: 86
C.I: [2.5%, 3.7%]

Average: 27.5 %
Contracts: 42
C.I: [21%, 34%]

Average:8.3%
Contracts: 149
C.I:[5.5%, 11%]

Weighted
Average

Average: -17%
Contracts: 13
C.I: [-23%, -11%]

Average: -3.7%
Contracts: 47
C.I: [-4.6%, -2.9%]

Average: 2.8%
Contracts: 255
C.I: [2.4%,3.2%]

Average: 22%
Contracts: 104
C.I: [19%, 25%]

Average: 6.3%
Contracts: 419
C.I:[5.1%,7.6%]

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)

The letting stage cost overrun exceeded 10% for 23% (62 of 270) of the kin contracts and for 28%
(42 of 149) of the stand-alone contracts. This indicates that cost overruns exceeding 10% are more frequent
for stand-alone contracts (Figure 5.37).
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Figure 5.37: Percent Contracts with Letting Stage Cost Overrun > 10% by Contract Type
For the contracts with letting stage cost overrun exceeding 10%, the average letting stage cost
overrun was 19% for kin contracts and 28% for stand-alone contracts. The 95% confidence interval of the
average letting stage cost overrun for stand-alone contracts [21%, 34%] was also higher than that of kin
contracts [17%, 21%], thereby indicating that letting stage cost overrun exceeding 10% are more severe for
stand-alone contracts (Figure 5.38).
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Figure 5.38: Average Letting Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts with Cost Overrun > 10% by Contract Type

5.3.4.4. Descriptive Analysis by Route Type
The average letting stage cost overrun was 7.1% for U.S. road contracts, 6.2% for state road contracts, and
5.4% for Interstate contracts (Table 5.27). The 95% confidence intervals of the average letting stage cost
overrun was [4.6%, 9.6%], [4.6%, 7.7%], and [2%, 8.7%] for U.S. Road, State Road, and Interstate
contracts, respectively. The average and the 95% confidence intervals indicated that cost overrun is more
prominent than cost underrun across the three route categories. U.S. Road contracts had a marginally higher
average and upper limit of the 95% confidence interval which indicated that U.S. road contracts had more
significant cost overrun compared to State Road and Interstate contracts.
The frequency of high cost overrun at the letting stage was not significantly different across the
three route types (Figure 5.39). The average letting stage cost overrun exceeded 10% for 26% (55 of 209)
of the State Road contracts, 24% (17 of 71) of the Interstate contracts, and 23% (32 of 139) of U.S. road
contracts.
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Table 5.27: Analysis of Average Cost Overrun of Final Cost over Letting Cost by Route Type

⎛ Final Cost - Letting Cost ⎞
Y4 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Letting Cost
⎝
⎠
Y4 < −10%
Interstates

Average: -27%
Contracts: 2

−10% ≤ Y4 < 0%

0% ≤ Y4 ≤ 10%

Weighted

Y4 > 10%

Average

Average: -4.6%
Contracts: 5
C.I: [-8.6%,-0.6%]

Average: 2.67%
Contracts: 47
C.I: [1.9%,3.5%]

Average: 20%
Contracts: 17
C.I: [9%, 30%]

Average: 5.4%
Contracts: 71
C.I:[2%, 8.7%]

Average: 26%
Contracts: 32
C.I: [19%,33%]

Average: 7.1%
Contracts: 139
C.I:[4.6%,9.6%]

U.S.
Roads

Average: -15%
Contracts: 5
C.I: [-20%,8.8%]

Average: -3.6%
Contracts: 14
C.I: [-5.2%,-2.2%]

Average: 3.2%
Contracts: 88
C.I: [2.5%, 3.8%]

State
Roads

Average: -16%
Contracts: 6
C.I:[-24%,-9 %]

Average: -3.6%
Contracts: 28
C.I: [-4.7%,-2.5%]

Average: 2.6%
Contracts: 120
C.I: [2%, 3%]

Weighted
Average

Average: -17%
Contracts: 13
C.I: [-23%,-11%]

Average: -3.7%
Contracts: 47
C.I: [-4.6%, -2.9%]

Average: 2.8%
Contracts: 255
C.I: [2.4%,3.2%]

Average: 21%
Contracts: 55
C.I: [18%,
24%]
Average: 22%
Contracts: 104
C.I: [19%,
25%]

Average: 6.2%
Contracts: 209
C.I:[4.6%,7.7%]
Average: 6.3%
Contracts: 419
C.I:[5.1%,7.6%]

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)
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Figure 5.39: Percent Contracts with Letting Stage Cost Overrun > 10% by Route Type
For the contracts with letting stage cost overrun greater than 10%, the average letting stage cost
overrun was 26% for U.S. road contracts, 21% for State Road contracts, and 20% for Interstate contracts.
The 95% confidence intervals of the average letting stage cost overrun for U.S. road contracts [19%, 33%],
State Road contracts [18%, 24%], and Interstate road contracts [9%, 30%] are plotted in Figure 5.40. The
upper limit of the confidence interval was lower for State Road contracts indicating that State Road
contracts did not experience high cost overrun. Also, the width of the confidence interval was least for State
Road contracts indicating a propensity of State Road contracts to exhibit lower variability of cost overruns.
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Figure 5.40: Average Letting Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts with Overrun > 10% by Route Type

5.3.4.5. Descriptive Analysis by NHS Status
The analysis of average letting stage cost overrun by NHS status and cost overrun category is presented in
Table 5.28. The average letting stage cost overrun was 6.8% for Non-NHS contracts, 6.0% for NonInterstate NHS contracts, and 5.4% for Interstate contracts. The 95% confidence intervals of the average
letting stage cost overrun was [5%, 8.5%], [4%, 8%], and [2%, 8.7%] for Non-NHS, Non-Interstate NHS,
and Interstate contracts, respectively. The average and the 95% confidence intervals indicated that cost
overrun is not significantly different across the three levels of NHS status.
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Table 5.28: Analysis of Average Cost Overrun of Final Cost over Letting Cost by NHS Status

⎛ Final Cost - Letting Cost ⎞
Y4 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Letting Cost
⎝
⎠
Y4 < −10%

−10% ≤ Y4 < 0%

0% ≤ Y4 ≤ 10%

Y4 > 10%

Weighted
Average

Interstate

Average: -27%
Contracts: 2

Average: -4.6%
Contracts: 5
C.I: [-8.6%,-0.6%]

Average: 2.7%
Contracts: 47
C.I: [1.9%,3.5%]

Average: 19.6%
Contracts: 17
C.I: [9.3%,30%]

Average: 5.4%
Contracts: 71
C.I: [2%,8.7%]

Non
Interstate
NHS

Average: -15%
Contracts: 4
C.I: [-23%,-6.3%]

Average: -3.6%
Contracts: 12
C.I: [-5.3%,-1.8%]

Average: 3.6%
Contracts: 72
C.I: [2.8%,4.3%]

Average: 21%
Contracts: 24
C.I: [17%, 26%]

Average: 6%
Contracts: 112
C.I: [4%,8%]

Non
NHS

Average: -16%
Contracts: 7
C.I: [-22%,-10%]

Average: -3.6%
Contracts: 30
C.I: [-4.7%, -2.6%]

Average: 2.5%
Contracts: 136
C.I: [2%, 3%]

Average: 24%
Contracts: 63
C.I: [19%, 28%]

Average: 6.8%
Contracts: 236
C.I: [5%,8.5%]

Weighted
Average

Average: -17%
Contracts: 13
C.I: [-23%, -11%]

Average: -3.7%
Contracts: 47
C.I: [-4.6%, -2.9%]

Average: 2.8%
Contracts: 255
C.I: [2.4%,3.2%]

Average: 22%
Contracts: 104
C.I: [19%, 25%]

Average: 6.3%
Contracts: 419
C.I:[5.1%,7.6%]

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)

The frequency of high cost overrun at the letting stage was analyzed across the levels of NHS
status (Figure 5.41). It was found that high cost overrun was marginally more frequent for Non-NHS
contracts. The average letting stage cost overrun exceeded 10% for 27% (63 of 236) of the Non-NHS
contracts, 24% (17 of 71) of the Interstate contracts, and 21% (24 of 112) of Non-Interstate NHS contracts.
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Figure 5.41: Percent Contracts with Letting Stage Cost Overrun > 10% by NHS Status
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For the contracts with letting stage cost overrun greater than 10%, the average letting stage cost
overrun was 24% for Non-NHS contracts, 21% for Non-Interstate NHS contracts, and 19% for Interstate
contracts. The 95% confidence intervals of the average letting stage cost overrun for Non-NHS contracts
[19%, 28%], Non-Interstate NHS contracts [17%, 26%], and Interstate contracts [9%, 30%] are plotted in
Figure 5.42. The confidence intervals and the average cost overrun indicated that Non-NHS contracts were
more susceptible to high cost overrun. The width of the confidence interval for Interstate contracts was
significantly higher compared to that of Non-Interstate NHS and Non-NHS contracts, thereby indicating
high variability of cost overrun across the Interstate contracts.
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Figure 5.42: Average Letting Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts with Overrun > 10% by NHS Status

5.3.4.6. Descriptive Analysis by Administrative District
The analysis of average letting stage cost overrun by district and cost overrun category is presented in
Table 5.29. The average letting stage cost overrun was found to be the least for the Laporte district (2.0%)
and highest for the Vincennes district (9.0%). The 95% confidence interval of the average letting stage cost
overrun of contracts in the Vincennes district was [5.8%, 12%] which exceeded that of the Laporte district
[0.3%, 4.7%]. For the other districts, the average letting stage cost overrun was in the range of 5%-8% and
the 95% confidence interval of the average was also not significantly different.
The frequency of high cost overrun at the letting stage was analyzed across the six administrative
districts. The letting stage cost overrun exceeded 10% for 35% of the contracts in the Vincennes district,
whereas only 8% of the contracts in the Laporte district had a cost overrun of greater than 10% at the
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letting stage. For the other districts, the frequency of cost overrun greater than 10% was in the range of
24%-28% (Figure 5.43).
Table 5.29: Analysis of Average Cost Overrun of Final Cost over Letting Cost by District

⎛ Final Cost - Letting Cost ⎞
Y4 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Letting Cost
⎝
⎠
Y4 < −10%

−10% ≤ Y4 < 0%

0% ≤ Y4 ≤ 10%

Y4 > 10%

Weighted
Average

Average: -27%
Contracts: 1

Average: -5.4%
Contracts: 6
C.I: [-8.1%,-2.7%]

Average: 2%
Contracts: 40
C.I: [1.2%,2.9%]

Average: 26%
Contracts: 19
C.I: [14%, 38%]

Average: 7.7%
Contracts: 66
C.I:[3.3%,12%]

FW

Average: -18%
Contracts: 2
C.I: [-75%, 39%]

Average: -3.2%
Contracts: 3
C.I: [-7.2%, 0.7%]

Average: 2.6%
Contracts: 45
C.I: [1.7%,3.5%]

Average: 20%
Contracts: 17
C.I: [16%,24%]

Average: 6.2%
Contracts: 67
C.I:[3.7%,8.6%]

GRE

Average: -14%
Contracts: 5
C.I: [-20%, -7.5%]

Average: -3.3%
Contracts: 6
C.I: [-5.7%, -1%]

Average: 3.2%
Contracts: 43
C.I: [2.3%,4.1%]

Average: 18%
Contracts: 17
C.I: [13%,22%]

Average: 5.0%
Contracts: 71
C.I:[2.7%,7.4%]

LAP

Average: -22%
Contracts: 3
C.I: [-70%, 24%]

Average: -3.3%
Contracts: 14
C.I: [-5%, -1.6%]

Average: 3.1%
Contracts: 51
C.I: [2.2%, 4%]

Average: 24%
Contracts: 6
C.I: [15%, 32%]

Average: 2.5%
Contracts: 74
C.I:[0.3%,4.7%]

CRAWF

SEY

-

Average: -3.8%
Contracts: 10
C.I: [-6%, -1.5%]

Average: 2.6%
Contracts: 42
C.I: [1.6%,3.5%]

Average: 24%
Contracts: 21
C.I: [15%, 33%]

Average: 7.9%
Contracts: 73
C.I:[4.3%,11%]

VIN

Average: -12%
Contracts: 2
C.I: [-32%, 7.6%]

Average: -3.8%
Contracts: 8
C.I: [-6.4%, -1%]

Average: 3.4%
Contracts: 34
C.I: [2.3%,4.5%]

Average: 23%
Contracts: 24
C.I: [18%, 28%]

Average: 9.0%
Contracts: 68
C.I:[5.8%,12%]

Weighted
Average

Average: -17%
Contracts: 13
C.I: [-23%, -11%]

Average: -3.7%
Contracts: 47
C.I: [-4.6%, -2.9%]

Average: 2.8%
Contracts: 255
C.I: [2.4%,3.2%]

Average: 22%
Contracts: 104
C.I: [19%, 25%]

Average: 6.3%
Contracts: 419
C.I:[5.1%,7.6%]

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)
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Figure 5.43: Percent Contracts with Letting Stage Cost Overrun > 10% by District
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For the contracts with letting stage cost overrun exceeding 10%, the average letting stage cost
overrun and the 95% confidence intervals of the averages were comparable for Greenfield (18%) and Fort
Wayne (20%) districts (Figure 5.44). Laporte and Seymour districts had an average letting stage cost
overrun of 24% and the 95% confidence interval of the average was [15%, 33%], indicating that contracts
in these districts experienced marginally higher cost overrun compared to Fort Wayne and Greenfield
districts. The contracts in the Vincennes district had an average letting stage cost overrun of 23%, but the
variability of cost overrun was lower compared to Laporte and Seymour districts, as indicated by the
confidence interval of the average [18%, 28%]. Crawfordsville district had the highest average letting stage
cost overrun (26%) and the highest upper limit of the confidence interval (38%), indicating that the
contracts in Crawfordsville were more susceptible to high cost overrun.
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Figure 5.44: Average Letting Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts with Overrun > 10% by District

5.3.4.7. Descriptive Analysis by Area Type
As shown in Table 5.30, the average letting stage cost overrun was higher for urban area contracts (8.1%)
compared to rural area contracts (5.5%). The 95% confidence intervals of the average letting stage cost
overrun also indicated that letting stage cost overrun in the urban areas were more significant than in the
rural areas. The 95% confidence interval for urban area contracts was [5.4%, 11%] and for rural area
contracts, [4%, 6.8%].
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Table 5.30: Analysis of Average Cost Overrun of Final Cost over Letting Cost by Area Type

⎛ Final Cost - Letting Cost ⎞
Y4 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Letting Cost
⎝
⎠

Y4 < −10%

−10% ≤ Y4 < 0%

0% ≤ Y4 ≤ 10%

Y4 > 10%

Weighted
Average

Urban

Average: -14%
Contracts: 4
C.I: [-24%, -5%]

Average: - 4.2%
Contracts: 12
C.I: [-6%, -2.3%]

Average: 3%
Contracts: 82
C.I: [2.4%, 3.7%]

Average: 25%
Contracts: 38
C.I: [18%, 32%]

Average: 8.1%
Contracts: 136
C.I:[5.4%,11%]

Rural

Average: -19%
Contracts: 9
C.I: [-27%, -10%]

Average: - 3.6%
Contracts: 35
C.I: [-4.5%,-2.6%]

Average: 2.7%
Contracts: 173
C.I: [2.3%, 3.2%]

Average: 21%
Contracts: 66
C.I: [18%, 24%]

Average: 5.5%
Contracts: 283
C.I: [4%, 6.8%]

Weighted
Average

Average: -17%
Contracts: 13
C.I: [-23%, -11%]

Average: -3.7%
Contracts: 47
C.I: [-4.6%, -2.9%]

Average: 2.8%
Contracts: 255
C.I: [2.4%,3.2%]

Average: 22%
Contracts: 104
C.I: [19%, 25%]

Average: 6.3%
Contracts: 419
C.I:[5.1%,7.6%]

Contracts: Number of Contracts
C.I: 95% Confidence Interval (Estimated Using One Sample t-Test)

Cost overruns exceeding 10% were more frequent for urban area contracts. Approximately 28%
(38 of 136) of the urban area contracts had a cost overrun of greater than 10%, whereas 23% (66 of 283) of
the rural area contracts had a cost overrun of greater than 10% (Figure 5.45).
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Figure 5.45: Percent Contracts with Letting Stage Cost Overrun > 10% by Area Type
For the contracts with letting stage cost overrun exceeding 10% (Figure 5.46), the average letting
stage cost overrun and the 95% confidence intervals of the averages suggested that urban area contracts are
more susceptible to high cost overrun compared to rural areas. The average letting stage cost overrun was
25% across the urban area contracts and was 21% for the rural area contracts. The upper limit of the 95%
confidence interval of the average was also higher for urban area contracts (32%) compared to rural area
contract (24%), which further indicated that urban area contracts experienced higher cost overruns.
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Figure 5.46: Average Letting Stage Cost Overrun for Contracts with Cost Overrun > 10% by Area Type

5.3.5. Letting Cost vs. Proposed Cost
The difference between the letting cost and the proposed cost was calculated to determine if contracts are
delivered at the initial proposed budget and the factors affecting any deviations thereof. The percentage
difference was calculated as:

⎛ Letting Cost - Proposed Cost ⎞
Cost Overrun : Y5 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

(5.6)

The average overrun of letting cost over proposed cost was found to be -1.4% and the standard
deviation was 23%. The 95% confidence interval of the average letting stage cost overrun was [-3.7%,
0.8%]. The negative sign of the average letting stage cost overrun value and the largely negative confidence
interval indicated that letting cost was lower than the proposed cost for most of the contracts.
Table 5.31 presents the average overrun of the letting cost over proposed cost, by cost overrun
category. For 61% of the contracts (259 of 419 contracts), the difference between letting cost and proposed
cost was within the ‘+/-10%’ bracket.
The letting cost was greater than the proposed cost for 43% (176 of 419) of the contracts but
exceeded the proposed cost by more than 10% (cost overrun) for only 15% of the contracts (59 of the 419
contracts). For the remaining 28% (117 of 419) contracts, the letting cost exceeded proposed cost by an
average of less than 2%. However, for the 59 contracts with letting costs greater than 10%, the average
overrun of the letting cost (over proposed cost) was 40.8%. Further, the 95% confidence interval for the
average overrun for contracts that belonged to this category ranged between 34% and 47%.
The proposed cost exceeded the letting cost for 57% (243 of 419). For 24% (101 of 419) of the
contracts the proposed cost exceeded letting cost by over 10%. For the 101 contracts whose proposed cost
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exceeded the letting cost by over 10%, the proposed cost was higher by an average of 28%, with a 95%
confidence of 25% - 31%.

Table 5.31: Analysis of Average Letting Stage Cost Overrun by Cost Overrun Category

⎛ Letting Cost - Proposed Cost ⎞
Y5 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

Number of
Contracts
Average
Overrun
95% Confidence
Interval

Y4 < −10%

−10% ≤ Y4 < 0%

0% ≤ Y4 ≤ 10%

Y4 > 10%

Total

101

142

117

59

419

-28 %

-2.3 %

1.53 %

40.8 %

3.91 %

[-31%, -25%]

[-2.8%, -1.8 %]

[1.1 %, 2.0 %]

[34%, 47%]

[5.1%,7.6%]

5.4. Cost Escalation across All Stages
The estimates of the final construction cost were tracked from the planning stage until the final construction
for each contract to determine the escalation pattern during the planning and development phase. On the
basis of an analysis of the 419 highway contracts in Indiana, three patterns of cost escalation were found to
be most widespread. This section presents an analysis of these cost escalation patterns. Contracts in each
pattern category were analyzed by their work category, contract size, area type, route type, district, and
NHS status to determine the influence of these factors.

5.4.1.

Cost Escalation Pattern ‘A’

A graphical representation of Pattern ‘A’ is presented in Figure 5.47. Contracts that exhibit this pattern are
characterized as follows: the cost estimate increases or remains constant at all stages except the letting
stage. The decrease in the cost estimate at the letting stage indicates that contracts that exhibit pattern ‘A’
are generally those that experience high competition at the letting stage. Such competition is generally
experienced by contracts that are straightforward construction activities. Pattern ‘A’ contracts tend to have
more information available about the construction activities compared to contracts exhibiting any other
pattern. Standard and reliable cost estimation procedures probably exist for such contracts and therefore
significant cost changes due to unforeseen factors and uncertainty in cost estimation are likely to be less.
This is perhaps why for such contracts, contractors submit bids that are lower than the design cost estimate,
in contrast to contracts as opposed to contracts that exhibit other patterns.
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Figure 5.47: Graphical Representation of Cost Escalation Pattern ‘A’
Pattern ‘A’ was observed in 215 of the 419 contracts. The cost escalation between two consecutive
stages was analyzed by calculating the percentage increase in the cost estimate at the latter stage compared
to the estimate at the preceding stage (Figure 5.48). The engineer’s assessment cost and the proposed cost
were generally not found to be significantly different from each other. It was found that the major cost
escalation generally occurred between the programming stage (engineer’s assessment estimate) and design
stage, and between the letting and final construction stages. The final design cost exceeded the engineer’s
assessment by an average of 6.2%. Further, it was determined with 95% confidence that the average
difference between the two estimates is between 3.6% and 8.6%. The cost escalation between letting and
final construction was found to be even higher. The final construction cost was more than the letting cost
by an average of 9.2%. The analysis of the 95% confidence interval indicated that the final cost exceeded
the letting cost by 7-11%. The letting cost was less than the design estimate by an average of 12.8%. The
95% confidence interval of the average difference between letting cost and the design cost indicated that
letting cost was less than the design cost estimate by 11-15%.
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Figure 5.48: Stage-to-Stage Cost Deviations for Pattern ‘A’ Contracts
Figure 5.49 presents a comparison of the cost estimates at each stage with the proposed cost
estimate. It was found that the cost estimate prepared after the programming phase (engineer’s assessment
cost) exceeded the proposed cost by an average of 0.1%. After the design stage was completed, the average
difference between the design cost and the proposed cost generally increased to 6.24%. At the letting stage,
the average difference between the letting cost and the proposed cost decreased to -7.7%. The average
difference between the final construction and proposed costs was found to be between -2.7% and 3.5% at
the 95% confidence level, indicating that the final construction cost was not significantly different from the
proposed cost for the contracts that exhibit Pattern ‘A’. The figure could also be utilized to determine the
average percentage difference between other cost estimates. For example, the design cost exceeds the
proposed cost by an average of 6.24% and the final cost exceeds the proposed cost by an average of 0.4%.
Therefore, the design cost exceeds the final cost by 5.84% (subtracting 0.4% from 6.24%). That is, for
contracts exhibiting Pattern ‘A’ the design cost is generally an overestimate of the final cost whereas the
letting cost is generally an underestimate of the final cost. Econometric models were developed (presented
in Chapter 6) that can be used to identify contracts that are most likely to exhibit Pattern ‘A’.
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Figure 5.49: Average Cost Deviation of Each Stage Relative to Proposed Cost for Pattern ‘A’ Contracts
A detailed analysis was conducted to examine the frequency at which contracts of certain
attributes exhibit Pattern ‘A’. Section 5.4.4 presents the results.

5.4.2.

Cost Escalation Pattern ‘B’

A graphical representation of Pattern ‘B’ is shown in Figure 5.50. For the contracts that exhibit this pattern,
the cost estimate increases or remains constant from the planning stage until the final construction. Pattern
‘B’ was exhibited by 97 of the 419 contracts. The increasing trend of the cost estimates indicates that
contracts that exhibit pattern ‘B’ are likely to be those that are more susceptible to increase in the cost
estimate, due to unforeseen costs arising from unforeseen site conditions, scope changes, and change
orders. Contracts exhibiting this pattern are likely to have greater uncertainty associated with the cost
estimates. It is probably because of the high risk that the contractors do not bid a low cost for such contracts
despite a competitive letting environment.
Each segment of the cost escalation pattern was analyzed. The increase in each cost estimate
compared to the cost estimate at the immediate preceding stage was determined. Figure 5.51 presents an
analysis of the pair-wise comparisons of cost estimates. The average difference between the engineer’s
assessment and the proposed cost indicated that the engineer’s assessment and the proposed cost estimates
were similar. The average difference between the design cost and engineer’s assessment was 2.5% (0.4% 5% with 95% confidence). Based on the 95% confidence intervals, it was concluded that the average
difference between the design cost and engineer’s assessment cost for contracts exhibiting Pattern ‘B’ (in
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the range of 0.4% - 4.6%) was less than that for contracts exhibiting Pattern ‘A’ (in the range of 3.6% 8.6%).

Figure 5.50: Graphical Representation of Cost Escalation Pattern ‘B’
A significant increase in the estimated cost was found to occur between the design and letting
stages, and between the letting and final construction stages. The cost estimate at the letting stage was
found to be higher than that of the design stage by over 10% (Figure 5.51). The average difference between
the cost estimate at the letting stage and the estimate at the design stage was 12% with a 95% confidence
interval of [7.5%, 16%]. The average difference between the final cost and the letting cost was 7.5% and
the 95% confidence interval of the average was [5.3%, 9.7%].
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Figure 5.51: Stage-to-Stage Cost Deviations for Pattern ‘B’ Contracts
The cumulative impact of cost estimate increases with respect to the proposed cost at each stage is
shown in Figure 5.52. The difference between the engineer’s assessment cost and proposed cost was found
to be negligible. The average difference between the design cost and the proposed cost was 2.8% and lay
between 1% and 5% with 95% confidence. Due to two significant cost escalations from design to letting
stage (an average increase of 12%) and from letting to final construction (an average increase of 8%), the
final cost exceeded the proposed cost by an average of 24%. Moreover, the average difference between the
final cost and proposed cost was 18-30% with 95% confidence. This analysis suggests that contracts
exhibiting Pattern ‘B’ were found to be associated with cost overrun to a greater extent compared to those
exhibiting other patterns.
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Figure 5.52: Average Cost Deviation of Each Stage Relative to Proposed Cost for Pattern ‘B’ Contracts
A detailed analysis was conducted to determine if contracts of certain characteristics have a
greater propensity to exhibit Pattern ‘B’. Section 5.4.4 presents the results. In Chapter 6, the study presents
econometric models that can be used to identify contracts that are most likely to exhibit Pattern ‘B’ based
on the contract-specific factors.

5.4.3.

Cost Escalation Pattern ‘C’

Figure 5.53 presents a graphical representation of Pattern ‘C’. For the 39 of 419 contracts that exhibit this
pattern, the cost estimate increases or remains constant across all stages except the final stage where it
decreases. Contracts exhibiting such a pattern are likely to be those that are expected to experience
contingencies and unforeseen costs arising from unforeseen site conditions, but the risk of occurrence of
such uncertainties is not very high.
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Figure 5.53: Graphical Representation of Cost Escalation Pattern ‘C’
Patterns ‘A’ and ‘B’ were found to be the most widely exhibited patterns across the 419 randomly
selected contracts. Together, they accounted for 75% of all the contracts. Pattern ‘C’ accounted for
approximately 10% (39 of 419) of the contracts. Contracts that did not exhibit patterns ‘A’, ‘B’, or ‘C’ were
designated as exhibiting Pattern ‘D’. The four patterns were mutually exclusive and exhaustive. That is, no
contract exhibited any two patterns at the same time and every contract exhibits one of the four cost
escalation patterns. Section 5.4.4 presents the distribution of the contracts exhibiting Patterns ‘A’ and ‘B’
by contract size, work, area, and route type.

5.4.4. Additional Analysis of Contracts Exhibiting Patterns ‘A’ and ‘B’
The contracts exhibiting Patterns ‘A’ and ‘B’ were analyzed by contract size, work catgory, area, and route
type. Figure 5.54 presents these contracts exhibiting by contract size. The figure suggests that large-sized
contracts experienced pattern ‘A’ or ‘B’ more frequently compared to small-sized contracts. Approximately
70% of contracts in the $1-$2 million contract size category (contract size based on proposed cost)
exhibited either pattern ‘A’ or pattern ‘B’, as compared to 73% in the $2-$5 million category, 77% in the
$5-$10 million category. and 89% in the greater than $10 million category. Large contracts (greater than
$10 million) were found to exhibit Pattern ‘A’ more frequently compared to small-sized contracts: 63% of
these exhibited Pattern ‘A’ compared to 60% in the $5-10 million size category, 51% in the $2-$5 million
size category, and 46% in the $1-$2 million size category. The small-sized contracts were found to exhibit
Pattern ‘B’ more frequently compared to large size contracts: approximately 25% of contracts in the $1-$2
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million size category exhibited Pattern ‘B’, compared to 22% of contracts in the $2-$5 million category,
and 17% of contracts in the $5-$10 million category. However, approximately 26% of the contracts
exceeding $10 million size exhibited Pattern ‘B’, this was marginally higher compared to other contract
size categories.
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Figure 5.54: Distribution of Contracts that Exhibit Cost Escalation Patterns ‘A’ and ‘B’ by Contract Size
Category
The distribution of contracts exhibiting patterns ‘A’ and ‘B’ by work category is shown in Figure
5.55. The expansion contracts exhibited Pattern ‘A’ or ‘B’ more frequently compared to bridge and
pavement contracts: approximately 80% (58 of 73) of the expansion contracts exhibited either Pattern ‘A’
or ‘B’ as compared to 78% (84 of 107) of bridge contracts and 71% (90 of 101) pavement contracts.
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Figure 5.55: Distribution of Contracts that Exhibit Cost Escalation Patterns ‘A’ and ‘B’ by Work Category
Compared to expansion and bridge contracts, pavement contracts exhibited Pattern ‘A’ less
frequently: approximately 62% of expansion contracts and 64% of bridge contracts exhibited Pattern ‘A’,
compared to 42% of pavement contracts. On the other hand, pavement contracts exhibited Pattern ‘B’ more
frequently compared to expansion and bridge contracts: approximately 29% of pavement contracts
exhibited Pattern ‘B’ compared to 18% of expansion contracts and 14% of bridge contracts. The relatively
high frequency of pavement contracts exhibiting Pattern ‘B’ appears to be associated with their greater
propensity to incur cost overrun exceeding 10% (see Sections 5.3.1.1 and 5.3.3.1).
The distribution of the contracts exhibiting Patterns ‘A’ and ‘B’ by area type is shown in Figure
5.56. The contracts in the rural areas (49%, 138 of 283) are found to exhibit Pattern ‘A’ less frequently
compared to contracts in urban areas (57%, 77 of 136 contracts). However, contracts in rural areas exhibit
Pattern ‘B’ more frequently (25%, 70 of 283) compared to contracts in urban areas (20%, 27 of 136).

155

yp
60

Percent Contracts

Average
40

Average
20

0
Urban

Rural

Area Type
Escalation Pattern A

Escalation Pattern B

Figure 5.56: Distribution of Contracts that Exhibit Cost Escalation Patterns ‘A’ and ‘B’ by Area Type

The Interstate contracts (65%, 46 of 71) were found to exhibit Pattern ‘A’ more frequently
compared to U.S. Road (51%, 71 of 139) or State Road (47%, 98 of 209) contracts (Figure 5.57). The State
Road contracts (26%, 54 of 209) exhibited Pattern ‘B’ more frequently compared to U.S. Road (23%, 32 of
139) and Interstate contracts (15%, 11 of 71) (Figure 5.57).
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Figure 5.57: Percent Contracts Exhibiting Cost Escalation Patterns ‘A’ and ‘B’ by Route Type
Approximately 56% of kin contracts were found to exhibit Pattern ‘A’ compared to 49% of standalone contracts. Also, it was found that 21% of stand-alone contracts and 24% of kin contracts exhibited
Pattern ‘B’. Therefore, stand-alone and kin contracts did not differ significantly with respect to exhibiting
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Pattern ‘B’. This seems to be generally consistent with the finding in Sections 5.3.1.3 and 5.3.2.3 that the
frequency of having a cost overrun exceeding 10% is similar for these two contract types.
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Figure 5.58: Distribution of Contracts that Exhibit Cost Escalation Patterns ‘A’ and ‘B’ by Route Type

5.5. Impact of Inflation
In Sections 5.3 and 5.4, cost overruns associated with the estimates prepared at the planning stage
(proposed cost), design stage (design cost), and letting stage (letting cost) were determined on the basis of
the value of these estimates in current dollars (that is, the value of these estimates as recorded at the time of
planning, design, and letting, respectively). The annual rate of inflation (across all sectors) in the state of
Indiana from 1970 to 2005 is shown in Figure 5.59. In the present study, approximately 78% (298 of 385)
contracts were proposed, planned, designed, and constructed during 1992 to 2005. The average annual
inflation across all sectors during this period was approximately 3%. In highway construction, the
construction price index (CPI) is used to determine the changes in prices of the inputs to, and outputs of,
the construction activity. Figure 5.60 presents a comparison of the growth in construction price index and
the rate of inflation. The growth trend in the U.S. average construction price index was similar to the
inflation trend in Indiana.
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Figure 5.59: Rate of Inflation in Indiana from 1970 to 2005 (IBRC, 2008)
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Figure 5.60: Growth of Construction Price Index (U.S.) and Inflation (Indiana) from 1970 to 2005
(IBRC, 2008)

5.5.1.

Proposed Cost Estimate vs. Final Construction Cost

For each of the 385 contracts for which the date information was available, the non-inflated proposed cost
estimate was inflated from the year it was estimated to the year when the final construction cost was
incurred. The impact of inflating the proposed cost estimate was studied by plotting the ‘proposed cost
estimate’, the ‘inflated proposed cost’, and the ‘final construction cost’. Six possible cases were considered
as described in Chapter 4. The first case represents a scenario where the final cost was significantly higher
than the non-inflated proposed cost estimate, but after adjusting for inflation, the difference was smaller. It
was found that only 63 of the 385 contracts showed such a pattern as shown in Figure 5.61. The final cost
exceeded the proposed cost estimate (non-inflated) by an average of approximately 45%. However, after
the proposed cost was adjusted for inflation, the average overrun of the final cost compared to the inflated
proposed cost reduced to 29%, implying that the inflation ( I1* ) was responsible for 16% of the overrun.
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Final Cost vs. Proposed Cost

Non Inflated
Proposed Cost

Case 1 - 63 of 385 Contracts

Inflated Proposed
Cost

Final
Cost

Construction Cost ($)

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

⎛ Final Cost - Non Inflated Proposed Cost ⎞
Y1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

45.45 %

30.61 %

3.88 %

121.13 %

⎛ Final Cost - Inflated Proposed Cost ⎞
Y1* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

28.99 %

25.33 %

0.54 %

100.42 %

⎛ Inflated - Non Inflated Proposed Cost ⎞
I1* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

16.46 %

11.89 %

0.73 %

68.12 %

Figure 5.61: Analysis of Impact of Inflation on Proposed Cost: Case 1

For approximately 40% of the 385 contracts, the final cost marginally exceeded the non-inflated
proposed cost estimate by an average of about 8% (Figure 5.62). However, after the non-inflated proposed
cost was adjusted for inflation, inflated proposed cost exceeded final cost by an average of 23%.

Final Cost vs. Proposed Cost

Non Inflated
Proposed Cost

Case 2 - 155 of 385 Contracts

Final
Cost

Inflated Proposed
Cost

Construction Cost ($)

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

⎛ Final Cost - Non Inflated Proposed Cost ⎞
Y1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

7.87 %

10.24 %

0.00 %

49.91 %

⎛ Inflated Proposed Cost - Final Cost ⎞
Y1* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

23.23 %

17.50 %

0.28 %

83.01 %

⎛ Inflated - Non Inflated Proposed Cost ⎞
I 2* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

31.10 %

19.75 %

4.56 %

85.99 %

Figure 5.62: Analysis of Impact of Inflation on Proposed Cost: Case 2
Also, for 161 of the 385 contracts, the non-inflated proposed cost estimate was found to exceed
the final cost by an average of approximately 13% (Figure 5.63). By adjusting the non-inflated estimate for
inflation, the average difference between inflated proposed cost and final cost increased to approximately
37%. Again, this observation suggests that the non-inflated estimate is a more accurate estimate of the final
cost compared to the inflated estimate. Figure 5.64 presents the number of years between project proposal
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and final construction, which indicates that inflation should have been a significant factor in affecting the
accuracy of non-inflated cost estimates.

Final Cost vs. Proposed Cost

Final
Cost

Case 3 - 161 of 385 Contracts

Non Inflated
Proposed Cost

Inflated Proposed
Cost

Construction Cost ($)

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

⎛ Non Inflated Proposed Cost - Final Cost ⎞
Y1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

13.08 %

14.65 %

0.00%

62.08 %

⎛ Inflated Proposed Cost - Final Cost ⎞
iY1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

36.80 %

20.58 %

1.57 %

99.20 %

⎛ Inflated - Non Inflated Proposed Cost ⎞
iY1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

23.72 %

15.08 %

1.56 %

83.20 %

Figure 5.63: Analysis of Impact of Inflation on Proposed Cost: Case 3
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Figure 5.64: Number of Years between the Final Construction Cost and Proposed Cost

5.5.2.

Final Cost vs. Design Cost

The analysis conducted for proposed cost was repeated with design cost. It was found that 75 contracts
exhibited Case 1. Across the 75 contracts, the final cost exceeded the non-inflated design estimate by an
average of approximately 31% (Figure 5.65). After the design estimate was adjusted for inflation, the
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average overrun of the final cost compared to the inflated design estimate reduced to 22%, implying that
inflation ( I3* ) was responsible for 10% of the overrun.
Most of the contracts exhibited Cases 2 and 3. Case 2 was exhibited by 26% of the 385 contracts.
For these contracts, the final cost marginally exceeded the non-inflated design cost estimate by an average
of 4% (Figure 5.66). After the estimate was adjusted for inflation, the inflated design cost exceeded the
final cost by an average of 9%. That is, the impact of inflating the ‘non-inflated’ design cost estimate
resulted in an average increase of 14% in the design cost estimate.
The third case (Case 3) was exhibited by 169 of the 385 contracts. Across these contracts, the noninflated design cost estimate was found to exceed the final cost by an average of approximately 11%
(Figure 5.67). After the design estimate was adjusted for inflation, the average difference increased to 23%.
The non-inflated design cost, therefore, was found to be a better estimate of the final cost for 70% of the
385 contracts (100 contracts exhibiting Case 2 and 169 exhibiting Case 3).

Final Cost vs. Design Cost

Non Inflated
Design Cost

Inflated Design
Cost

Case 1 - 75 of 385 Contracts

Final
Cost

Construction Cost ($)

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

⎛ Final Cost - Non Inflated Design Cost ⎞
Y3 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Design Cost
⎝
⎠

31.40 %

26.46 %

2.07 %

115.12 %

⎛ Final Cost - Inflated Design Cost ⎞
Y3* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Design Cost
⎝
⎠

21.85 %

24.22 %

0.52 %

111.84 %

⎛ Inflated - Non Inflated Design Cost ⎞
I 3* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Design Cost
⎝
⎠

9.56 %

7.80 %

0.63 %

26.04 %

Figure 5.65: Analysis of Impact of Inflation on Design Cost: Case 1
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Final Cost vs. Design Cost
Design Cost
Estimate

Case 2 - 100 of 385 Contracts
Final
Cost

Inflated Design
Cost

Construction Cost ($)

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

⎛ Final Cost - Non Inflated Design Cost ⎞
Y3 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Design Cost
⎝
⎠

4.34 %

6.19 %

0.00 %

27 %

⎛ Inflated Design Cost - Final Cost ⎞
Y3* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Design Cost
⎝
⎠

9.38 %

7.35 %

0.09 %

42.65 %

⎛ Inflated - Non Inflated Design Cost ⎞
I 3* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Design Cost
⎝
⎠

13.67 %

8.75 %

1.56 %

44.69 %

Figure 5.66: Analysis of Impact of Inflation on Design Cost: Case 2

Final Cost vs. Design Cost

Final
Cost

Non Inflated
Design Cost

Case 3 - 169 of 385 Contracts

Inflated Design
Cost

Construction Cost ($)

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

⎛ Non Inflated Proposed Cost - Final Cost ⎞
Y1 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Proposed Cost
⎝
⎠

11.08 %

12.81 %

0.00 %

56.42 %

⎛ Inflated Design Cost - Final Cost ⎞
Y3* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Design Cost
⎝
⎠

22.78 %

15.15 %

1.57 %

71.21 %

⎛ Inflated - Non Inflated Design Cost ⎞
I 3* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Design Cost
⎝
⎠

10.98 %

7.37 %

1.56 %

33.19 %

Figure 5.67: Analysis of Impact of Inflation on Design Cost: Case 3
The inflated design cost was found to be closer to the final cost compared to the inflated proposed
cost because the impact of inflation on the non-inflated design cost was not as significant as it was for the
inflated proposed cost. This is because average time between design completion and construction
completion is significantly less than the average duration between project proposal and construction
completion (Figure 5.68).
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Figure 5.68: Number of Years between the Final Construction Cost and Design Cost

5.5.3.

Final Cost vs. Letting Cost

The ‘letting cost’, the ‘inflated letting cost’ and the ‘final construction cost’ were plotted using the same
methodology used for analyzing the design cost. Again, most of the contracts were found to exhibit Cases 2
and 3. Only 93 of the 385 contracts exhibited Case 1. Across the 93 contracts (that exhibited Case 1), the
final cost exceeded the non-inflated letting cost by an average of 20%. After the letting cost was adjusted
for inflation, the average overrun of the final cost compared to the letting cost reduced to approximately
12.4%, implying that inflation (II4) was responsible for an average overrun of 7% (Figure 5.69).

Final Cost vs. Letting Cost

Non Inflated
Letting Cost

Inflated
Letting Cost

Case 1 - 93 of 385 Contracts

Final
Cost

Construction Cost ($)

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

⎛ Final Cost - Non Inflated Letting Cost ⎞
Y4 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Letting Cost
⎝
⎠

19.58 %

17.97 %

0%

103.46 %

⎛ Final Cost - Inflated Letting Cost ⎞
Y4* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Letting Cost
⎝
⎠

12.39 %

15.95 %

0%

93.24 %

⎛ Inflated - Non-Inflated Letting Cost ⎞
I 4* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Letting Cost
⎝
⎠

7.18 %

6.65 %

0%

26.04 %

Figure 5.69: Analysis of Impact of Inflation on Letting Cost: Case 1
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For approximately 48% (184 of 385) of the contracts, the final cost exceeded the letting cost (noninflated) marginally by an average of 3.5% (Case 2: Figure 5.70). However, after the letting cost was
adjusted for inflation, the inflated letting cost exceeded the final cost by an average of approximately 9%.
Only 44 of the 385 contracts exhibited Case 3, wherein the non-inflated letting cost was found to exceed
the final cost by an average of 7.6%, and inflation adjustment resulted in increasing this average difference
to 16% (Figure 5.71). Therefore, for the contracts exhibiting Cases 2 and 3, inflated letting cost was not a
significant overestimate of the final cost.

Final Cost vs. Letting Cost

Case 2 - 184 of 385 Contracts

Letting Cost

Final
Cost

Inflated Letting Cost

Construction Cost ($)

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

⎛ Final Cost - Non Inflated Letting Cost ⎞
Y4 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Letting Cost
⎝
⎠

3.48 %

6.68 %

0.00 %

24.42 %

⎛ Final Cost - Inflated Letting Cost ⎞
iY4 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Letting Cost
⎝
⎠

9.06 %

7.02 %

0.05 %

42.65 %

⎛ Inflated - Non-Inflated Letting Cost ⎞
II 4 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Letting Cost
⎝
⎠

12.54 %

7.88 %

1.25 %

43.29 %

Figure 5.70: Analysis of Impact of Inflation on Letting Cost: Case 2

Final Cost vs. Letting Cost

Final
Cost

Letting Cost

Case 3 - 44 of 385 Contracts

Inflated
Letting Cost

Construction Cost ($)

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

⎛ Final Cost - Non Inflated Letting Cost ⎞
Y4 = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Letting Cost
⎝
⎠

7.64 %

8.38 %

0.03 %

44.23 %

⎛ Inflated Letting Cost - Final Cost ⎞
Y4* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Non Inflated Letting Cost
⎝
⎠

15.86 %

10.09 %

3.90 %

49.71 %

⎛ Inflated Letting Cost - Letting Cost ⎞
I 4* = 100 ⎜
⎟%
Letting Cost
⎝
⎠

8.22 %

6.08 %

1.25 %

26.82 %

Figure 5.71: Analysis of Impact of Inflation on Letting Cost: Case 3
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Typically, the letting costs are established shortly after the final design estimates are evaluated
(Figure 5.72). Therefore, the impact of inflation on the non-inflated letting costs and design estimates was
similar.
210

188

Total Number of Contracts
Average
95% Confidence Interval
Std. Deviation

Number of Contracts

180

150
150
120

: 385
: 2.4 Years
: [2.3, 2.6] Years
: 1.3 Years

90
60

43

30

4

0

0

7 To 10 Years

10 To 15 Years

> 15 Years

0
<= 2 Years

2 To 4 Years

4 To 7 Years

Years Between Final Construction Cost and Letting Cost Estimate

Figure 5.72: Number of Years between the Final Construction Cost and Letting Cost
Based on the analysis of the impact of inflation, it was concluded that inflation adjustment resulted in
inconsistent estimates of final construction cost. The following factors could be responsible for the
observed counter-intuitive trends.
(a) The non-inflated cost estimates (particularly the proposed cost) could include large contingency
amounts, which are getting inflated as well.
(b) It is likely that the included contingency amounts accounted for inflation and never got used up by the
contingency. Either the contingency never happened or planners and contractors learnt to deal with
recurrent contingencies over the course of development of the project. Issues that were perceived as
contingencies at the planning stage, perhaps no longer remained contingencies at the time of
construction.
(c) Inflation was perhaps inherently taken into consideration by the methods that were used to prepare the
construction cost estimate at latter stages. For example, the unit averages those were used to determine
the non-inflated proposed cost estimate were calculated based on the final cost of historical contracts
that had experienced high inflation.
(d) Improved technology, better construction equipment, and less number of labor hours were used in the
actual construction process, which were not expected at the time when the contract was proposed.
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5.6. Chapter Summary
This chapter presented a statistical analysis of cost overrun in Indiana. The accuracy of the proposed cost,
engineer’s assessment cost, design cost, and letting cost estimates was evaluated for 419 historical contracts
from Indiana. Approximately 52% of the contracts were found to have the proposed cost estimate,
engineer’s assessment, and design cost within +/-10% of the final cost. The engineer’s assessment cost and
proposed cost estimate did not differ significantly from each other across the 419 contracts. The letting cost
was found to be within +/-10% of the final cost for 72% of the contracts. For only 14% (57 of 419) of the
contracts, the final construction cost exceeded all the cost estimates (proposed, engineer’s assessment,
design, and letting) by more than 10%. The proposed cost, engineer’s assessment and design cost estimate
were exceeded by more than 10% for 20% (85 of 419) of the contracts. Cost overrun and underrun were
found to be equally frequent when the final cost was compared to the proposed cost, engineer’s assessment,
and design cost. Approximately 23% of the contracts were found to have an underrun, whereas 26% of the
contracts had an overrun of final cost compared to these estimates. However, when the final cost was
compared to the letting cost only 14% (60 of 419) of the contracts were found to have an underrun, whereas
86% (359 of 419) contracts had an overrun of the final cost. But, only for approximately 25% (104 of 419)
of the contracts, the final cost exceeded the letting cost by more than 10%. The frequency and severity of
cost overrun and underrun were also analyzed by contract-specific factors such as work category, contract
size, contract type, district, area type, route type, and NHS status. Cost overrun and underrun were found to
be fairly uniformly distributed across most categories within these factors. The escalation pattern of the
cost estimates from planning stage to final construction stage was analyzed to determine the most
commonly followed cost estimate trend during the planning and development process. It was found that
approximately 60% of the contracts exhibited a pattern where the cost estimate increases from planning
stage until the letting stage, but the estimate at the letting stage is lower than the design estimate. For such
contracts, the final construction cost was found to be higher than the letting cost but comparable to the
proposed and engineer’s assessment cost and lower than the design cost estimate. The above results were
based on the reported costs in current dollars (that is without specifically adjusting for inflation). It was
found in the chapter that inflation was perhaps taken into consideration implicitly by the methodology used
to prepare the cost estimates. In the next chapter, the observed trends and impacts of contract specific
factors are tested for statistical significance and models are developed to study the relationship of cost
overrun with contract-specific factors.
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CHAPTER 6.

RISK-BASED ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF COST OVERRUN IN INDIANA

6.1. Introduction
The methodology proposed in Chapter 4 was used for the development of a risk-based stochastic
econometric framework for analysis of cost overrun. The econometric models comprising the framework
were developed using the historical highway contracts (419) from Indiana DOT analyzed in Chapter 5.
Therefore, the developed framework can be used to identify the contract types that are likely to experience
cost overrun in Indiana. The framework was applied by first identifying the contract-specific factors that
affect the risk of occurrence of escalation pattern. Next, models were developed to determine the
probability and magnitude of planning, design, and letting stage cost overrun based on the risk of
occurrence of escalation patterns and contract-specific factors.

6.2. Econometric Analysis Framework Development
6.2.1. Identification of Factors Affecting Cost Overrun
The contract-specific factors include work category, administrative district, area type, highway functional
class, NHS status, route type, and contract size (based on proposed cost). These were tested for their impact
on the probability of occurrence of escalation patterns. These factors were also identified as those that
could influence cost underestimation at the planning, design, and letting stage cost overrun. In addition to
these factors, the impact of risk of escalation pattern on cost overrun was also studied. Additional contract
specific factors are generally available at the design and letting stages. The additional factors that become
available at the design stage include: a) time duration between project proposal and final design completion
and b) percentage change in the design cost estimate relative to proposed cost. These factors were studied
for their impact on design stage cost overrun. The additional factors that become available at letting stage
include: a) time span between project proposal and letting, b) time span between letting and final design
completion, and c) percentage change in the letting cost relative to proposed cost. The impact of these
factors on letting stage cost overrun was studied. The relationship between the identified factors and
probability of cost overrun was studied by calibrating econometric models as described in Chapter 4.
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6.2.2. Model Calibration
The 419 historical contracts that were used to calibrate the models comprised of: 239 pavement contracts,
107 bridge contracts, and 73 expansion contracts. Separate models were developed for each work category.
Likelihood ratio tests were also conducted to justify the development of separate models.
The methodology for the model development has been described in Chapter 4. A three-step
approach was adopted. First, a multinomial logit model was developed to estimate the probability that a
given contract will exhibit a given escalation pattern. The contract-specific factors that were found to affect
the probability of escalation pattern at the 90% confidence level were used to calibrate the model. After the
models were calibrated, a Monte Carlo simulation was conducted to determine the probability and the
variability in the probability of the escalation patterns (as described in Chapter 4). The mean and the
standard deviation of the probability of an escalation pattern were used as indicators of the risk associated
with occurrence of an escalation pattern. Next, multinomial logit models were developed to determine the
probability of planning, design, and letting stage cost overrun as a function of the deterministic contractspecific factors and the risk that a contract will exhibit a particular escalation pattern (which is a random
independent variable). The model can be used to determine the probability that a contract will fall in any
one of the established of cost overrun categories: less than <-10%, between -10% and 0%, between 0% and
10%, and greater than 10%. Finally, the expected average cost overrun for any given contract, was
determined for contracts in each cost overrun category. The magnitude of cost overrun is determined using
the principle of conditional probability as described in Chapter 4.

6.2.3. Methodology for Analyzing the Impact of Contract-Specific Using the Developed Models
To study the impact of the factors used to develop the models on the probability of following a particular
escalation patterns, and the probability and magnitude of cost overrun, a sensitivity analysis was conducted.
The inter-relationships between the factors can be studied via a graphical approach. The probability of
planning stage cost overrun was computed for 2,268 distinct contract types, corresponding to various
combinations of the contract specific factors (6 districts * 9 functional classes * 21 contract sizes * 2
contact types). The size of expansion contracts was varied from $1M to $30M, whereas the size of bridge
contracts was varied from $1M to $7M and size of pavement contracts was varied from $1M to $10M. The
range of contract size for contracts in each work category was decided based on the range of the sizes of
these contracts that was observed in practice (based on the 419 contracts).
Similarly, the probability of design stage cost overrun was computed for 181,440 distinct contract
types, corresponding to various levels of contract specific factors that affect the design stage cost overrun
(6 districts * 9 functional classes * 21 contract sizes * 2 contract types * 10 levels of time duration between
design completion and project proposal * 8 levels of percentage difference between design and proposed
cost).
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Finally, the probability of letting stage cost overrun was computed for 420,000 distinct contract
types corresponding to various levels of contract specific factors that affect the design stage cost overrun (6
districts * 7 functional classes * 8 contract sizes * 2 contract types * 5 levels of time duration between
design completion and project proposal * 5 levels of percentage difference between design and proposed
cost * 5 levels of time duration between letting and project proposal * 5 levels of percentage difference
between letting and proposed cost).
The mean probability of planning, design and letting stage cost overrun was computed by each
contract-specific factor such as by: contract size, highway functional class, time duration between design
and project proposal, etc. The variation in the mean probability of overrun was studied corresponding to the
changing levels of the contract-specific factors.

6.3. Econometric Models for Expansion Contracts
The expansion contracts for which models were developed included: added travel lanes, new highway
construction, interchange modification, or new interchange construction. Such contracts are significantly
different from the pavement and bridge contracts that generally involve routine rehabilitation, resurfacing,
and reconstruction work. Expansion contracts are particularly likely to experience comparatively higher
risk of incurring unforeseen costs related to excavation, utility relocation, and design plan changes. Also, as
they typically are of large scale and high profile, contracts they experience intense competition at the letting
stage.

6.3.1. Probability of Escalation Patterns
A total of 73 expansion contracts of size ranging from $1-$30M were used to develop multinomial logit
models to determine probability of occurrence of a given escalation pattern, for such contracts. Table 6.1
presents the multinomial logit model. Contract-specific factors such as geographic location (district and
area type), contract size (based on initial proposed cost), and highway functional class were found to
significantly affect the probability of occurrence of each escalation pattern. The model had a McFadden Rsquare value of 0.36, indicating that the model explains 36% of the randomness associated with the
tendency of the cost estimates to exhibit a particular escalation pattern. The methodology used for the
development of this model is described in Chapter 4 and can be used by highway agencies in other states
for developing similar models.
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Table 6.1: Model to Estimate Probability of Occurrence of Escalation Patterns for Expansion Contracts
PATTERN
PATTERN ‘A’

PATTERN ‘B’

PATTERN ‘C’

PATTERN ‘D’

Contract Specific Factor

Coefficient

Std. Err.

T-Ratio

P-Value

Constant

3.0371

0.6161

4.93

0.00

State Roads / Non-NHS Highways

-1.5297

0.5825

-2.63

0.06

Proposed Cost ($ Millions)

0.2048

0.0917

2.23

0.02

Vincennes District

-2.1646

1.1877

-1.82

0.12

Square of Proposed Cost ($ Millions)

-0.0044

0.0029

-1.60

0.05

Arterial Roads (Urban / Rural)

-3.9398

1.6786

-2.35

0.04

U.S. Roads / Non-Interstate NHS

3.0957

1.5235

2.03

0.02

Vincennes District

6.2753

2.7755

2.26

0.01

Fort Wayne and Laporte Districts in
North

4.5336

1.8462

2.46

0.11

Proposed Cost ($ Millions)

-0.3598

0.2013

-1.79

0.07

Crawfordsville and Greenfield Districts
in Central Indiana

2.4759

1.1463

2.16

0.09

Laporte District

1.9429

0.7503

2.59

0.02

Log-Likelihood (Model): -65.18; Log-Likelihood (No Coefficients): -101.20; Log-Likelihood (Constant): -78.03;
Number of Observations: 73

6.3.1.1. Impact of Contract Size
Figure 6.1 shows the variation in the mean probability of each escalation pattern by contract size. The
figure suggests that the probability of expansion contracts to exhibit patterns ‘A’ and ‘B’ was found to
increase with an increase in contract size, but the tendency to exhibit pattern ‘C’ was found to decrease
with an increase in contract size. Pattern ‘D’ was found least likely to be exhibited and its probability did
not change with increased contract size. Large expansion contracts (greater than $10M) were found more
likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’, whereas expansion contracts less than $5M in size were found more likely to
exhibit pattern ‘C’. Contracts between $5- $10M were found equally likely to exhibit patterns ‘A’ and ‘C’.
Therefore, while the probability to exhibit pattern ‘A’ increases with increasing contract size, the
probability to exhibit pattern ‘C’ decreases (and at a higher rate) than the rate of increase in the probability
of pattern ‘A’. Large expansion contracts (greater than $10M) generally provide contractors with more
opportunity to incur a profit and therefore contractors tend to bid less than the design cost (Pattern ‘A’),
despite the uncertainty associated with unforeseen site conditions, scope changes, and change orders. Small
expansion contracts (< $5M), on the other hand, do not provide any incentive of additional profit to
compensate for the uncertainty arising due to scope changes and change orders. As a result, contractors
submit bids that exceed the design cost (Pattern ‘C’) for small contracts to account for the uncertainty. As
some of the unforeseen factors and contingencies do not occur, contractors end up completing the
construction for less than the overestimated letting cost. The transition between the tendencies to show
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escalation pattern ‘A’ or ‘C’ occurs in the contract size range in between $5-$10M. The tendency to exhibit
pattern ‘C’, however, tends to be low for larger expansion contracts. As such, contracts are less likely to be
completed within the let amount, owing to the higher risk of experiencing unforeseen construction
problems. Due to the greater uncertainty, large contracts are more likely to exceed the letting cost. This is
probably why they become more likely to exhibit patterns ‘A’ and ‘B’ as compared to pattern ‘C’.
MEAN
PROBABILITY

Proposed Cost
($ Millions)

Figure 6.1: Comparison of Mean Probability of Escalation Patterns across Expansion Contracts of Different
Sizes

6.3.1.2. Impact of Geographic Location and Contract Size
The trends in the mean probability of the escalation patterns were studied in further detail by geographic
location (i.e., the six districts). The objective was to determine whether the increasing trend in the
probability of escalation patterns ‘A’ and ‘B’ and the decreasing trend in the probability of escalation
pattern ‘C’ were prevalent across all districts. It was found that for the urbanized districts of Seymour,
Greenfield, and Laporte, the probability of escalation pattern ‘A’ showed a non-increasing trend with
increasing contract size (Figure 6.2). In spite of the non-increasing trend, large contracts in these districts,
nevertheless, were found to be more likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’ compared to the other patterns. However,
the tendency to exhibit pattern ‘B’ increased at a faster rate in these districts compared to other districts,
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and therefore large contracts were only marginally more likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’ compared to pattern
‘B’ (Figure 6.3). In fact, contracts in the urbanized districts were found to be more likely to exhibit pattern
‘B’ compared to contracts in other districts. The probability to exhibit pattern ‘C’ was low for contracts in
Seymour and Greenfield districts (Figure 6.4) even for smaller contract sizes, indicating that contracts in
these two districts had a greater propensity to exhibit patterns ‘A’ and ‘B’.

MEAN PROBABILITY
OF PATTERN ‘A’

Proposed Cost ($ Millions)

Figure 6.2: Distribution of Probability of Occurrence of Escalation Pattern ‘A’ for Expansion Contracts in
Seymour, Greenfield, and Laporte Districts
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MEAN PROBABILITY OF
PATTERN ‘B’
Contracts in comparatively more
Urbanized Districts of Laporte,
Greenfield and Seymour were
found more likely to exhibit
Pattern ‘B’ as compared to other
districts.

Proposed Cost ($ Millions)

Figure 6.3: Distribution of Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘B’ for Expansion Contracts by District
MEAN PROBABILITY
OF PATTERN ‘C’
Contracts in comparatively more
Urbanized Districts of Laporte,
Greenfield and Seymour were
found less likely to exhibit
Pattern ‘C’

Proposed Cost
($ Millions)

Figure 6.4: Distribution of Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘C’ for Expansion Contracts by District
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Contracts in the relatively less urbanized districts of Vincennes, Crawfordsville, and Fort Wayne
were found to exhibit increasing probability of escalation pattern ‘A’ with increasing contract size. Large
contracts were significantly more likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’ (Figure 6.5). On the other hand, small-sized
contracts (less than $10M) in these districts were significantly more likely to exhibit pattern ‘C’ (Figure
6.4).

MEAN PROBABILITY OF
PATTERN ‘A’

Proposed Cost ($ Millions)

Figure 6.5: Distribution of Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘C’ for Expansion Contracts in Vincennes,
Crawfordsville, and Fort Wayne Districts
The above trends are indicative of the propensity of expansion contracts in Seymour and
Greenfield districts to experience unforeseen costs (as contracts in these districts were found more likely to
experience pattern ‘B’). Contracts in the less urbanized districts, on the other hand, are less likely to
experience unforeseen costs (as they have a higher propensity to exhibit patterns ‘C’). Construction in
urbanized districts is more likely to encounter underground utilities compared to construction in less
urbanized districts, thereby resulting in higher risk of unforeseen conditions. Due to the lower risk of
unforeseen conditions in the less urbanized districts, contractors bid low to win large contracts in these
districts (as indicated by the tendency of large contracts to exhibit pattern ‘A’). Also, above trends indicate
that large expansion contracts in all the districts are more susceptible to unforeseen costs compared to
small-sized contracts (as indicated by the increase in the probability of pattern ‘B’ with contract size and
decrease in the probability of pattern ‘C’ with contract size). These findings were validated based on the
analysis of the probability of cost overrun (presented in Section 6.3.2).
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6.3.1.2. Impact of NHS Status and Route Type
The NHS status or route type was found to influence the probability of escalation pattern occurrence. The
tendency to exhibit pattern ‘A’ was found to increase with increasing contract size for contracts on all route
types (Figure 6.6). Large expansion contracts (greater than $5M) on Interstate highways were found more
likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’ and less (but equally) likely to exhibit patterns ‘B’ and ‘C’. Large expansion
contracts at Interstates are high profile contracts and therefore are more likely to experience greater scrutiny
and competition during the programming and letting stages. As a result, such contracts are more likely to
exhibit pattern ‘A’ compared to those at lower class highways.
MEAN PROBABILITY
OF PATTERN ‘A’

Interstates
Non-Interstate NHS /
U.S. Highways

State Roads /
Non-NHS Roads

Proposed Cost ($ Millions)

Figure 6.6: Distribution of Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘A’ for Expansion Contracts by NHS Status /
Route Type
The results suggest that expansion contracts at lower highway functional classes have a greater
propensity to exhibit pattern ‘C’. This suggests that the cost estimates prepared for contracts at lower class
highways, even at the letting stage, tend to be conservative. Contracts at these highway functional classes
are not high profile contracts and therefore a conservative approach is preferred to account for the risk of
unforeseen costs. The risk of unforeseen costs is probably not high as indicated by the low propensity of
Interstate contracts to exhibit pattern ‘B’ (Figure 6.8). In fact, small expansion contracts at Interstates,
being comparatively low profile compared to large expansion contracts at these highway classes, are
equally likely to exhibit patterns ‘A’ and ‘C’ (Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7, respectively). This finding
suggests that contractors generally accept smaller risk (and thus submit higher bids) for small expansion
contracts on Interstate highways, they accept greater risk by submitting relatively low bids (in spite of the
uncertainty from unforeseen costs).
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MEAN PROBABILITY
OF PATTERN ‘C’

Proposed Cost
($ Millions)

Figure 6.7: Distribution of Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘C’ for Expansion Contracts by NHS Status
The greater propensity of large expansion contracts on Non-NHS highways to exhibit pattern ‘B’
compared to contracts on NHS highways indicates that large contracts at lower functional classes are more
susceptible to unforeseen costs. Large expansion contracts on Non-NHS highways, such as arterial roads,
are more likely to encounter underground utilities to a greater extent compared to Interstates and therefore
are more susceptible to higher unforeseen costs. On the other hand, small expansion contracts at lower
functional classes are less likely to encounter underground utilities and therefore are more likely to
experience pattern ‘C’ (Figure 6.7), this represents a scenario where planning is done for unforeseen costs,
but are not experienced in most cases.
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MEAN PROBABILITY OF
PATTERN ‘B’

Figure 6.8: Distribution of Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘B’ for Expansion Contracts by NHS Status

6.3.2. Probability of Cost Overrun Occurrence
Discrete choice multinomial logit models were developed to determine the occurrence probability of cost
overrun at planning, design, and letting stages. Table 6.2 presents the model for determining probability of
planning stage cost overrun. Contract-specific factors, which included the propensity of a contract to
exhibit an escalation pattern, were found to have an impact on the outcome.
Table 6.3 presents the model for estimating the occurrence of cost overrun at the design stage. A
greater amount of information on the contract is available at the design stage,. The percentage difference
between design estimate and proposed cost was found to affect the probability of design stage cost overrun.
These factors are not available at the planning stage and therefore were not included in the model for
determining planning stage cost overrun. As a result, the McFadden R-squared value of the design stage
cost overrun model (0.39) was higher than that of the planning stage cost overrun model (0.30).
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Table 6.2: Multinomial Logit Model for Determining Occurrence Probability of Planning Stage Cost
Overrun, Expansion Contracts
Cost
Overrun
Category 1

< -10%
Category 2

[<-10%, 0%)

Category 3

[0%, 10%]

Category 4

> 10%

Contract Specific Factor

Coeff.

Std.Err.

t-ratio

p-Value

Seymour and Vincennes Districts in
South Indiana
Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘B’

1.2654

0.6127

2.07

0.04

-8.2766

2.9172

-2.84

0.00

Proposed Cost (in Million $)

-0.1348

0.0458

-2.94

0.00

Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘C’

2.8402

0.9362

3.03

0.00

Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘A’
Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘A’ /
Variability in Probability of Escalation
Pattern ‘A’

-7.1492

3.0458

-2.35

0.02

0.4798

0.2290

2.09

0.04

Variability in Probability of Escalation
Pattern ‘A’ (Measured using Std. Dev)

8.8551

5.0124

1.77

0.08

Fort Wayne and Laporte Districts in
North

-2.2259

0.7937

-2.80

0.01

Log-Likelihood (Model): -82.81; Log-Likelihood (No Coefficients): -101.20; Log-Likelihood (Constant): -100.54

Table 6.3: Multinomial Logit Model for Determining Occurrence Probability of Design Stage Cost
Overrun, Expansion Contracts
Cost Overrun
Category 1
<-10%

Category 2
[-10%, 0%)

Category 3
[0%, 10%]
Category 4
> 10%

Contract Specific Factor
Seymour and Vincennes Districts in
South Indiana
Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘B’
Urban Districts of Seymour,
Greenfield and Laporte
Proposed Cost (in Million $)

Coeff.

Std.Err.

t-ratio

P-Value

2.8686

1.2686

2.26

0.02

-34.0507

15.0947

-2.26

0.02

3.1787

1.3464

2.36

0.02

-0.5460

0.1784

-3.06

0.00

Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘C’
Probability of Pattern ‘B’ relative to
Pattern ‘D’
Laporte District

5.1216

1.4182

3.61

0.00

1.9437

0.5462

3.56

0.00

4.6339

1.4915

3.11

0.00

Vincennes District
Time Between Design and Project
Proposal (years)
Probability of Escalation Pattern
‘A’ / Variability in Probability of
Escalation Pattern ‘A’
Fort Wayne and Laporte Districts in
North
Probability of Pattern ‘B’

4.4344

1.5762

2.81

0.00

-0.1597

0.0842

-1.90

0.06

0.1505

0.0981

1.53

0.12

-4.1188

1.8252

-2.26

0.02

5.9898

2.8466

2.10

0.04

-0.1452

0.1002

-1.45

0.15

Percentage Difference Between
Design and Proposed Cost

* Log-Likelihood (Model): -49.29; Log-Likelihood (No Coefficients): -80.41; Log-Likelihood (Constant): -76.80
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At the letting stage, the factors that were found to affect the probability of letting stage cost
overrun include: contract size, geographic location, NHS status, contract type, percentage difference
between proposed, design, and letting costs, and the time between final design completion and project
proposal. In addition to these contract-specific factors, the propensity of a contract to exhibit a particular
escalation pattern was also found to affect the probability of occurrence of letting stage cost overrun (Table
6.4). The McFadden R-squared value of the letting stage cost overrun model (0.40) was found to be higher
than that of planning stage (0.30) and design stage models (0.39). This is because additional information is
available at the letting stage, such as percentage difference between letting and proposed cost.
Table 6.4: Multinomial Logit Model for Determining Occurrence Probability of Letting Stage Cost
Overrun, Expansion Contracts
Cost Overrun
Category

Contract Specific Factor

Coeff.

Std.Err.

t-ratio

P-Value

Probability of Escalation Pattern 'B'

-27.763

11.881

-2.34

0.02

Category 1

Urban Districts of Seymour, Greenfield
and Laporte

2.0229

1.1512

1.76

0.08

< 0%

Percentage Difference Between Letting
and Proposed Cost

0.0858

0.0498

1.72

0.08

Proposed Cost (in Million $)

-0.1098

0.0439

-2.50

0.01

[0%, 5%)

Time Between Final Design and Project
Proposal (Years)

0.1799

0.0608

2.96

0.00

Category 3

Variability in Probability of Escalation
Pattern 'A' (Measured using Std. Dev)

-40.7846

16.5534

-2.46

0.01

Kin Contracts
Crawfordsville District
Fort Wayne and Laporte Districts in North

3.7110
4.3130
-3.0351

1.8226
1.7832
1.0549

2.04
2.42
-2.88

0.04
0.02
0.00

Percentage Difference Between Design
and Proposed Cost

0.7281

0.2748

2.65

0.01

Non-NHS Highways

1.6106

0.8142

1.98

0.05

Category 2

(5%, 10%]
Category 4
> 10%

* Log-Likelihood (Model): -48.41; Log-Likelihood (No Coefficients): -80.41; Log-Likelihood (Constant): -70.96

The factors that were found to affect the probability of cost overrun at the planning, design, and
letting stages were compared to study the impact of these factors on the accuracy of the cost estimates
prepared at the various stages. Table 6.5 compares the coefficients. It is seen that the sign of the
coefficients did not change across the models for the three stages. However, the magnitudes of the
coefficients were found to be different. Also, contract size, geographic location, highway functional class,
NHS status, and probability of escalation pattern were found to affect the probability of cost overrun
occurrence at all stages.
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Table 6.5: Comparison of Coefficients of the Factors Affecting Occurrence Probability of Planning, Design
and Letting Stage Cost Overrun, Expansion Contracts
Cost
Overrun
Category

Category 1
< -10%

Cost
Overrun
Category

Contract Specific Factor

Planning

Design

Seymour and Vincennes Districts in South
Indiana

1.2654

2.8686

Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘B’

-8.2766

-34.0507

-27.76

3.1787

2.02

Urban Districts of Seymour, Greenfield
and Laporte
Percentage Difference Between Letting
and Proposed Cost

0.086

Proposed Cost (in Million $)

-0.1348

-0.546

Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘C’

2.8402

5.1216

Category 2

Probability of Pattern ‘B’ relative to
Pattern ‘D’

1.9437

[-10%, 0%)

Laporte District

4.6339

Vincennes District

4.4344

Time Between Design and Project
Proposal (years)

-0.1597

Proposed Cost (in Million $)

-0.1097
0.18

Kin Contracts

3.7109

Crawfordsville District

4.3129

Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘A’

> 10%

< 0%

[0%, 5%]

-7.1492

[0%, 10%]

Category 4

Category 1

Category 2

Time Between Design and Project
Proposal (years)

Category 3

Letting

Category 3
Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘A’ /
Variability in Probability of Escalation
Pattern ‘A’

0.4798

Variability in Probability of Escalation
Pattern ‘A’ (Measured using Std. Dev)

8.8551

Fort Wayne and Laporte Districts in North

-2.2259

0.1505

-40.7845
-4.1188

Probability of Pattern ‘B’

5.9898

Percentage Difference Between Design
and Proposed Cost

-0.1452

Non-NHS Highways

(5%, 10%]

-3.035
Category 4
> 10%

0.72814
1.6106
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6.3.2.1. Impact of Escalation Pattern by Geographic Location (District)
The probability of a negative cost overrun was found to decrease with an increase in the probability of
escalation pattern ‘B’. Expansion contracts that were more likely to Pattern ‘B’ were found more likely to
have a cost overrun of greater than 10%. Figure 6.9 shows the increasing trend in the probability of cost
overrun greater than 10% with increasing probability of pattern ‘B’ for contracts in each district. The plot
shows the trend across the 2,268 contract types of various sizes and on various highway functional classes
in the six districts of Indiana. This trend was seen in all six districts. However, the trend pattern was found
to be different across the districts, suggesting that that the probability of an overrun greater than 10% is
affected by several factors including the probability of exhibiting escalation pattern ‘B’ and the
administrative district.

PROBABILITY OF
OVERRUN > 10%

PROBABILITY OF ESCALATION PATTERN ‘B’

Figure 6.9: Impact of Escalation Pattern ‘B’ on the Probability of Planning Stage Cost Overrun > 10%
(Expansion Contracts)

On the basis of the escalation patterns presented in Section 6.3.1, it was found that expansion
contracts in the Seymour and Greenfield districts are more likely to exhibit pattern ‘B’ compared to
contracts in other districts. Figure 6.9 shows that contracts in Seymour and Greenfield districts are more
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likely to have a cost overrun exceeding 10% compared to those in other districts. This finding seems to be
supported by the expectation that expansion contracts in comparatively urban districts are more likely to
have higher cost overruns due to a higher risk of experiencing unforeseen factors during construction.
Expansion contracts more likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’ were found more likely to have a negative
cost overrun of less than -10%. Contracts exhibiting pattern ‘A’ are expected to be those that are likely to
experience more competition and a lower risk of unforeseen cost factors during project development. This
explains the propensity of contracts exhibiting pattern ‘A’ to have negative cost overrun. Figure 6.10 shows
the tendency of contracts in each district to experience negative cost overrun because of their propensity to
exhibit pattern ‘A’. The contracts in the relatively urban districts of Seymour and Greenfield were found
less likely to have negative cost overrun compared to contracts in urban districts. This is because contracts
in these districts were found more likely to exhibit pattern ‘B’ and consequently are more likely to have a
cost overrun exceeding 10%.
PROBABILITY OF
OVERRUN < -10%
Contracts in Seymour and
Greenfield districts are less
likely to have negative cost
overrun compared to other
districts

PROBABILITY OF ESCALATION PATTERN ‘A’

Figure 6.10: Impact of Escalation Pattern ‘B’ on the Probability of Planning Stage Cost Overrun > 10%
(Expansion Contracts)

In addition to the probability of the escalation patterns ‘A’ and ‘B’, the variability in the
probability of the escalation pattern ‘A’ was also found to be a significant factor that affects the probability
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of cost overrun. As the variability in the probability to exhibit pattern ‘A’ increases, the tendency to have a
high cost overrun decreases. Expansion contracts, in general, were found more likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’
compared to other patterns (refer to Figure 6.1). As the variability increases, the upper limit of the 95%
confidence interval of the probability of pattern ‘A’ increases and becomes closer to 100%. As a result, an
increase in the variability further increases the likelihood of a contract to exhibit pattern ‘A’. Therefore, the
possibility of a scenario where a contract is more likely to experience competition during letting and less
likely to experience unforeseen factors increases, thereby resulting in a negative cost overrun.

6.3.2.2. Impact of Contract Size and Geographic Location (District)
Contract size was found to have an impact on the probability of planning, design, and letting stage cost
overrun. Large expansion contracts (greater than $10M) were found more likely to experience high cost
overrun (Figure 6.11). Large expansion contracts are more likely to experience scope changes, unforeseen
and unplanned costs because of the large volume of construction activities involved and therefore tend to
be more likely to have high overrun.

MEAN PROBABILITY

Proposed Cost
($ Millions)

Figure 6.11: Comparison of Probability of Planning Stage Cost Overrun by Contract Size for
Expansion Contracts
An analysis of the large expansion contracts by district type indicates that large expansion
contracts in the districts of Greenfield and Seymour are more likely to have cost overrun greater than 10%.
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Figure 6.12 presents the tendency of large expansion contracts to have higher cost overruns compared to
small expansion contracts in these districts. The difference in the propensities of large and small expansion
contracts to have a high cost overrun was found to be comparatively small in the districts of Vincennes,
Laporte, and Fort Wayne. Contracts in Seymour and Greenfield districts were found more likely to exhibit
pattern ‘B’, which indicates that large expansion contracts in these districts are more likely to experience
scope changes and unforeseen costs compared to the large contracts in other districts.

MEAN PROBABILITY
OF OVERRUN > 10%

Proposed Cost ($ Millions)

Figure 6.12: Comparison of Mean Probability of Planning Stage Cost Overrun Greater than 10% by
Contract Size and Geographic Location (District)

The probability of large expansion contracts to experience a negative cost overrun of less than
-10% was found to be higher than the probability of overrun between +/-10%. In particular, large contracts
in the districts of Fort Wayne and Vincennes were found more likely to experience a high negative cost
overrun. Overall, across all districts, large expansion contracts were found more likely to experience cost
overrun outside the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’. Small expansion contracts (less than $10M), on the
other hand, were found more likely to have a negative planning stage cost overrun between -10% and 0%
(Figure 6.11), indicating that small expansion contracts are less likely to see unforeseen costs due to their
size.
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6.3.2.3. Impact of Area Type
Urban and rural areas in Indiana were compared to determine whether the tendency of contracts in
Seymour and Greenfield districts to have high cost overrun was due to comparatively more urbanization of
these districts. The expansion contracts in urban and rural areas were not found to be significantly different
from each other in their propensity to experience higher cost overruns (>10%). Therefore, it was concluded
other factors are responsible for the tendency of contracts in more urbanized districts to experience a high
cost overrun.

6.3.2.4. Impact of NHS Status
Expansion contracts on higher levels of NHS status were found more likely to have a negative planning
stage cost overrun of less than -10%. Figures 6.13 and 6.14 present a comparison of the mean probability of
planning stage cost overrun across contracts of various sizes at Interstates, Non-Interstate NHS, and NonNHS highways. Contracts at Non-NHS highways were found less likely to have a negative cost overrun of
less than -10% and more likely to experience a positive cost overrun of greater than 10%. Contracts at NonNHS highways were also found more likely to experience a design and letting stage cost overrun of greater
than 10%.
The expansion contracts at NHS highways were found less likely to experience pattern ‘B’ (refer
to Figure 6.8) compared to Non-NHS highways, indicating that NHS highways are less likely to experience
unforeseen costs. Expansion contracts at Non-NHS highways, such as urban and rural arterials, are more
likely to experience underground utilities and other urban-related construction problems compared to those
at Interstates, and therefore the unforeseen costs were less likely for Non-NHS highways.

6.3.2.5. Impact of Contract Classification (Standalone vs. Kin Contract)
The kin contracts were found more likely to have a letting stage cost overrun between 5%-10%. The
estimates of cost prepared at the letting stage for kin contracts possibly do not take into account the
additional costs due to lack of coordination in the construction of all the projects in the kin. Due to the low
bidding at the letting stage, the impact of not considering these costs is further exacerbated.
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MEAN PROBABILITY OF
OVERRUN < -10%

Proposed Cost
($ Millions)

Figure 6.13: Mean Probability of Planning Stage Cost Underrun by NHS Status and Contract Size

MEAN PROBABILITY OF
OVERRUN > 10%

Proposed Cost
($ Millions)

Figure 6.14: Mean Probability of Planning Stage Cost Overrun by NHS Status and Contract Size
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6.3.2.6. Impact of Changes in Cost Estimates
At any stage of the project development cycle, the change in the cost estimate from a previous stage was
found to significantly influence the probability of cost overrun at that stage. It was found that as the
percentage difference between design and proposed cost increases, the probability of a design stage cost
overrun of greater than 10% decreases. An increase in the percentage difference between the design
estimate and the proposed cost suggests that scope changes were made to the project or unforeseen costs
were identified as more and more information became available about the construction process and related
activities. In either scenario, an updated design cost enhances understanding of the effect of construction
activities (compared to a scenario when design cost was not updated). Therefore, cost increases from the
proposed stage to the design stage tend to make the design estimate more accurate.
The percentage difference between design cost and proposed cost was also found to be a
significant factor in determining the probability of a letting stage cost overrun; a higher percentage
difference between design and proposed cost tends to increase the probability of experiencing a letting
stage cost overrun of greater than 10%. An increase in the design estimate compared to proposed cost due
to scope changes tends to make the contract bigger in size, and large contracts tend to have high cost
overrun due to increased complexity and susceptibility to unforeseen factors. On the other hand, design
estimates could also be higher than the proposed cost estimates, because unforeseen factors at the planning
stage were identified during the design stage. It is possible that some of such factors were not identified by
the contractors at the letting stage given the short time span within which they had to prepare the bids. As a
result, the probability of a letting stage cost overrun increased.
An increase in the percentage difference between letting cost and proposed cost tends to increase
the probability of experiencing a negative letting stage cost overrun. If letting cost was less than the
proposed cost, a contract was more likely to have an overrun. As the percentage difference between the
letting cost and the proposed cost increases, the probability of having an over-estimated letting cost
decreases. This is because as letting cost increases, final cost estimate tends to become more conservative.

6.3.2.7. Impact of Time between Final Design Completion and Project Proposal
Contracts with a long time span between design and project proposal were more likely to experience a
positive design stage cost overrun and less likely to experience a negative design stage cost overrun. Also,
the probability of a positive letting stage cost overrun was found to increase with an increase in the time
span between final design completion and project proposal. A longer time span indicates that the contract
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was a large-scale project with more complex design process, or the project had scope changes during the
design process. Large-scale expansion contracts are susceptible to a large number of unforeseen factors.
Complex designs may experience constructability issues, therefore as the time span increases, the
occurrence probability of design and letting stage cost overrun increases.

6.3.3.

Magnitude of Cost Overrun

The magnitude of cost overrun was determined by using the concepts and principles of conditional
probability. The probabilities of cost overrun less than -10%, between -10% and 0%, between 0% and 10%,
and greater than 10% (as computed in Section 6.3.2) were multiplied by the expected value of cost overrun
for that particular cost overrun category. Table 6.6 presents the expected value of planning, design, and
letting stage cost overrun by cost overrun category. Figure 6.15 presents the expected value of planning
stage cost overrun by contract size and district. As discussed in Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2, large expansion
contracts in Seymour and Greenfield districts are more likely to have higher cost overruns.
Table 6.6: Expected Value of Cost Overrun for Expansion Contracts by Cost Overrun Category
Cost
Overrun
Type
Planning
Stage

Design
Stage
Letting
Stage

Cost Overrun Category
Category 1
Average: -25 %
Contracts: 16
C.I:[-33%, 18%]
Average: -26 %
Contracts: 15
C.I:[-35%, 18%]
Average: -10 %
Contracts: 1

Category 2

Category 3

Category 4

Weighted
Average

Average: -1.71 %
Contracts: 19
C.I: [-2.8%, -0.6%]

Average: 2.96 %
Contracts: 22
C.I: [1.7%, 4.3%]

Average: 34%
Contracts: 16
C.I: [17%, 50%]

Average: 2.3%
Contracts: 73
C.I: [-3.6%,8.2%]

Average: -2.1 %
Contracts: 21
C.I: [-3%, -1%]

Average: 3.1 %
Contracts: 22
C.I: [1.7%, 4.6%]

Average: 28%
Contracts: 15
C.I: [18%, 38%]

Average: 0.7%
Contracts: 73
C.I:[-4%,5.5%]

Average: - 2.8 %
Contracts: 9
C.I: [-4.8%,0.8%]

Average: 3.2 %
Contracts: 42
C.I: [2.2%, 4.1%]

Average: 26%
Contracts: 21
C.I: [17%, 35%]

Average: 8.8%
Contracts: 73
C.I:[5.2%,12.5%]

188

MEAN
COST
OVERRUN
(%)

PROPOSED COST (MILLION $)

Figure 6.15: Mean Planning Stage Cost Overrun Across Expansion Contracts by Size and District

6.4 Econometric Models for Bridge Contracts
Models were developed for bridge contracts that involved rehabilitation, replacement, or removal work on
bridges. Bridges deteriorate over time and can become either structurally or functionally deficient.
Extensive information and knowledge is generally available about the nature of construction activities,
costs involved, and cost estimation practices due to the periodic nature of work on bridges. Therefore, the
extent of uncertainty associated with cost estimation for bridge contracts is generally lower than that for
expansion contracts.

6.4.1.

Probability of Escalation Patterns

A total of 107 bridge contracts of sizes ranging from $1-$30M were analyzed to develop multinomial logit
models (Table 6.7) to estimate the probability of occurrence of each escalation pattern. Contract-specific
factors such as geographic location (district and area type), contract size (based on initial proposed cost),
and highway functional class were found to significantly affect the probability of the escalation patterns.
The model had a McFadden R-squared value of 0.47, indicating that the model explains 47% of the
randomness associated with the tendency of the cost estimates to exhibit a particular escalation pattern. The
model can be used for determining the escalation pattern of the cost estimates associated with bridge
project development cycle in Indiana. The methodology used for the model development is described in
Chapter 4. This can be used for developing similar models by highway agencies in other regions.
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Table 6.7: Multinomial Logit Model for Determining Probability of Escalation Pattern for Bridge Contracts
PATTERN
PATTERN A
PATTERN B

PATTERN C

PATTERN D

Contract Specific Factor

Coeff.

Std.Err.

T-ratio

p-value

Constant
Urban Area
Greenfield District
Constant
Non-NHS Highways
Laporte District

5.1362
1.1453
3.3570
4.7146
-1.4383
7.8440

1.3012
0.5292
1.5535
1.3301
0.6474
1.8862

3.95
2.16
2.16
3.54
-2.22
4.16

0.00
0.03
0.03
0.00
0.03
0.00

Seymour and Vincennes in South

6.3447

1.7207

3.69

0.00

Proposed Cost ($ Millions)
Arterial Roads (Urban / Rural)
Crawfordsville and Greenfield in Central
U.S. Highways
Minor Arterial Roads
Non-NHS Roads

-1.2470
-1.4241
3.1901
2.4029
-4.3282
3.1161

0.7028
0.7205
1.3591
0.9538
1.7378
1.2252

-1.77
-1.98
2.35
2.52
-2.49
2.54

0.08
0.05
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01

Log-Likelihood (Model): -79.36; Log-Likelihood (No Coefficients): -148.34; Log-Likelihood (Constant): -111.03
Number of Observations: 107

6.4.1.1. Impact of Contract Size
Bridge contracts were found to be more likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’ compared to other patterns. The
tendency of bridge contracts to exhibit pattern ‘A’ was found to be higher than the propensity of expansion
contracts to exhibit pattern ‘A’ (refer to Figure 6.1). Also, the tendency of bridge contracts to exhibit a
pattern was not found to change significantly with increases in proposed cost or contract size (Figure 6.16).
MEAN PROBABILITY OF
ESCALATION PATTERN
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PROPOSED COST (MILLION $)

Figure 6.16: Comparison of Probability of Escalation Patterns by Contract Size for Bridge Contracts
The propensity of bridge contracts to exhibit pattern ‘A’ indicates that most of the bridge contracts
are straightforward construction activities with standard construction practice and cost estimation process.
The low tendency of bridge contracts to exhibit pattern ‘B’ indicates that bridge contracts were less likely
to experience unforeseen costs and changes in large changes in cost estimates.

6.4.1.2. Impact of Contract Size and Geographic Location (District)
A detailed analysis of the tendency of bridge contracts of various sizes to exhibit pattern ‘A’ was conducted
by geographic location (district). The objective was to determine if the tendency of bridge contracts to
exhibit pattern ‘A’ was prevalent in each of the six districts irrespective of the contract size. The results of
the trends, seen in all the districts, are shown in Figure 6.17. Small bridge contracts (less than $3M) in
Laporte district were found to be less likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’ compared to large contracts in this
district. Also small contracts (less than $3M) in Seymour and Vincennes districts were found to be
marginally less likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’ compared to large contracts in these districts. Across all the
other districts, the propensity to exhibit pattern ‘A’ did not change with increasing contract sizes. Contracts
in Greenfield district were found more likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’ and least likely to exhibit pattern ‘B’
compared to contracts in other districts.
MEAN PROBABILITY OF
ESCALATION PATTERN ‘A’
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PROPOSED COST (MILLION $)

Figure 6.17: Comparison of Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘A’ Across Districts (Bridge Contracts)

6.4.1.3. Impact of NHS Status
An analysis of probability of escalation pattern by NHS status indicated that bridge contracts on Interstates
were more likely to exhibit pattern ‘B’, followed by the contracts on Non-Interstate NHS and Non-NHS
highways (Figure 6.18). The tendency of Interstate bridge contracts to exhibit pattern ‘B’ indicates that
such contracts are more likely to experience unforeseen costs compared to contracts on comparatively
lower levels of NHS status. The probability of Non-NHS highway contracts to exhibit pattern ‘B’ was
found to be very low. The bridges on Interstates are generally high profile as they are designed to carry
more traffic as compared to bridges on Non-NHS highways. The structural and functional efficiency that is
required for these bridges, makes the construction activities on these bridges more susceptible to scope
changes and unforeseen costs. As a result, they become more likely to exhibit pattern ‘B’ compared to other
NHS status level. However, most of the contracts on each of these NHS status levels were more likely to
exhibit pattern ‘A’ as compared to pattern ‘B’. The propensity to exhibit pattern ‘A’ was not found to be
significantly different across these NHS status levels.
MEAN PROBABILITY OF
ESCALATION PATTERN ‘B’
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PROPOSED COST (MILLION $)

Figure 6.18: Comparison of Tendency to Exhibit Pattern ‘B’ Across Levels of NHS Status by Contract Size
(Bridge Contracts)

6.4.2. Probability of Cost Overrun Occurrence
The models presented in Tables 6.8-6.10 were developed for bridge contracts to estimate the occurrence
probability of planning, design, and letting stage cost overruns, respectively. Contract-specific factors such
as size, geographic location, highway functional class, and the tendency of a contract to exhibit an
escalation pattern were found to have an impact on the probability of planning, design, and letting stage
cost overrun. Factors such as the time duration between final design completion and project proposal and
the percentage difference between the design estimate and proposed cost were found to affect the
probability of design stage cost overrun. These factors are not available at the planning stage and therefore
were not included in the model for determining planning stage cost overrun. Because of inclusion of
additional factors, the McFadden R-squared value of the design stage cost overrun model (0.33) was higher
than that of the planning stage cost overrun model (0.26). The occurrence probability of letting stage cost
overrun was found to be affected by additional factors (compared to planning and design stage cost
overrun) as more information about contract-specific factors becomes available at the letting stage. These
include: contract classification as stand-alone or kin, percentage difference between proposed, design and
letting estimates, and the time between final design completion and project proposal. The propensity of a
contract to exhibit an escalation pattern was also found to affect the probability of letting stage cost
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overrun. Table 6.10 presents the multinomial logit model for determining the probability of letting stage
cost overrun.

Table 6.8: Multinomial Logit Model for Determining the Probability of Planning Stage Cost Overrun for
Bridge Contracts
Cost Overrun
Category
Category 1
< -10%
Category 2
[-10%, 0%)
Category 3
[0%, 10%]
Category 4
> 10%

Contract Specific Factor

Coeff.

Std.Err.

t-ratio

p-Value

Laporte District

1.1568

0.5686

2.03

0.04

Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘B’

-4.6787

2.7052

-1.73

0.08

Urban Area

-0.8711

0.5446

-1.62

0.10

Variability in Probability of Escalation
Pattern ‘A’ (Measured using Std. Dev)

9.9976

4.3059

2.32

0.02

Proposed Cost (in Million $)

-0.4943

0.2417

-2.05

0.04

Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘B’

2.7521

1.6862

1.63

0.10

Urban and Rural Collectors

0.8772

0.5538

1.64

0.10

Urban Interstate, Freeway or Expressway

2.7013

0.9055

2.98

0.00

Rural Arterial

1.5655

0.6680

2.34

0.02

Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘A’

-3.1036

1.0760

-2.88

0.00

Log-Likelihood (Model): -123.79; Log-Likelihood (No Coefficients): -148.34; Log-Likelihood (Constant): -138.51
Number of Observations: 107

Table 6.9: Multinomial Logit Model for Determining the Probability of Design Stage Cost Overrun for
Bridge Contracts
Overrun
Category
Category 1

Contract Specific Factor

Coeff.

Std.Err.

t-ratio

P-Value

Percentage Difference Between
Design and Proposed Cost

0.0468

0.0173

2.71

0.01
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< -10%

Category 2
[-10%, 0%)

Category 3
[0%, 10%]
Category 4
> 10%

Kin Contract
Interstate
Variability in Probability of
Escalation Pattern ‘A’ (Measured
using Std. Dev)
Proposed Cost (in Million $)
Urban and Rural Arterials
Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘B’
/ Variability in Probability of
Escalation Pattern ‘B’
Urban and Rural Collectors
Vincennes District
Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘A’
Square of Time Between Design
and Project Proposal (years)

1.2948
-1.2162

0.5296
0.6709

2.44
-1.81

0.01
0.07

18.7070

5.2980

3.53

0.00

-0.3806
-1.1250

0.2141
0.5208

-1.78
-2.16

0.08
0.03

0.4543

0.1303

3.49

0.00

1.7873
-1.4932
-1.8551

0.6670
0.6940
0.9336

2.68
-2.15
-1.99

0.01
0.03
0.05

0.0054

0.0036

1.50

0.13

* Log-Likelihood (Model): -110.96; Log-Likelihood (No Coefficients): -142.78; Log-Likelihood (Constant): -129.84

Table 6.10: Multinomial Logit Model for Determining the Probability of Letting Stage Cost Overrun for
Bridge Contracts
Cost Overrun
Category
Category 1
< 0%
Category 2
[0%, 5%)

Category 3
(5%, 10%]

Category 4
> 10%

Contract Specific Factor

Coeff.

Std.Err.

t-ratio

P-Value

Percentage Difference Between Letting
and Proposed Cost

0.0462

0.0279

1.66

0.10

Laporte District

1.3975

0.6071

2.30

0.02

Urban / Rural Arterials

-1.0191

0.6395

-1.59

0.11

Proposed Cost ($ Millions)

0.4420

0.2141

2.06

0.04

Variability in Probability of Escalation
Pattern 'B' (Measured using Std. Dev)

14.9898

7.4202

2.02

0.04

Percentage Difference Between Design
and Proposed Cost

0.0569

0.0201

2.83

0.00

Probability of Escalation Pattern 'C'

-4.1314

2.4138

-1.71

0.09

Probability of Escalation Pattern 'B'

5.9627

1.9455

3.06

0.00

Kin Contracts

-2.1932

1.1544

-1.90

0.06

Crawfordsville District

1.2388

0.6714

1.85

0.07

Urban and Rural Interstates

1.1354

0.6530

1.74

0.08

Square of Proposed Cost ($ Millions)

0.0642

0.0376

1.71

0.09

* Log-Likelihood (Model): -105.19; Log-Likelihood (No Coefficients): -148.34; Log-Likelihood (Constant): -145.3

Factors that were found to affect the probability of planning, design, and letting stage cost overrun
were compared to study the similarity of their impact on the probability of the cost overrun. Contract size,
geographic location, highway functional class, NHS status, and probability of escalation pattern were found
to affect the probability of cost overrun at all stages. Table 6.11 presents a comparison of the coefficients of
the factors. For the factors found to influence the probability of cost overrun at all stages, the sign of their
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coefficients was the same across the models, indicating that the impact of the factors on the probability of
cost overrun was not different.

6.4.2.1. Impact of Escalation Pattern by Geographic Location (District)
The tendency to exhibit escalation patterns ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ was found to have an impact on the
probability of planning, letting, and design stage cost overrun. It was found that bridge contracts that are
more likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’ were more likely to experience negative cost overrun and, consequently,
less likely to experience a cost overrun of greater than 10%. On the other hand, contracts that were more
likely to exhibit pattern ‘B’ were found to be more likely to have planning, design and letting stage cost
overruns. As the tendency to exhibit pattern ‘B’ increased, the probability to experience planning stage cost
overrun between 0% and 10% and letting stage cost overrun between 5% and 10% increased.
Consequently, the probability of a negative cost overrun decreased. Bridge contracts that were more likely
to exhibit pattern ‘B’ were likely to be more susceptible to unforeseen factors, either due to unforeseen site
conditions or due to scope changes, and therefore were more likely to have cost overrun. Contracts more
likely to experience pattern ‘A’ generally have low cost overrun as they: are straightforward construction
activities that follow the routine planning process, experience competition at letting, and have efficient
management during the development and construction stages so as to ensure that contracts are completed
within the low letting cost.
In addition to patterns ‘A’ and ‘B’, pattern ‘C’ was also found to have an impact on the probability
of cost overrun for bridge contracts (unlike expansion contracts where only patterns ‘A’ and ‘B’ were
found to affect the probability of cost overrun). The tendency to experience a high letting stage cost
overrun was found to decrease with an increase in the probability of pattern ‘C’. Pattern ‘C’ represents a
scenario where the risk of unforeseen costs exists during planning, development, and letting, but is not as
high as for contracts exhibiting pattern ‘B’. That is, unforeseen costs and factors resulting in design and
scope changes were less likely to occur for contracts exhibiting pattern ‘C’. As a result, the probability of
cost overrun decreased with an increase in the likelihood of occurrence of pattern ‘C’.

Table 6.11: Comparison of Coefficients of the Factors Affecting Probability of Planning, Design, and
Letting Stage Cost Overrun (Bridge Contracts)
Cost
Overrun
Category 1

Contract Specific Factor
Laporte District

Planning
1.1568

Design

Cost
Overrun

Letting

Category 1

1.3974
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< -10%

Probability of Escalation Pattern 'B'

-4.6787

Urban Area

-0.8711

Percentage Difference Between Design
and Proposed Cost

< 0%
0.0468

Kin Contract

1.2948

Interstate Highway

-1.2162

Percentage Difference Between Letting
and Proposed Cost

0.0461

Urban / Rural Arterials

-1.019

Category 2

Variability in Probability of Escalation
Pattern 'A' (Measured using Std. Dev)

9.9976

18.707

[-10%, 0%)

Proposed Cost (in Million $)

-0.4943

-0.3806

Urban and Rural Arterials
Urban and Rural Collectors
Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘B’ /
Variability in Probability of Escalation
Pattern ‘B’
Vincennes District
Category 3
[0%, 10%]

-1.125
0.8772

1.7873
0.4543
Category 2
-1.4932

Proposed Cost (in Million $)

[0%, 5%]

Variability in Probability of Escalation
Pattern 'B' (Measured using Std. Dev)

14.9897

Percentage Difference Between Design
and Proposed Cost

0.05686
Category 3

Probability of Escalation Pattern 'C'
Probability of Escalation Pattern 'B'

0.442

(5%, 10%]

2.7521

-4.1314
5.9626

Kin contracts

Category 4
> 10%

Urban Interstate, Freeway or Expressway

2.7013

Rural Arterial

1.5655

Probability of Escalation Pattern 'A'

-3.1036

Square of Time Between Design and
Project Proposal (years)

-1.8551
Category 4
0.0054
> 10%

Crawfordsville District

1.23875

Square of Proposed Cost ($ Millions)

0.06423

Urban and Rural Interstates

1.1354

In addition to the probability of the escalation patterns, the variability in the probability of an
escalation pattern was also found to affect the probability of cost overrun. The variability in the probability
of an escalation pattern indicates the variability across the contracts of a particular type to exhibit that
escalation pattern. The contract-specific factors that are used to determine the probability of an escalation
pattern define a contract type or a category of contracts. Several contracts can belong to this type and may
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experience variability in their tendency to exhibit an escalation pattern. A contract may be likely to exhibit
pattern ‘B’ with 30% probability while another might have a 45% chance to exhibit pattern ‘B’. It was
found that as this variability in the propensity to exhibit pattern ‘B’ increases for a particular contract type,
the probability of cost overrun increases (Figure 6.19).
1

PROBABILITY
OF OVERRUN
BETWEEN 0.8
0% - 10%
0.6

0.4

0.2

0
< 0.05

[0.05, 0.1]

[0.1, 0.3]

> 0.3

Standard Deviation of Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘B’

Figure 6.19: Impact of Variability in Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘B’ on the Probability of Cost
Overrun
Contract types that experience high variability in the probability to exhibit pattern ‘B’ may or may
not experience pattern ‘B’. That is, contracts belonging to such a contract type may or may not experience
unforeseen costs. This degree of uncertainty about the occurrence of unforeseen costs indicates towards the
uncertainty associated with cost estimation. As a result, the probability of cost overrun increases.

6.4.2.2. Impact of Contract Size and Geographic Location (District)
Bridge contracts were found more likely to have a cost overrun within the ‘+/-10% cost overrun bracket’.
The tendency to have cost overrun between 0% and 10% was found to be higher than the tendency to have
a negative cost overrun between -10% and 0% (Figure 6.20). Moreover, large contracts were found more
likely to experience cost overrun in the 0% to 10% range compared to small contracts, whereas the
tendency to experience a negative cost overrun was found to decrease with a decrease in contract size.
Large contracts are generally bridge replacement contracts or contracts involving significant replacement of
the bridge deck or the superstructure. Such contracts are more likely to experience cost overrun compared
to routine bridge maintenance and rehabilitation contracts, which are comparatively smaller in size and
involve low profile construction activities.
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MEAN PROBABILITY
OF OVERRUN

PROPOSED COST (MILLION $)

Figure 6.20: Probability of Planning Stage Cost Overrun by Contract Size for Bridge Contracts

An analysis of the tendency of bridge contracts to experience cost overrun was conducted by
district to determine if the trends in the probability of overrun shown in Figure 6.20 were prevalent across
all districts. Greenfield, Laporte, and Crawfordsville districts were found more likely to have a negative
cost overrun and less likely to have a cost overrun in the range of 0% to 10% compared to other districts
(Figure 6.21). Contracts in Greenfield district were found least likely to exhibit pattern ‘B’ followed by
contracts in Laporte and Crawfordsville districts. That is, contracts in these districts experienced lower risk
of unforeseen costs compared to contracts in other districts. More experience with high profile bridge
construction contracts and better management and construction practices are likely to be responsible for
contracts in Greenfield, Laporte, and Crawfordsville districts to experience relatively low cost overrun.

MEAN PROBABILITY
OF OVERRUN BETWEEN
0% AND 10%
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PROPOSED COST (MILLION $)

Figure 6.21: Probability of Planning Stage Cost Overrun Between 0% and 10% by Contract Size and
District for Bridge Contracts

6.4.2.3. Impact of Area Type
Urban area bridge contracts were found more likely to experience planning stage cost overrun greater than
10% compared to contracts in rural areas. Contracts in rural areas were found more likely to have planning
stage cost overrun of less than 10% compared to contracts in urban areas. The tendency of contracts in
urban areas to experience high cost overrun was observed across contracts of all sizes. Factors such as
traffic management and the availability of limited space for construction and rehabilitation work are likely
to be responsible for high cost overrun in urban areas.

6.4.2.4. Impact of NHS Status
A detailed analysis of the planning, design and letting stage cost overrun was conducted by NHS status in
the urban and rural areas. The planning, design and letting stage cost overrun corresponding to Interstate
contracts were found more likely to be greater than 10% compared to contracts on Non-Interstate NHS
highways and Non-NHS highways. Figure 6.22 presents the probability of planning stage cost overrun
greater than 10% by NHS status. Across the Interstate contracts, urban Interstate contracts were found more
likely to have a cost overrun of greater than 10% compared to rural Interstate contracts. The rural Interstate
contracts were found more likely to have a comparatively lower cost overrun between 0% and 10% as
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opposed to urban Interstate contracts. In general, contracts on rural highway functional classes such as
Interstates, principal arterials, minor arterials, and collectors were found more likely to have lower cost
overruns (0% to 10%). The contracts on urban collectors and arterials were similar to contracts on rural
functional classes with respect to their tendency to have cost overruns. The increased likelihood of
contracts on urban Interstates to have high cost overruns was likely due to the traffic management issues on
these highways. Because of the difference between the functional classes, contracts in urban areas were
found more likely to have higher cost overruns.
MEAN PROBABILITY
OF OVERRUN > 10%

PROPOSED COST (MILLION $)

Figure 6.22: Comparison of Probability of Planning Stage Cost Overrun Greater than 10% by NHS Status
and Contract Size (Bridge Contracts)

6.4.2.5 Impact of Contract Classification (Standalone vs. Kin Contract)
The letting strategy was not found to have an impact on the probability of cost overrun. Standalone and kin
contracts were not found to be significantly different from each other (unlike expansion contracts where
probability of letting stage cost overrun was higher for kin contracts). These contracts were found to be not
different from each other with respect to their tendency to exhibit a particular escalation pattern.
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6.4.2.6. Impact of Changes in Cost Estimates
The change in the cost estimate from planning stage to final design stage was found to have an impact on
the probability of cost overrun at the design and letting stages. It was found that as the percentage
difference between design and proposed cost increased, there was an increase in the probability that the
design stage cost overrun will be less than -10% increased. An increase in the percentage difference
between the design estimate and the proposed cost indicates that either scope changes were made to the
project or unforeseen costs were identified as more information became available about the construction
process and activities. In either scenario, an updated design cost is indicative of a more comprehensive
understanding of the construction activities (compared to a scenario when design cost was not updated).
Therefore, cost increases at the design stage tend to make the design estimate more accurate.
The percentage difference between design cost and proposed cost was also found to be a
significant factor in determining the probability of a letting stage cost overrun. It was found that a higher
percentage difference between design and proposed cost tends to increase the probability of letting stage
cost overrun. The letting stage cost overrun becomes more likely to be in the 5%-10% category as the
percentage difference between design and proposed cost increases. An increase in the design estimate
compared to proposed cost due to scope changes tends to make the contract bigger in size; large contracts
tend to have higher cost overruns due to increased complexity and susceptibility to unforeseen factors. As a
result, the letting stage cost overrun increases. On the other hand, design estimates could also be higher
than the proposed cost estimates because unforeseen factors at the planning stage were identified during the
design stage. Some of such factors were possibly not identified by the contractors at the letting stage given
the relatively short time span they had to prepare the bids. As a result the probability of a letting stage cost
overrun increased.
An increase in the percentage difference between letting cost and proposed cost tends to increase
the probability of experiencing letting stage cost underrun. If letting cost was less than the proposed cost, a
contract was more likely to have an overrun. An increase in the letting cost (compared to proposed cost)
indicates that contractors bid a higher cost. This is generally done to take into consideration the risk of
unforeseen costs. Therefore, a comparatively higher letting cost suggests that a conservative approach was
adopted for the preparation of the letting cost estimate. Consequently, the probability of letting stage cost
underrun increases.

6.4.2.7. Impact of Time between Final Design Completion and Project Proposal
The time span between the final design completion and the project proposal was found to have a positive
impact on the probability of design stage cost overrun. As the time span increases, contracts were found to
be more likely to experience a cost overrun greater than 10%. The time between final design completion
and project proposal is a reflection of the complexity of the contract. Large time spans are generally
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experienced for: large contracts, contracts where site conditions created design challenges, or where
multiple scope changes were made. Each of these factors could make a contract more susceptible to high
cost overrun.

6.4.3.

Magnitude of Cost Overrun

The magnitude of cost overrun was determined by using the conditional probability concept in the same
way as for the expansion contracts. Table 6.12 presents the expected value of planning, design, and letting
stage cost overrun by cost overrun category. Figure 6.15 presents the magnitude of planning stage cost
overrun by contract size, area type, and highway functional class. Bridge contracts on urban Interstates,
freeways, and expressways were expected to have high planning stage cost overruns (greater than 10%)
compared to contracts on rural highway functional classes.
Table 6.12: Expected Value of Cost Overrun for Bridge Contracts by Cost Overrun Category
Cost Overrun Category

Cost
Overrun

Category 1

Planning
Stage

Average: -23 %
Contracts: 17
C.I: [-30%, -17%]

Average: -1.34%
Contracts: 29
C.I: [-2.4%, -0.3%]

Average: 1.65%
Contracts: 45
C.I: [0.8%, 2.5%]

Average: 34 %
Contracts: 16
C.I: [20%, 48%]

Average: 1.8%
Contracts: 107
C.I: [-1.9%, 5.6%]

Design
Stage

Average: -20 %
Contracts: 24
C.I: [-25%, -16%]

Average: -1.89%
Contracts: 30
C.I: [-3%, -0.7%]

Average: 1.45%
Contracts: 45
C.I: [0.7%, 2.1%]

Average: 33%
Contracts: 8
C.I: [11%, 55%]

Average: -2%
Contracts: 107
C.I:[-5%,1%]

Average: - 44 %
Contracts: 1

Average: - 4%
Contracts: 11
C.I: [-6%, -1.8%]

Average: 2.9%
Contracts: 75
C.I: [2.3%, 3.5%]

Average: 23%
Contracts: 20
C.I: [13%, 33%]

Average: 5.6%
Contracts: 107
C.I:[3%, 8.2%]

Letting
Stage

Category 2

Category 3

Category 4

Weighted

Type

Average
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MEAN OVERRUN (%)

PROPOSED COST (MILLION $)

Figure 6.23: Mean Planning Stage Cost Overrun (%) for Bridge Contracts by Size and Functional Class

6.5. Econometric Models for Pavement Contracts
Pavement contracts involve rehabilitation, resurfacing, replacement, or reconstruction work. The extent of
uncertainty and variability associated with the construction process of a pavement contract can generally be
expected to be lower than that for expansion and bridge contracts. Pavement contracts are usually
straightforward, routine construction activities for which sufficient knowledge and information exists about
the factors that can result in cost overrun.

6.5.1.

Probability of Escalation Patterns

A total of 239 historical pavement contracts in the range of $1-$10M were analyzed to develop the
multinomial logit models (Table 6.13) for analysis of escalation pattern of pavement contracts. Contractspecific factors such as geographic location, contract size, and highway functional class were found to
significantly affect the probability of the escalation patterns.
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Table 6.13: Multinomial Logit Model to Determine Probability of Escalation Pattern (Pavement Contracts)
PATTERN

PATTERN A

PATTERN B

PATTERN C

PATTERN D

Contract Specific Factor

Coeff.

Std.Err.

T-ratio

Constant

0.7723

0.2742

2.82

Proposed Cost (in Million $)

0.1109

0.0579

1.92

Proposed Cost between $2M-$5M

-0.6812

0.3036

-2.24

Urban and Rural Interstates

-0.9193

0.5934

-1.65

Vincennes District

-0.8684

0.4452

-1.95

Proposed Cost (in Million $)

0.1283

0.0610

2.10

Proposed Cost between $1M-$2M

0.6334

0.2718

2.33

Proposed Cost (in Million $)

-0.3061

0.1206

-2.54

Fort Wayne and Laporte Districts in North

0.5901

0.3690

1.60

Greenfield District

0.7761

0.4241

1.83

Rural Principal Arterial

0.8078

0.4794

1.68

Rural Minor Arterial

-1.7239

0.7571

-2.28

U.S. Roads

-0.7939

0.4828

-1.64

Log-Likelihood (Model): -283.8; Log-Likelihood (No Coefficients): -331.3; Log-Likelihood (Constant): -300.9
Number of Observations: 239

6.5.1.1. Impact of Contract Size
Pavement contracts were found to be more likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’ compared to other patterns. Figure
6.24 presents the tendency of pavement contracts of various sizes to exhibit each escalation pattern. The
probability to exhibit pattern ‘A’ was found to increase with increases in contract size, indicating that the
cost estimates of large contracts (greater than $5M) were more likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’. For large
pavement contracts, highways may be closed to traffic and therefore the traffic management costs are
smaller, thereby allowing contractors to submit bids. Small pavement contracts, on the other hand, may
involve more traffic management as the road is often are not completely closed to traffic, and therefore they
are expected to experience comparatively lower propensity to exhibit pattern ‘A’. Therefore, there is a jump
observed in the probability of occurrence of pattern ‘A’ for contracts greater than $5M.
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Figure 6.24: Mean Probability of Escalation Patterns by Contract Size for Pavement Contracts

6.5.1.2. Impact of Contract Size and Geographic Location (District)
Figure 6.25 presents a detailed analysis of the mean probability of escalation pattern ‘A’ by district and
contract size. The increasing trend of the probability of pattern ‘A’ with contract size was found across all
districts. The jump in the probability of escalation pattern ‘A’ for contracts greater than $5 million was
found across all districts, indicating that large contracts experience lower letting costs. The districts of
Vincennes, Crawfordsville, and Fort Wayne were found to be relatively more likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’,
followed by the relatively more urbanized districts of Seymour, Laporte and Greenfield. Contracts in
urbanized districts were less likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’, perhaps because contractors find it difficult to
quote a lower construction cost in urbanized districts owing to the difficulties in traffic management, lack
of availability of space for construction, and higher labor costs.
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Mean Probability of
Escalation Pattern ‘A’

Jump in the Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘A’
for Contracts > $5 Million
Indicating that large contracts are more likely to
experience letting costs lower than design estimate
and final cost

Proposed Cost ($ Millions)

Figure 6.25: Mean Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘A’ by Contract Size and District for Pavement
Contracts
The probability of pattern ‘B’ follows a step-wise increasing trend with increasing size for
contracts in all districts. Figure 6.26 presents an analysis of the mean probability of escalation pattern ‘B’
by district and contract size. The drop in the probability of pattern ‘B’ for contracts greater than $5M is
because large contracts were found more likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’ because of the tendency of
contractors to bid low. The drop was observed across all districts. Contracts less than $5M have
comparatively lower returns due to their small size, and are likely to experience more costs because of
traffic management, limited construction space, and overall management of construction process compared
to large contracts. This also explains why contracts of size $1-$2M were found to be more likely to exhibit
pattern ‘B’ compared to contracts of larger size.
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Figure 6.26: Mean Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘B’ by Contract Size and District for Pavement
Contracts

6.5.1.3. Impact of Route Type
Figure 6.27 presents an analysis of the mean probability of pattern ‘A’ by route type (Interstate, U.S.
highway, and State Road) and contract size. Interstate contracts were found more likely to experience
escalation pattern ‘A’, followed by U.S. highway and State Road contracts. Interstate contracts possibly
involved less traffic management costs, as they were either partially closed to traffic or underwent
pavement work during non-peak hours. It is likely that pavement work on Interstates was completed faster,
owing to more uniform features and less unforeseen site conditions. On the other hand, the Non-Interstate
NHS highways and the Non-NHS highways would have involved more traffic management and over a
longer period of time, as site conditions change from one location to another. As a result, they were found
to be more likely to experience an increasing trend in the construction cost.
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Figure 6.27: Mean Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘A’ by Contract Size and Route Type for Pavement
Contracts

6.5.2.

Probability of Cost Overrun Occurrence

A set of econometric models were developed for pavement contracts to determine the occurrence
probability of planning, design, and letting stage cost overruns. Influential factors found to affect such
probabilities include: contract size, geographic location, highway functional class, and the propensity of a
contract to exhibit an escalation pattern (Table 6.14). In addition, the time span between final design
completion and project proposal and the percentage difference between design estimate and proposed cost
were found to affect the probability of a design stage cost overrun (Table 6.15). The occurrence probability
of letting stage cost overrun was also found to be influenced by other factors such as the: time span
between project proposal and letting, percentage difference between letting cost and proposed cost, and
percentage difference between design cost and proposed cost (Table 6.16).
The impacts of the factors that were found to influence the probability of planning, design, and
letting stage cost overruns were compared. Table 6.17 presents a comparison of the coefficients of the
factors; the sign of the coefficients of these factors did not change across the models. This implies that for a
given factor, the nature of its impact on planning, design, and letting stage cost overruns was not different.
However, since the magnitudes of the coefficients were different, the extent of the impact varied.

209

Table 6.14: Multinomial Logit Model to Determine Probability of Planning Stage Cost Overrun for
Pavement Contracts
Cost
Overrun

Contract Specific Factor

Coeff.

Constant

< -10%

[0%, 10%]
> 10%

t-ratio

p-Value

-46.8711

8.8960

-5.27

0.00

Logarithm of Proposed Cost (in $)

3.2794

0.6131

5.35

0.00

Rural Area

1.1117

0.5690

1.95

0.05

Proposed Cost between $1M-$2M

1.3376

0.5401

2.48

0.01

-41.1529

14.9668

-2.75

0.01

Urban Interstate, Freeway or Expressway

1.5378

0.9036

1.70

0.09

Rural Collector (Major/Minor)

-0.7275

0.3475

-2.09

0.04

Seymour District

-1.1384

0.5502

-2.07

0.04

Proposed Cost (in Million $)

0.2216

0.0707

3.14

0.00

Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘A’

-0.8538

0.4979

-1.71

0.09

Proposed Cost (in Million $)

0.1631

0.0632

2.58

0.01

Variability in Probability of Escalation
Pattern B (Measured using Std. Dev)

[<-10%, 0%)

Std.Err.

* Log-Likelihood (Model): -296; Log-Likelihood (No Coefficients): -331.32; Log-Likelihood (Constant): -326.09

Table 6.15: Multinomial Logit Model to Determine Probability of Design Stage Cost Overrun for Pavement
Contracts
Cost
Overrun

<-10%

[-10%, 0%)

Contract Specific Factor

Coeff.

Std.Err.

t-ratio

P-Value

Constant
Logarithm of Proposed Cost (in $)
Proposed Cost between $1 - $2 M
Variability in Probability of
Escalation Pattern ‘B’
(Measured using Std. Dev)
Square of Time Between Design and
Project Proposal (years)
Urban Districts of Seymour,
Greenfield and Laporte
Percentage Difference Between
Design and Proposed Cost

-31.6941
2.5121
0.8394

7.5128
0.5482
0.5329

-4.22
4.58
1.58

0.00
0.00
0.12

-74.7932

20.4891

-3.65

0.00

-0.0126

0.0071

-1.78

0.08

-1.0584

0.4243

-2.49

0.01

-0.0195

0.0106

-1.84

0.07

-0.0360

0.0128

-2.81

0.00

-1.1180

0.5560

-2.01

0.04

0.9686

0.3136

3.09

0.00

-0.0500

0.0134

-3.72

0.00

1.3377

0.6976

1.92

0.06

Percentage Difference Between
Design and Proposed Cost
[0%, 10%]

> 10%

Seymour District
2-4 years Between Design and
Project Proposal
Percentage Difference Between
Design and Proposed Cost
Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘B’

* Log-Likelihood (Model): -274.26; Log-Likelihood (No Coefficients): -310.5; Log-Likelihood (Constant): -308.8
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Table 6.16: Multinomial Logit Model to Determine Probability of Letting Stage Cost Overrun for
Pavement Contracts
Cost Overrun
< 0%

[0%, 5%)

(5%, 10%)

> 10%

Contract Specific Factor

Coeff.

Std.Err.

t-ratio

P-Value

Laporte District
Constant

1.0337
1.3153

0.6023
0.2253

1.72
5.84

0.09
0.00

Percentage Difference Between Design
and Proposed Cost

0.0002

0.0001

1.60

0.11

Interstate Highways

0.9245

0.4553

2.03

0.04

Time Between Letting and Project
Proposal (Years)

-0.1278

0.0581

-2.20

0.03

Square of Proposed Cost ($ Millions)
Laporte District

0.0042
1.1798

0.0020
0.5734

2.15
2.06

0.03
0.04

Urban Districts of Seymour, Greenfield
and Laporte

-1.2118

0.5454

-2.22

0.03

Kin Contracts
Probability of Escalation Pattern 'B'
Seymour District

0.8534
2.5124
1.1356

0.3855
1.2491
0.5729

2.21
2.01
1.98

0.03
0.04
0.05

* Log-Likelihood (Model): -269.64; Log-Likelihood (No Coefficients): -310.5; Log-Likelihood (Constant): -289.46
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Table 6.17: Comparison of Coefficients of the Factors Affecting Probability of Planning, Design and
Letting Stage Cost Overrun (Pavement Contracts)
Cost Overrun

Contract Specific Factor
Constant

Planning

Design

-46.8711

-31.694

Logarithm of Proposed Cost (in $)

3.2794

2.5121

Proposed Cost between $1M-$2M

1.3376

0.8394

Urban Districts of Seymour, Greenfield
and Laporte

Letting

-1.0584

Laporte District
< -10%

Kin Contract
Rural Area
Variability in Probability of Escalation
Pattern ‘B’ (Measured using Std. Dev)
Urban Interstate, Freeway or
Expressway
Square of Time Between Design and
Project Proposal (years)

1.0336
-1.3902

-1.2332

1.112
-41.15

-74.79

< 0%

1.5378
-0.0126

Constant
[-10%, 0%)

Percentage Difference Between Design
and Proposed Cost
Rural Collector (Major/Minor)

-0.0195
-0.7275

Constant
Seymour District

1.315
-1.1384

-1.118

Interstate Highways
Proposed Cost (in Million $)

0.9245
0.2216

Percentage Difference Between Design
and Proposed Cost
[0%, 10%]

-0.036
[0%, 5%)

Square of Percentage Difference
Between Design and Proposed Cost

0.0002

2-4 years Between Design and Project
Proposal

0.9686

Time between Letting and Project
Proposal
Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘A’

-0.1278
-0.8538

Square of Proposed Cost ($ Millions)

[5%, 10%]

Laporte District

> 10%

0.0042
1.18

Urban Districts of Seymour, Greenfield
and Laporte

-1.2112

Seymour District

1.1356

Kin Contracts
Percentage Difference Between Design
and Proposed Cost

> 10%
-

Probability of Escalation Pattern ‘B’
Proposed Cost (in Million $)

-0.05
1.3377

0.1631

0.8534

2.512
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6.5.2.1. Impact of Contract Size
The probability of planning stage cost overrun was found to decrease with an increase in contract size for
pavement contracts (Figure 6.28). Large pavement contracts (greater than $5M) were found more likely to
experience a planning stage cost overrun less than -10%. The probability of experiencing planning stage
cost overruns less than -10% was lower for small contracts. Small pavement contracts were found more
likely to experience cost overruns greater than 10%, as opposed to large pavement contracts. In Section
6.5.1, it was found that large pavement contracts were more likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’ (see Figure 6.24),
whereas small pavement contracts were more likely to exhibit pattern ‘B’. This probably explains why
large pavement contracts were found more likely to experience cost underruns, whereas small pavement
contracts were found more susceptible to cost overruns. Large pavement contracts are perhaps managed
more efficiently, because they often, unlike smaller pavement contracts, involve complete highway
closures, thereby during the construction period thereby resulting in low traffic management costs.

MEAN PROBABILITY
OF OVERRUN

PROPOSED COST ($ MILLIONS)

Figure 6.28: Mean Probability of Planning Stage Cost Overrun Corresponding to Various Levels of a
Pavement Contract Size (Based on Proposed Cost)
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6.5.2.2. Impact of Escalation Pattern
The likelihood of occurrence of escalation pattern ‘A’ was found to have a decreasing effect on the
probability of positive planning, design, and letting stage cost overruns. Further, it was found that as the
probability of pattern ‘B’ increases, overruns greater than 10% were more likely to occur. Contracts that are
more likely to exhibit pattern ‘B’ were found to be more likely to experience unforeseen factors, and
therefore more likely to have high cost overrun. On the other hand, contracts that are more likely to exhibit
pattern ‘A’ were found to be more likely to experience low letting costs, which indicates that such contracts
were straightforward construction activities that were less likely to experience unforeseen factors and costs.
The variability in the probability of escalation pattern ‘B’ was also found to have an impact on the
probability of cost overruns. As the variability in the probability of pattern ‘B’ increases, contracts were
found to be less likely to experience negative cost overruns of less than -10%. This is because, as the
variability in probability of pattern ‘B’ increases, the uncertainty associated with unforeseen costs that
result in escalation pattern ‘B’ increases. Contract types that experience high variability in the probability
to exhibit pattern ‘B’ may or may not experience pattern ‘B’ because contracts of such types may or may
not experience unforeseen costs. This degree of uncertainty surrounding the occurrence of unforeseen costs
is indicative of the uncertainty associated with cost estimation. As a result, the probability of cost overrun
increases.

6.5.2.3. Impact of Geographic Location (Area Type)
Large (greater than $5M) pavement contracts in rural areas were found to be more likely to experience
negative cost overruns, while large pavement contracts in urban areas were found more likely to experience
positive overruns. Figure 6.29 presents a comparison of the mean probability of cost overruns greater than
10% for contracts of different sizes in urban and rural areas. Corresponding to each contract size, the mean
probability of overruns, across contracts on all highway functional classes, in urban and rural areas was
computed. The unit costs of labor, traffic management costs, and additional costs due to limited space on
construction sites are some of the factors that are generally responsible for higher construction costs in
urban areas.
Figure 6.30 compares the mean probability of overrun across urban and rural area contracts in
each district. The mean probability of having a planning cost overrun exceeding 10% is marginally higher
for urban area contracts. However, these contracts have a relatively higher upper limit of 95% confidence
interval of the mean probability, which indicates that some urban area pavement contracts are likely to
experience high cost overruns.
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MEAN PROBABILITY OF
OVERRUN > 10%

PROPOSED COST ($ MILLIONS)

Figure 6.29: Comparison of Mean Probability of Planning Stage Cost Overrun Across Urban and Rural
Area Contracts by Contract Size

MEAN PROBABILITY OF
OVERRUN > 10%
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Crawfordsville Fort Wayne

Greenfield
Urban

Laporte

Seymour

Vincennes

Rural

Figure 6.30: Comparison of Mean Probability of Planning Stage Cost Overrun Across Urban and Rural
Area Contracts in Each District
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6.5.2.4. Impact of Contract Classification (Standalone vs. Kin)
Kin pavement contracts were found to be more likely to experience letting stage cost overruns exceeding
10%, as compared to stand-alone contracts. Figure 6.31 presents a comparison of the mean probability of
letting stage cost overruns greater than 10% by contract classification and administrative district. Across all
six districts, the probability of a letting stage cost overrun was greater for kin contracts. The variability in
the probability of cost overruns greater than 10% was also analyzed to study the difference in the
propensity of stand-alone and kin contracts to experience cost overrun. The overlap of the 95% confidence
intervals across all the districts, suggests that the mean probability of overruns greater than 10% is not
significantly different for kin and stand-alone contracts. However, the upper and lower limits of the
confidence interval indicate that kin contracts are more susceptible to high cost overruns.
MEAN PROBABILITY OF
OVERRUN > 10%
0.6

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Crawfordsville Fort Wayne

Greenfield
Kin

Laporte

Seymour

Vincennes

Standalone

Figure 6.31: Comparison of Mean Probability of Letting Stage Cost Overrun Across Standalone and Kin
Contracts in each District

6.5.2.5. Impact of Geographic Location (District)
A comparison of the mean probability of cost overrun greater than 10% across the districts indicated that
contracts in Seymour district were marginally more likely to have a cost overrun of greater than 10%
compared to contracts in other districts. In particular, for less than $3 million pavement contracts, the
probability of having a cost overrun greater than 10% was higher for Seymour district contracts compared
to contracts in other districts. Seymour district is more urbanized compared to the districts of
Crawfordsville, Fort Wayne, and Vincennes which was one of the reasons why contracts in this district
were found to be more likely to have a cost overrun exceeding 10% compared to other districts. However,
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other urbanized districts of Greenfield and Laporte were not found to be significantly different than the less
urbanized districts. This indicated that factors other than the urbanized nature of the Seymour district were
responsible for the relatively higher tendency of contracts in this district to experience cost overrun.

6.5.2.6. Impact of Highway Functional Class
The contracts on urban Interstates, freeways, and expressways were found more likely to experience
negative cost overrun of less than -10%. The contracts on these highways were also found more likely to
exhibit pattern ‘A’ (refer to Figure 6.27) and less likely to exhibit pattern ‘B’ compared to other highways,
which explains their tendency to have a negative cost overrun. Interstate contracts possibly involved less
traffic management costs, as they were either partially closed to traffic or underwent pavement work during
non-peak hours. Also, it is likely that pavement work on Interstates was completed faster, due to more
consistent and less unforeseen site conditions.
PROBABILITY OF
OVERRUN < -- 10%

PROPOSED COST ($ MILLIONS)

Figure 6.32: Comparison of Mean Probability of Planning Stage Cost Overrun Across Highway Functional
Classes by Contract Size
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6.5.2.7. Impact of Changes in Cost Estimates
The probability of design stage cost overruns decreases with increases in the percentage difference between
design cost and proposed cost. The percentage difference between design cost and proposed cost was also
found to be a significant factor in determining the probability of a letting stage cost overrun. It was found
that as design cost exceeds the proposed cost, the probability of experiencing a high letting stage cost
overrun increases. An increase in the design cost relative to proposed cost indicates that unforeseen costs
were identified during the development of the design plans. As a result, the accuracy of the design estimate
improves. On the other hand, an increase in the design cost compared to proposed cost can also be due to
scope changes. As the project scope is enhanced and the project becomes bigger, the tendency to
experience competition at letting stage increases. As a result, contractors may bid low which would
increase the probability of a letting stage cost overrun.
The probability of experiencing a letting stage cost underrun was found to increase with an
increase in the percentage difference between letting cost and proposed cost. As letting cost increases
relative to the proposed cost, it tends to evolve into a more conservative estimate of the construction cost,
and therefore the probability of letting stage cost overrun decreases and the probability of an underrun
increases.

6.5.2.8. Impact of Time between Final Design Completion and Project Proposal
Large time durations between project proposal and final design completion result in a higher tendency to
experience design and letting stage cost overruns. A long time span suggests that the design process was
complicated, many scope changes were made, or the contract is being constructed on a large scale.
Complex designs and large contracts are generally more likely to experience constructability problems, and
hence cost overrun. This explains the increase in the probability of design and letting stage cost overruns
with increases in time duration.

6.5.3.

Magnitude of Cost Overrun

Table 6.18 presents the expected value of planning, design, and letting stage cost overrun by cost overrun
category. The magnitude of cost overrun is determined by using the conditional probability principle, as for
expansion and bridge contracts. Pavement contracts were expected to have low planning design and letting
stage cost overruns. Large pavement contracts (greater than $5M) were found to have negative planning
and design stage cost overruns, while smaller pavement contracts were found to have comparatively higher
(between 0% and 10%) planning and design stage cost overruns. The average letting stage cost overrun was
found to be marginally higher for large pavement contracts (5-10%) compared to small pavement contracts
(0-5%), indicating that at the letting stage, lower bids for large contracts are received.
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Table 6.18: Expected Value of Cost Overrun for Pavement Contracts by Cost Overrun Category
Cost Overrun Category
Cost
Overrun
Type

CONTRACTS

CONTRACTS

CONTRACTS

CONTRACTS

WHERE

WHERE

WHERE

WHERE

Weighted

Y1 < −10%

−10% ≤ Y1 < 0%

0% ≤ Y1 ≤ 10%

Y1 > 10%

Average

Planning
Stage

Average: -27 %
Contracts: 58
C.I: [-31%, -24%]

Average: -3.43%
Contracts: 45
C.I: [-4.4%, -2.5%]

Average: 3.36%
Contracts: 56
C.I: [2.6%, 4.1%]

Average: 38 %
Contracts: 80
C.I: [32%, 44%]

Average: 6.4%
Contracts: 239
C.I: [2.5%, 10.2%]

Design
Stage

Average: -23 %
Contracts: 66
C.I: [-26%, -21%]

Average: -3.1%
Contracts: 52
C.I: [-3.9%, -2.4%]

Average: 3.5%
Contracts: 50
C.I: [2.7%, 4.3%]

Average: 35%
Contracts: 71
C.I: [29%, 41%]

Average: 4%
Contracts: 239
C.I:[0.5%,7%]

Letting
Stage

Average: -16 %
Contracts: 11
C.I:[-19%,-12%]

Average: - 4%
Contracts: 27
C.I: [-5%, -2.9%]

Average: 2.7%
Contracts: 138
C.I: [2.1%, 3.2%]

Average: 21%
Contracts: 63
C.I: [18%, 24%]

Average: 5.9%
Contracts: 239
C.I:[4.4%,7.4%]

6.6. Econometric Models for Comparing Letting and Proposed Cost
Econometric models were developed using the proposed methodology to compare the cost estimates. The
models helped to identify the contracts for which letting cost is significantly higher or lower than the
proposed cost. Tables 6.19–6.21 present the models for expansion, bridge, and pavement contracts,
respectively. Based on the sensitivity analysis, it was found that the letting cost is generally lower than the
proposed cost by 0-10% for contracts in all work categories. Large expansion contracts (greater than $10
M) were found to be more likely to have lower letting cost compared to proposed cost, opposes opposed to
small expansion contracts.
Table 6.19: Model to Determine Overrun of Letting Cost Compared to Proposed Cost, Expansion Contracts
Overrun
< -10%

Contract Specific Factor

Coeff.

Std.Err.

t-ratio

Seymour and Vincennes Districts in South Indiana

1.7068

0.6745

2.53

Probability of Pattern 'B'

-8.7610

3.4968

-2.51

Square of Proposed Cost (in $ millions)

0.0019

0.0012

1.64

Rural Principal Arterial

1.1347

0.5462

2.08

-1.4403

0.7526

-1.91

Urban Districts of Seymour, Greenfield and Laporte

0.6221

0.4126

1.51

Crawfordsville and Greenfield Districts in Central Indiana

-2.2946

0.9146

-2.51

Proposed Cost between $1 M -$ 2M

2.0807

1.1871

1.75

Constant

-1.9431

0.6316

-3.08

Vincennes District

2.3284

1.0823

2.15

[-10%, 0%] Greenfield District

[0%, 10%]
>10%
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The probability of experiencing a lower letting cost relative to the proposed cost was found to
increase with larger bridge contract sizes. Large pavement contracts (greater than $5M) were found more
likely to experience a lower letting cost compared to proposed cost, as opposed to small pavement
contracts. More results corresponding to the comparison of letting cost with proposed cost are summarized
in Appendix A.
Table 6.20: Model to Determine Overrun of Letting Cost Compared to Proposed Cost, Bridge Contracts
Overrun
<-10%

Contract Specific Factor

Coeff.

Std.Err.

t-ratio

P-value

Probability of Pattern 'B'

-4.3647

2.5941

-1.68

0.09

Proposed Cost ($ Millions)

0.4103

0.1847

2.22

0.03

Non-NHS Highway

1.5649

0.5995

2.61

0.01

Constant

3.6267

0.7834

4.63

0.00

-1.2815

0.5024

-2.55

0.01

Probability of Pattern 'b'

-6.6929

2.2536

-2.97

0.00

Variability in Probability of Pattern 'C'

15.2867

4.5225

3.38

0.00

State Roads

0.9244

0.6020

1.54

0.12

Urban Interstates and Expressways

5.0596

1.4881

3.40

0.00

Probability of Pattern 'A'

-4.5001

1.9997

-2.25

0.02

Rural Minor Arterial

2.8171

1.4809

1.90

0.06

[-10%, 0%] U.S. Highway

[0%, 10%]

>10%

Table 6.21: Model to Determine Overrun of Letting Cost Compared to Proposed Cost, Pavement Contracts
Overrun

Contract Specific Factor

Coeff.

Std.Err.

t-ratio

P-value

-28.7780

5.2123

-5.52

0.00

Logarithm of Proposed Cost (in $)

2.0747

0.3617

5.74

0.00

Urban Arterials and Collectors

-1.0555

0.5094

-2.07

0.04

Variability in Probability of Escalation Pattern 'B'

-31.4144

12.0364

-2.61

0.01

Proposed Cost > $10 M

-2.4762

0.9550

-2.59

0.01

-0.7617

0.4025

-1.89

0.06

-1.7341

0.9739

-1.78

0.07

Rural Minor Arterial

0.7942

0.3650

2.18

0.03

Proposed Cost between $1 M -$ 2M

-0.8477

0.2960

-2.86

0.00

Probability of Pattern 'A'

-1.8193

0.5631

-3.23

0.00

Constant

<-10%

[-10%, 0%] Crawfordsville District
Probability of Pattern 'B'
[0%, 10%]
>10%
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6.7. Conclusions
The developed methodology was used to carry out a risk-based econometric analysis for expansion,
pavement, and bridge contracts in Indiana. Econometric models were calibrated to describe the relationship
of escalation pattern, planning, design, and letting stage cost overruns with contract-specific factors. The
contracts that are more likely to experience a cost overrun were identified and the relationships suggested
by cost overrun trends (presented in Chapter 4) in Indiana, were statistically validated using the developed
models. It was demonstrated that the proposed methodology (in Chapter 4) can be used to developed riskbased econometric analysis frameworks for identification of contracts susceptible to cost overrun. Contracts
that are more likely to have unfavorable escalation patterns and are more likely to experience high cost
overrun can be identified by other highway agencies by developing similar frameworks.
A summary of the findings and the impact of contract-specific factors on the probability and
magnitude of cost overrun is provided in Appendix A. A Cost Overrun Analysis Software was developed
for Indiana that incorporates the developed risk-based econometric models for expansion, bridge, and
pavement contracts. The software can be used by INDOT in the future to conduct the analysis presented in
this Chapter. Moreover, the software can also be used by INDOT to identify the contracts that are currently
being planned and are likely to experience cost overrun. Chapter 7 describes the features and the working
of the software.
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CHAPTER 7. COST OVERRUN ANALYSIS SOFTWARE

7.1 Introduction
A software tool was developed for Indiana to help the state highway agency estimate the probability and
magnitude of a cost overrun for a contract on the basis of its characteristics. The estimated probability and
magnitude of cost overrun can be compared across a set of contracts, and the ones that are more likely to
experience cost overrun can be identified. This chapter presents the software modules, framework, and an
example to demonstrate the working of the software and the process of estimating the probability and
magnitude of cost overrun.

7.2 Software Modules
The software has three modules. Figure 7.1 presents a flowchart that describes the working of the software
and the flow of information from one module to another. First, a list of contracts that to be compared is
prepared. The three modules are then run one by one for each contract in the list. For each contract,
information on contract-specific factors is specified as input. Module I is run to determine the probability
and the variability in probability of an escalation pattern. The multinomial logit models presented in
Chapter 6 for expansion, bridge, and pavement contracts are used to determine the probability of escalation
pattern depending upon the work type of the contract being analyzed. A Monte Carlo simulation is
conducted to calculate the variability in the probability of an escalation pattern. The risk that the given
contract type will exhibit a particular escalation pattern is determined by calculating the mean, standard
deviation, and 95% confidence interval of the probability of an escalation pattern. Next, Module II is run to
determine probability of a planning, design, or letting stage cost overrun (as specified by the user). The
contract-specific factors and the risk of occurrence of an escalation pattern are used as an input in the
Module II models. In order to determine the variability in the probability of overrun, Monte Carlo
simulation is conducted. The mean, standard deviation and 95% confidence interval of the probability of
cost overrun are determined based on the Monte Carlo simulation runs. Module III is run to determine the
magnitude of cost overruns based on the probability of occurrence of each cost overrun category (as
computed using Module II). The conditional probability principle is used to calculate the magnitude of cost
overrun. The conditional probability principle uses the probability of cost overrun categories and the
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magnitude of overrun corresponding to each category, so as to determine the expected magnitude of cost
overrun.
The modules are run for all the contracts in the list until the end of list is reached. The results
corresponding to probability of escalation patterns, probability of cost overrun, and magnitude of cost
overrun are stored in an Excel file for further analysis. Further analysis is conducted to compare the
propensity of contracts to exhibit a particular escalation pattern and to experience a cost overrun. The
contracts that are most likely to experience increasing costs and high cost overruns are identified based on
this comparison.
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Prepare list of Contracts that
have to be compared so as to
identify the ones most
susceptible to cost overrun

Select a Contract Type

Specify Work Category

Specify Other Contract Specific Factors

Module I
Determine Probability of Escalation Patterns. Also,
Determine Variability in Probability of Escalation
Patterns Using Monte Carlo Simulation

Module II
Determine Occurrence Probability of Cost Overrun Categories.
Also, Determine Variability in Occurrence Probability of Cost
Overrun Categories Using Monte Carlo Simulation

Module III:
Use, (a) Probability of Cost Overrun Category, and
(b) Expected Value of Magnitude of Cost Overrun for each cost overrun
Category,
To Calculate Magnitude of Cost Overrun

End of List?

No

Yes

Compare Probability and Magnitude of Cost Overrun Across
All Contract Types
Figure 7.1: Flowchart Depicting the Working of Cost Overrun Analysis Software
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7.3 Interface and Software Framework
The software provides the user with three options to compare a set of contract types and consequently to
identify the ones with high positive and negative cost overruns. Figure 7.2 shows the front page interface of
the software with the three options.

Figure 7.2: Front Page Interface Showing the Features of the Cost Overrun Analysis Software
a.

Option 1: Select the criteria to define the contract types

Using this option, the user can define the contract types to be compared based on criteria such as the
geographic location (district), highway functional class, area type, work category, contract size, and
contract letting strategy. The option is used when it is desired to study the trends in cost overrun due to
variation in these contract-specific factors. Figure 7.3 shows the user interface that provides the options to
select the criteria to compare contracts based on a planning stage cost overrun. For example, contracts
across all districts, highway functional classes, work categories, and contract sizes ranging from $1M to
$20M can be compared by selecting the appropriate criterion. When contracts have to be compared on the
basis of the design and letting stage cost overruns, additional criteria are used such as: a) time duration
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between design and project proposal, b) time duration between letting and project proposal, c) percentage
difference between design and proposed cost, and d) percentage difference between letting and proposed
cost.

Figure 7.3: Select Criteria to Define Contract Types for Comparison Based on Planning Cost Stage
Overrun
b.

Option 2: Read pre-defined contract types from a file

This option allows the user to compare the tendency towards cost overruns across pre-defined contract
types that are being planned, designed, or are scheduled for letting. If the accuracy of the proposed cost has
to be compared the ‘planning stage cost overrun’ tab is selected (Figure 7.4). Information available at the
planning stage is read for each contract type from a file. The information that is required includes: work
category, district, highway functional class, area type, NHS status, kin vs. stand-alone contracts, and
proposed cost (in $Million). If the accuracy of final design estimate has to be compared, the ‘design stage
cost overrun’ tab is selected. Information available at the design stage is read for each contract type. This
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includes the information available at the planning stage plus the time duration from planning to final design
and the percentage difference between design estimate and proposed cost. If the accuracy of letting cost has
to be compared, the ‘letting stage cost overrun’ tab is selected. Information in addition to that read at the
design stage is read from a file. Additional information includes: time duration from planning to letting and
percentage difference between letting and proposed cost.

Figure 7.4: Reading Contract Types from a File for Comparison Based on Planning Cost Stage Overrun
c.

Option 3: For each contract type, manually specify contract characteristics and determine cost overrun

This option allows the user to compare contract types by estimating the cost overrun for each contract type,
one by one. It allows the user to manually enter the data corresponding to a contract type. By selecting this
option, the user is taken through each of the three modules of the software that are used for determining:
a) probability of escalation pattern (Module I), b) probability of cost overrun (Module II), and c) magnitude
of cost overrun (Module III). Figures 7.5-7.7 present the inputs that the user is required to provide when
this option is selected, in order to determine the planning, design, and letting stage cost overruns,
respectively. This option allows the user to track the workings of the software by going through each
module one by one. Options 1 and 2, on the other hand, determine the cost overrun for all the specified
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contract types and stored them in a file without allowing the user to analyze the results at the end of each
module. The results of each module are presented for the contract type corresponding to which information
was entered. The process is repeated for all the contracts that the user wishes to analyze.

Figure 7.5: Entering Contract-Specific Factors to Determine Planning Stage Cost Overrun

Figure 7.6: Entering Contract-Specific Factors to Determine Design Stage Cost Overrun
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Figure 7.7: Entering Contract-Specific Factors to Determine Letting Stage Cost Overrun

7.4 Example – Identifying Contracts Susceptible to Cost Overrun
Irrespective of the option that is selected (1, 2, or 3), the three modules of the software are run to compute
the probability of an escalation pattern, probability of cost overrun, and the magnitude of cost overrun,
respectively. When options 1 or 2 are selected, the modules are run, one after the other, once for each
contract type, in the list of contract types that are desired to be compared. For example, INDOT may plan
to implement 15 expansion contracts during the next ten years (say 2010-2020) for which an estimate of the
construction cost has been prepared for all the contracts at the planning stage (proposed cost). The agency
is then looking to identify the contracts that are more relatively susceptible to cost overrun. Table 7.1
presents the information on contract-specific factors corresponding to the hypothetical contracts.
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Table 7.1: A List of 15 Hypothetical Expansion Contracts
Contract
ID

District

Area
Type

Route Type

1

Greenfield

Rural

State Road

2

Greenfield

Rural

Interstate

3

Greenfield

Urban

Interstate

4

Greenfield

Rural

U.S. Road

5

Seymour

Rural

U.S. Road

6

Seymour

Rural

Interstate

7

Seymour

Urban

State Road

8

Seymour

Urban

Interstate

9

Laporte

Urban

State Road

10

Laporte

Rural

State Road

11

Laporte

Urban

U.S. Road

12

Crawfordsville

Urban

U.S. Road

13

Crawfordsville

Rural

Interstate

14

Fort Wayne

Urban

U.S. Road

15

Vincennes

Rural

Interstate

Functional
Class
Rural Minor
Arterial
Rural Interstate
Urban
Interstate
Rural Principal
Arterial
Rural Principal
Arterial
Rural Interstate
Rural Principal
Arterial
Urban
Interstate
Urban Other
Principal
Arterial
Rural Minor
Arterial
Urban Freeway
/ Expressway
Urban Freeway
/ Expressway
Urban
Interstate
Urban Other
Principal
Arterial
Rural Interstate

NHS Status

Proposed
Cost
($
Million)

Non-NHS

6

Interstate

11

Interstate

15

Non-Interstate
NHS
Non-Interstate
NHS
Interstate

5.5

Non-NHS

8

Interstate

10

Non-NHS

6

Non-NHS

4

Non-Interstate
NHS
Non-Interstate
NHS

7
3

5
8

Interstate

9

Non-Interstate
NHS

3.5

Interstate

2

Module I of the software is run to determine the probability of occurrence of escalation patterns
‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘D’. Figure 6.8 presents a plot of the mean probability of the four escalation patterns. A
detailed analysis of the propensity of each contract type to exhibit pattern ‘B’ (increasing cost trend) is
presented in Figure 6.9. It is found that contracts 1, 2, 3, and 7 are most likely to experience an increasing
trend of cost from planning to final construction.
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Figure 7.8: Probability of Occurrence of Escalation Pattern for the Hypothetical Contracts

Figure 7.9: Probability of Occurrence of Escalation Pattern ‘B’ and its Variability
Module II of the software is run to determine the probability of planning stage cost overrun. The
objective is to identify the contracts that are most likely to have an inaccurate estimate of proposed cost.
Figure 7.10 presents a plot of the probability of occurrence of cost overrun in each of the four cost overrun
categories. Contracts 1, 2, 3, and 7 were found more likely to experience a cost overrun of greater than 10%
compared to other contracts. The variability in the probability of occurrence of the four cost overrun
categories can be analyzed in the same way as the variability in the probability of escalation pattern (see
Figure 7.9). Module III of the software is used to determine the expected magnitude of cost overrun (Figure
7.11).
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Figure 7.11: Expected Cost Overrun for Hypothetical Contracts
By selecting option 3, the user is allowed to run the three modules for each contract type
individually, one at a time. This way the user is able to track the workings of the software and the flow of
information from one module to another as described in Figure 7.1. For example, say option 3 is selected
and the contract specific factors for contract 3 in Table 7.1 are specified as follows (see Figure 7.5):

District: Greenfield; Area type: Urban; Work Category: Expansion; Functional Class:
Urban Interstate; Route type: Interstate; NHS Status: Interstate; Proposed Cost: $15 M.
The contract details are submitted by clicking on the “submit contract details” button (Figure 7.5),
then, Module I is run. Figure 7.12 shows the inputs to and output of Module I. The mean, standard
deviation, coefficient of variation, and 95% confidence interval of the probability of each escalation pattern
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is computed using Module I. The probability of each escalation pattern was calculated in two ways: the first
way is to use the calibrated multinomial logit models for determining the escalation pattern of expansion
contracts (as presented in Chapter 6) to determine the mean U-function values and probabilities
corresponding to each escalation pattern (these probabilities are shown under “Without Risk Analysis
(Using Mean U-function Values)” tab) and the second way is to use Monte Carlo Simulation to determine
the probability of each escalation pattern, so as to take into consideration the variability in the probability
of each escalation pattern across all the contracts of the type that is being analyzed here. A total of 100
simulation runs were done. The mean probability of each escalation pattern that was computed, based on all
the simulation runs, was found to converge to the mean probability of each escalation pattern that was
determined without conducting a Monte Carlo simulation. The mean probability, its standard deviation,
95% confidence interval, and coefficient of variation were calculated for each pattern and are shown under
the “With Risk Analysis (Based on Monte Carlo Simulation)” tab.
The results indicate that contracts of the specified type are likely to exhibit pattern ‘A’, 68% of the
time. However, the risk of cost overrun increases with pattern ‘B’ and the probability of pattern ‘B’ was
considerable (27%). The upper limit of the 95% confidence interval of this probability was 48%, which
further indicated that there is a chance that some of the contracts of the specified type will experience an
increasing trend in cost estimates due to unforeseen costs.

Figure 7.12: Interface Showing the Inputs and Results from Module 1
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Module II is run next by clicking on the “Run Module 2” button. Module II is used to calculate the
probability of cost overrun. Figure 7.13 presents the interface showing the inputs to and output of Module
II. The probability of cost overrun is computed using the planning stage cost overrun models for expansion
contracts, which were presented in Chapter 6. Monte Carlo simulation is conducted, as in Module I, to
determine the variability in the probability of cost overrun across all the contracts of the type that is being
analyzed here. It was found that the contracts of the specified type were significantly more likely to
experience cost overruns greater than 10%. The probability of overruns greater than 10% was found to be
75% and was likely to be between 52% and 98% for 95% of the contracts that are of the type that is being
analyzed here. However, it is important to note here that the multinomial logit models, that were presented
in chapter 6, were developed to identify contracts that were more likely to experience high cost overrun by
conducting a comparative analyses of a set of contract types. The developed models were more suitable to
study the impact of variations in the specified inputs on the probability of escalation pattern and on the
probability and magnitude of cost overrun. The predictions made using the developed models for planning
stage cost overrun are likely to be less reliable as the models McFadden R-squared values were low (0.15 0.25). However, the models developed for design stage and letting stage cost overrun had comparatively
higher R-squared values (0.20 –0.40). Despite the low R-squared value, the results in Figure 7.9 do provide
a reasonable estimate of the probability of cost overrun corresponding to the specified contract types.

Figure 7.13: Interface Showing the Inputs and Results from Module 2
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Module III is run next to determine the magnitude of cost overrun using the probability of cost
overrun computed in Module II. The magnitude of cost overrun is determined corresponding to each draw
of the Monte Carlo simulation that was conducted in Module II. The average magnitude of planning stage
cost overrun is calculated based on the magnitude of overrun in all the draws. The standard deviation,
coefficient of variation, and 95% confidence interval of the average are also computed. Figure 7.14
presents the interface that presents the results of Module III.

Figure 7.14: Interface Showing the Inputs and Results from Module 3

7.5 Chapter Summary
The Cost Overrun Analysis Software was presented in this chapter. The working of the three modules of
the software was demonstrated with the help of an example. The framework of the software was also
presented. The software can be used by highway agencies as a tool to identify the contract types that are
likely to experience high cost overrun, based on the trends seen for historical contracts. The use of the
software for predictive purposes is limited and is likely to give less reliable results. However, the estimated
cost overrun using the software provide planners and decision-makers with an approximate idea about the
expected cost overrun. Such information can be useful in establishing monetary amounts for contract
contingencies.
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CHAPTER 8.

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1. Summary
8.1.1.

Background

Highway construction costs are estimated at several stages during the project cycle. The first estimate is
prepared at the planning stage, followed by the engineer’s assessment, design estimates, engineer’s
estimate, and letting cost. A comprehensive literature review was conducted on highway construction cost
overruns. It was found that most of the highway agencies focused on the comparison of final and letting
costs. However, the overrun of the final cost relative to the design estimate, engineer’s estimate, or
proposed cost has been rarely studied. More importantly, the pattern of escalation of the cost estimate from
one stage to another during the planning and development phase received little or no attention. Highway
agencies resorted to calculating cost overruns using simple averages for contracts within their jurisdiction
as means to measure the severity of final cost overrun with respect to the letting cost. This approach often
results in serious underestimation of construction cost overruns. This is because large positive cost overruns
(>10%) are often compensated by large negative cost overruns (< -10%), resulting in a simple average of
zero. To resolve the issue, some highway agencies have started to look at the distribution of cost overruns,
taking into account factors, such as change orders, unforeseen site conditions, and inflation that may be
responsible for cost overruns. However, there is still a huge vacuum in research and practice as
transportation planners and decision-makers need a tool that can help them identify contracts that are likely
to experience cost overruns. Knowledge about the inaccuracy of the estimates prepared at various stages of
planning and development phase allows planners to plan appropriately by readjusting contingency amounts
and planning risk-prone contracts in efficient ways.

8.1.2.

Contribution

8.1.2.1. Methodology for the Analysis of Construction Costs
Most agencies do not have a methodological framework to identify projects where final cost is likely to
exceed the cost estimate, or where the cost estimate is likely to exceed the final cost. This study proposes a
methodology consisting of a risk-based econometric analysis framework that can be used to analyze the
escalation pattern of the cost estimates from planning stage to final construction and to determine the
probability and magnitude of cost overruns. Cost overrun is determined on the basis of a comparison of the
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final cost with any one of the cost estimates prepared at a prior stage. Those contracts that are more likely
to experience an increasing trend of cost estimates and are more likely to experience high cost overrun can
be identified using the risk-based econometric analysis framework. The proposed framework comprises
three modules.
Module I comprises models that can be used to determine the probability that for a given contract,
the cost estimates across the entire project development cycle will exhibit a particular escalation pattern.
Information on contract-specific factors that are available during the planning and development phase is
required for determining the probability of escalation pattern. Such factors include: work category
(expansion, bridge, pavement), geographic location (district and area type), highway functional class, NHS
status (NHS, Non-NHS), route type (Interstate, U.S. highway, State Road), contract size (based on
proposed cost), and contract classification as a stand-alone or kin contract. These contract-specific factors
define a contract type. In practice, several contracts can have these characteristics. In order to take into
account the variability in the probability of an escalation pattern across the contracts of a particular type, a
Monte Carlo simulation approach is used in this study. The coefficients of the models, that are used to
determine the required functions, are multivariate, normal-distributed, therefore, the functions are also
multivariate, normal-distributed. In each draw of Monte Carlo simulation the functions of the escalation
patterns are drawn from the multivariate normal distribution. The probabilities of the escalation patterns are
determined using the randomly drawn functions. The risk that the given contract type will exhibit a
particular escalation pattern is determined by calculating the mean, standard deviation, and 95% confidence
interval of the probability of an escalation pattern. The escalation pattern of the construction cost estimates
has not been analyzed in past studies and the proposed approach to determine the risk associated with
occurrence of an escalation pattern has also been used rarely, if at all, in the field of transportation
engineering.
Module II comprises models that use information on contract-specific factors and the risk that a
contract type will exhibit a particular escalation pattern to determine the probability of cost overrun.
Therefore, the models in this module use a combination of deterministic and random independent variables
to identify the contract types that are most likely to experience high positive and negative cost overruns. In
order to take into account the variability in the probability of overrun across the contracts of a particular
type, the Monte Carlo simulation approach was used to determine the mean, standard deviation, and 95%
confidence interval of the probability of overrun. Since the models in Module II take into account the risk
of an escalation pattern to determine the probability of overrun, they are referred to as risk-based
econometric models, and consequently the developed framework has been referred to as the risk-based
econometric analysis framework.
Module III is used to determine the magnitude of cost overrun based on the probability of cost
overrun greater than 10%, between 0% and 10%, between -10% and 0%, and less than -10% (as computed
using Module II models). The use of the conditional probability principle has been proposed to calculate the
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magnitude of cost overruns. The conditional probability concept involves the use of the probability of
overrun in each cost overrun category and the magnitude of overrun, corresponding to each category, so as
to determine the expected magnitude of cost overrun. Statistical models or simple averages can be used to
determine the magnitude of overrun corresponding to each category, depending upon the extent of
variability in the data.

8.1.2.2. Application of Proposed Methodology
The proposed methodology was used to develop a risk-based econometric analysis framework for Indiana.
Risk-based multinomial logit models were developed to compare the escalation pattern of the cost
estimates across contract types (Module I) and to identify contracts that are likely to experience high cost
overrun (Modules II and III). Separate models were developed for different work categories. Corresponding
to each work category, models were developed to analyze planning stage cost overrun (final cost vs.
proposed cost), design stage cost overrun (final cost vs. design cost), and letting stage cost overrun (final
cost vs. letting cost). The proposed methodology was also used to compare letting cost with the proposed
cost, to identify the contracts that are likely to have a high percentage difference between the two estimates.
A software tool was developed for Indiana based on the developed models. The tool was used to
compare contract types in Indiana and to determine the ones with unfavorable escalation patterns and high
planning, design, and letting stage cost overruns. The variability in the probability of escalation pattern and
the probability and magnitude of cost overrun across contracts of the same type, were also determined by
conducting a Monte Carlo simulation using the software tool.

8.2. Conclusions
The study develops and applies a methodology for risk–based econometric analysis to identify contracts
that are likely to experience unfavorable escalation patterns and high cost overruns. The framework was
developed for expansion, bridge, and pavement contracts in Indiana. Specifically, the framework identifies
contracts that were likely to experience planning, design, and letting stage cost overruns, based on the
contract-specific factors and the probability that the contract exhibits a particular escalation pattern.
Appendix A presents the contract types that were identified as those that are likely to experience high cost
overrun on the basis of contract-specific factors.
Factors that were found to affect the probability and magnitude of cost overrun in Indiana
included: contract work category, size, geographic location, highway functional class, route type, NHS
status, contract classification, time duration between final design completion and project proposal, time
duration between letting and project proposal, percentage difference between design estimate and proposed
cost, percentage difference between letting and proposed cost, the probability of a contract type to exhibit a
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particular escalation pattern, and the variability in the probability to exhibit a particular escalation pattern.
Information on these factors is available during the planning and development phase. Appropriate decisions
can be taken and contingencies can be allocated before the start of construction, for the contract types that
are found likely to experience high risk of cost overrun.

8.3. Recommendations for Future Work
8.3.1.

Data Quality

In the present study, historical contract data were acquired from the INDOT Management Information
Portal. The recorded construction cost estimates were those prepared at the planning, design, and letting
stages of the historical contracts. Hence, the recorded estimates were costs in current dollars. However,
when these costs were inflated to the year of construction for each contract type, it was found that the
inflated costs were significantly higher than the final construction cost for 80% of the contracts. This
implied that if inflation was to be taken into consideration, the prepared cost estimates would be overestimated. This seems contrary to the popular belief that costs are underestimated. It is likely that there is
an implicit adjustment for inflation during the planning and development phase. For example, if the unit
averages were used to prepare the estimates, it is likely that the unit averages were determined based on the
final cost of historical contracts that had experienced inflation. On the other hand, it is also likely that the
recorded cost estimates were prepared in the construction year dollars. This could particularly be true for
design and letting costs. More information on the data such as the methods used for the preparation of the
estimates can provide additional insights in cost overrun analysis studies.
The proposed cost (planning stage estimate) and the engineer’s assessment cost (post
programming stage estimate), that were recorded from the Management Information Portal, were not found
to be significantly different from each other. The design estimate was also found to be very close to these
estimates for most of the contracts. The similarity of these cost estimates raises the issue of data quality.
A larger database of historical contracts with appropriate cost information can provide more
validity and credibility to the developed models. Also, information on additional variables such as
population, number of bids at letting stage, and specific type of construction activities that were identified
during the design stage can also help in improving the developed models. Additional information from the
planning and development phase should be retained and maintained in the form of a database to provide
further insights.
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8.3.2.

Development of Risk-based Econometric Framework

The developed econometric analysis framework for expansion, pavement, and bridge contracts comprises
of multinomial logit models for determining the escalation pattern and probability of cost overrun. As more
data becomes available about the contract-specific factors that are available during the planning and
development phase, better models with higher McFadden R-squared values could be developed. Also, as
more observations about the contracts become available (the present study used 419 contracts), the models
that are developed will cover a wide range of cost overrun behavior.
The models developed in the present study for determining the probability of cost overrun, were
developed on the basis of deterministic contract-specific factors and random variables, such as the
probability of escalation pattern and the variability in the escalation pattern probability. This approach can
be used in the future to determine the probability of cost overrun as a function of other random variables
that are not available during the planning and development phase but are estimated using statistical models.
For example, the time duration from project proposal to design completion and the time duration from
project proposal to letting can be estimated using duration models, and the predicted values can be used as
independent variables in the cost overrun models. This methodology allows planners and decision-makers
to model the probability of cost overrun as a function of the risk associated with experiencing a large time
duration between project proposal and letting or between project proposal and design completion.

8.3.3.

Development of Cost Overrun Analysis Software

The Cost Overrun Analysis Software that was developed in the present study can be further improved for
increased user-friendliness and self-sufficiency. The current version of the software creates a Microsoft
Access file and writes all the results in the file. The file needs to be imported in Excel or other data analysis
software to analyze the computed probabilities of cost overruns across the set of contract types. That is, the
current version of the software cannot be used to plot graphs and conduct statistical analysis of the
probabilities of cost overrun. It calculates the probability and magnitude of cost overrun but graphical
analysis has to be done in other software (such as Excel, Access or SAS). In addition to the capability to
draw graphs, the current version of the software can be made more user-friendly by allowing the user to
update the statistical models without having to go into the source. Further, the software can be developed to
be able to calibrate models instead of requiring the user to calibrate the models and update those that are
presently embedded into the software. Statistical models in the software need to be updated periodically (23 years), as the relationship between the contract-specific factors and the cost overrun may change due to
changes in the way contracts are planned, managed, estimated, and constructed.
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

Contract Types Experiencing Cost Overrun / Underrun in Indiana
Planning stage cost overrun

Design Stage cost Overrun

Letting Stage Cost Overrun

(Final Cost vs. Proposed Cost)

(Final Cost vs. Design Cost)

(Final Cost vs. Letting Cost)

Letting Cost vs. Proposed Cost

FACTORS AFFECTING COST OVERRUN

More likely to have overruns. Probability of

Contracts less than $15 M more likely to have
Expansion

overrun between -10% and 0%. Contracts
greater than $15 M more likely

Contracts less than $20M more likely to have

overrun between 0% and 5% marginally

overrun between -10% and 0%. Contracts greater

higher than the probability of overrun greater

than $20 M more likely to have overrun > 10%

than 10%. Average overrun increases with

to have overrun > 10%.

Contract Size

Bridge

increase in contract size.

Contracts greater than $2 M more likely

Contracts greater than $3 M more likely to have

to have overrun between 0% and 10%.

overrun between 0% and 10%. Contracts

Contracts less than $2 M more likely to have

less than $2 M more likely to have overrun

overrun between -10% and 0%

between -10% and 0%

0% and 5%. Magnitude of overrun
increases with increase in contract size
More likely to experience positive cost overruns

Contracts greater than $5 M More likely to
Pavement

More likely to have overruns between

have overrun < -10%. Contracts less than
$5 M more likely to experience
overrun > 10%

Contracts greater than $5 M More likely to have

between 0% and 10%. Contracts greater

overrun < -10%. Contracts less than $5 M more

than $5 M have average overrun between

likely to experience overrun > 10%.

5% and 10%. Contracts less than $5 M have
average overrun between 3-4%.

Letting Cost tends to be lower than the
Proposed Cost by 0-10%. Large Contracts
(>$10M) more likely to have a lower letting
cost compared to small contracts.
Letting Cost tends to be lower than the
Proposed Cost by 0-10%. As Contract size
increases, the probability of letting cost
being lower than proposed cost increases.
Letting cost likely to be higher than
proposed cost for less than $5M contracts.
Greater than $5 M Contracts more likely to
have a lower letting cost.

Contract Types Experiencing Cost Overrun / Underrun in Indiana
Planning stage cost overrun

Design Stage cost Overrn

Letting Stage Cost Overrun

(Final Cost vs. Proposed Cost)

(Final Cost vs. Design Cost)

(Final Cost vs. Letting Cost)

Letting Cost vs. Proposed Cost

FACTORS AFFECTING COST OVERRUN

Greenfield and Seymour districts more likely to

Contracts less than $15 M in Greenfield and

have overruns > 10%. The average cost overrun Seymour more likely to have cost overrun greater
District

Expansion

in these districts is expected to be higher than

than 10% compared to other districts. However

10% for greater than $5 M contracts. The

most of the contracts (< $15 M) in these districts

average overrun can go as high as 25% for

are likely to have overruns in the range of 0% to

contracts greater than $15 M. Crawfordsville 10%. Therefore, average overrun is expected to be

Greenfield and Seymour districts more likely to
have overruns > 10%. Average overrun in all

Laporte , Seymour and Greenfield Districts are

districts expected to be between 0% and 10%,

more likely to have lower letting costs (vs.

except FortWayne. Average overrun in Fort

proposed cost) compared to other districts.

Wayne is expected to be < 0%..
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district also likely to have cost overruns

around 10%. Greater than $15M contracts in

although not as high as Greenfield and

Crawfordsville and Vincennes districts likely to

Seymour.

have high cost overruns. Average cost overrun for
>$15 M contracts can be as high as 15% in
Crawfordsville and Vincennes districts.

Expected Average Overrun: Crawfordsville >
Vincennes ~ Fort Wayne ~ Seymour >>
Greenfield ~ Laporte Districts. Contracts >
$3M in Crawfordsville District more likely to
have cost overrun > 10% compared to similar
Bridge

contracts in other districts. Seymour,
FortWayne and Vincennes more likely to have
overrun between 0% and 10% compared to
other districts. Laporte and Greenfield more

Expected Average overrun: Seymour ~ Laporte >
Crawfordsville > Vincennes > Fortwayne >

Expected Average Overrun and the probability of

Greenfield. Contracts > $5M in Crawfordsville

overun >10% follows the following order:

Laporte > Seymour ~ Vincennes >

District more likely to have cost overrun > 10%.

Crawfordsville > Greenfield > Vincennes ~

Crawfordsville > FortWayne > Greenfield

Seymour and Vincennes more likely to have

Seymour > FortWayne > Laporte

overrun >10% for less than $5 M Contracts.

likely to have overrun < -10% compared to
other districts.
Seymour district marginally more likely to have
Pavement

Expected Average Cost Overrun and the

overrun > 10% compared to other districts.

Seymour more likely to have overrun > 10%,

probability of overrrun > 10% follows the

Other districts do not differ significantly from

followed by Greenfield and Laporte.

following order: Seymour > Vincennes ~ Fort

each other.

No Significant Difference

Wayne >> Greenfield > Laporte
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CONTRACT TYPES EXPERIENCING COST OVERRUN / UNDERRUN IN INDIANA

Planning stage cost overrun

Design Stage cost Overrn

Letting Stage Cost Overrun

(Final Cost vs. Proposed Cost)

(Final Cost vs. Design Cost)

(Final Cost vs. Letting Cost)

FACTORS AFFECTING COST OVERRUN

Urban and rural areas do not differ significantly from
each other with respect to their tendency to have
Expansion

positive cost overruns. However, urban areas were
found more likely to experience negative cost

Area Type

overruns < -10%

Urban and rural areas do not differ significantly from each
other with respect to their tendency to have positive cost
overruns. However, urban areas were found more likely to
experience negative cost overruns < -10%

Bridge
Pavement

Urban area contracts more likely to have high cost
overruns compared to rural area contracts
Contracts on Non-NHS highways more likely to have
high cost overruns. Contracts on Interstate and Non-

Expansion

Interstate NHS highways more likely to have negative
cost overruns > -10%. Average cost overruns
expected to be greater than 10% for large contracts (>

Contracts on Non-NHS highways more likely to have high
cost overruns (> 10%). Contracts on Interstate and NonInterstate NHS highways more likely to have negative cost

Non-NHS > Non-Interstate NHS ~ Interstate

overruns (<-10%)

$15 M) on Non-NHS highways.

NHS Status

Bridge

Interstate > Non-Interstate NHS > Non-NHS

Non-Interstate NHS > Interstate > Non-NHS

Contracts on Non-NHS highways more likely to have Contracts on Non-NHS highways more likely to have high
Pavement

high cost overruns. Contracts on Interstate and Non-

cost overruns. Contracts on Interstate and Non-Interstate

Interstate NHS highways more likely to have negative NHS highways more likely to have negative cost overruns <
cost overruns < -10%

-10%. .

Interstate > Non-NHS ~ Non-Interstate NHS

Contracts on Non-NHS highways more likely to
have high cost overruns followed by contracts on
Non-Interstate NHS and Interstate highways
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Contract Types Experiencing Cost Overrun / Underrun in Indiana
Planning stage cost overrun

Design Stage cost Overrn

Letting Stage Cost Overrun

(Final Cost vs. Proposed Cost)

(Final Cost vs. Design Cost)

(Final Cost vs. Letting Cost)

FACTORS AFFECTING COST OVERRUN

Kin contracts were more likely
Expansion

-

-

to experience a letting stage cost overrun
between 5-10%

Standalone vs. Kin

Bridge

-

-

Pavement

-

-

Expansion

-

Large Time Spans result in higher probability of cost

Large time spans result in higher probability of

overrun

cost overrun

Time Duration
Between Design
Completion and

Bridge

-

Pavement

-

Expansion
Bridge

Project Proposal

Large Time Spans result in higher probability of cost
overrun between 0-10%

Kin Contracts more likely to
experience cost overrun > 10%

Not Significant

Large Time Spans result in lower probability of

Large time spans result in higher probability of

negative cost overrun < -10%

cost overrun

-

-

Not Significant

-

-

Not Significant

Time Duration
Between Letting
and Project
Proposal

Large time spans result in lower probability of
Pavement

-

-

cost overrun between 0-5%. Probability of
higher cost overruns increases
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Contract Types Experiencing Cost Overrun / Underrun in Indiana
Planning stage cost overrun

Design Stage cost Overrun

Letting Stage Cost Overrun

(Final Cost vs. Proposed Cost)

(Final Cost vs. Design Cost)

(Final Cost vs. Letting Cost)

FACTORS AFFECTING COST OVERRUN

Expansion

-

Percentage difference
between Design and

Bridge

-

Proposed Cost

Pavement

-

As the design cost becomes higher than the proposed cost, the
probability of design stage cost overrun decreases

As the design cost becomes higher than the proposed
cost, the probability of letting stage cost overrun > 10%
increases

As the design cost becomes higher than the proposed cost, the

As the design cost becomes higher than the proposed

probability of design stage cost overrun decreases (probability of

cost, the probability of letting stage cost overrun

negative design stage cost overrun <-10% increases)

between 0-10% increases

As the design cost becomes higher than the proposed cost, the
probability of design stage cost overrun decreases

As the design cost becomes higher than the proposed
cost, the probability of letting stage cost overrun
between 0-5% increases
As the letting cost becomes higher than the proposed

Expansion

-

-

cost, the probability of negative letting stage cost
overrun < -10% increases

Percentage difference
between Letting and

As the letting cost becomes higher than the proposed
Bridge

-

-

Proposed Cost

overrun < -10% increases
Pavement

Expansion

Escalation Pattern

cost, the probability of negative letting stage cost

Bridge

Pavement

-

-

Not Significant

Contracts exhibiting Pattern 'B' more likely to experience cost overrun. Contracts exhibiting pattern 'A' more likely to experience cost underrun.
As Variability of Pattern 'B' increases, probability of cost overrun increases.
Contracts exhibiting Pattern 'B' more likely to experience cost overrun. Contracts exhibiting pattern 'A' more likely to experience cost underrun.
As Variability of Pattern 'B' increases, probability of cost overrun increases.
Contracts exhibiting Pattern 'B' more likely to experience cost overrun. Contracts exhibiting pattern 'A' more likely to experience cost underrun.
As Variability of Pattern 'B' increases, probability of cost overrun increases.
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